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This	   dissertation	   uses	   a	   systems	   thinking	   approach	   to	   investigate	   how	   current	   health	   system	  
frameworks	   conceive	   of	   universal	   coverage	   schemes	   and	   the	   conditions	   which	   led	   to	   their	  
implementation	   and	   sustainability.	   After	   reviewing	   the	   conceptual	   literature	   and	   using	   three	   case	  
studies;	  Cuba,	  Thailand	  and	  Rwanda	  –	  each	  of	  which	  have	   implemented	  universal	  health	   coverage	  
policies	   –	   it	   establishes	   that	   consideration	   of	   the	   contextual	   factors	   –	   the	   political	   and	   economic	  
factors	  that	  frame	  the	  health	  sector	  –	   is	  necessary	  to	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  health	  systems	  and	  
the	  likely	  outcomes	  of	  their	  reform.	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In	   2005,	   the	   58th	   session	   of	   the	  World	   Health	   Assembly	   at	   the	  World	   Health	   Organisation	   (WHO,	  
2005)	   adopted	   a	   resolution	   towards	   achieving	   universal	   health	   services	   coverage	   through	   health	  
financing	   systems.	   In	   this	   conception,	   all	   people	   would	   have	   access	   to	   necessary	   promotive,	  
preventive,	  curative	  and	  rehabilitative	  health	  services	  without	  risking	  financial	  catastrophe	  (Carrin	  et	  
al,	   2008)	   –	   an	   approach	   for	   advancing	   health	   equity	   which	   is	   central	   to	   the	   primary	   health	   care	  
philosophy,	  enunciated	  in	  the	  1978	  Alma	  Ata	  Declaration.	  
	  
Assessment	  of	  universal	  health	  coverage	  schemes	  have	  centred	  on	  the	  health	  system	  mechanisms	  
needed	   to	   carry	   out	   the	   reform	   initiative	   –	   adequate	   revenue	   collection,	   pooling	   of	   financial	  
resources	   to	   mitigate	   risk	   and	   purchasing	   of	   services.	   This	   assessment	   approach	   is	   informed	   by	  
current	   health	   systems	   frameworks.	   Such	   frameworks	   provide	   consistent	   definitions	   of	   the	   health	  
system	   and	   its	   components	   in	   order	   to	   generate	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   how	   the	   components	  
articulate	  to	  achieve	  health	  outcomes	  and	  how	  these	  can	  be	  strengthened	  to	  improve	  health	  system	  
performance	  (Sheikh	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	  growing	  global	  movement	   for	   implementation	  of	  universal	  health	   coverage,	   there	  has	  
been	   little	  assessment	  of	  what	  determines	  the	  successful	   implementation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  this	  
reform	  initiative.	  	  
	  
This	  dissertation	  will	  investigate	  how	  current	  health	  system	  frameworks	  are	  conceptualised;	  and	  the	  
extent	   to	  which	   these	   conceptual	   frameworks	   incorporate	   all	   factors	   which	   influence	   how	   health	  













Using	  the	  universal	  health	  coverage	  initiative	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  policy	  directive,	  the	  dissertation	  will	  
review	  those	  conditions	  which	  led	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  universal	  health	  coverage,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
conditions	  which	  sustain	  them,	  through	  a	  detailed	  review	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  three	  countries:	  Cuba,	  
Thailand	  and	  Rwanda.	  
	  
By	  examining	  the	  different	  country	  experiences	  of	  implementing	  and	  managing	  universal	  health	  care	  
this	  paper	  will	  also	  assess	  whether	  these	  frameworks	  capture	  all	  the	  determinants	  of	  how	  heath	  
systems	  function	  under	  universal	  coverage	  
	  
Questions	  this	  paper	  aims	  to	  address	  are:	  
What	   are	   the	   characteristics	   of	   developing	   countries	   that	   claim	   to	   have	   successfully	   implemented	  
universal	  health	  coverage	  policies?	  and	  	  
How	  have	  these	  systems	  been	  sustained?	  
	  
These	  questions	  will	  provide	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  those	  factors	  important	  to	  health	  system	  
functioning	  can	  be	  identified.	  	  
	  
For	  each	  country	  under	  review,	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  critically	  assess	  the	  range	  of	  factors	  that	  influence	  
health	  system	  outcomes.	  Without	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  health	  system	  success	  
or	  failure,	  implementation	  of	  a	  successful	  system	  or	  reform	  of	  an	  unsuccessful	  one	  is	  doomed	  to	  fail.	  
	  
Section	  1	  of	  this	  paper	  will	  introduce	  the	  universal	  health	  coverage	  initiative;	  Section	  2	  will	  provide	  a	  
detailed	  review	  of	  the	  conceptual	  literature	  on	  health	  systems	  frameworks;	  in	  Section	  3	  the	  current	  
health	  systems	  framework	  approach	  is	  challenged	  by	  the	  proposal	  of	  a	  new	  systems	  thinking	  












sector;	  Section	  4	  articulates	  a	  framework	  for	  health	  system	  analysis	  based	  on	  a	  systems	  thinking	  
approach	  while	  Section	  5	  outlines	  the	  methodology	  which	  this	  paper	  has	  employed.	  Section	  6,	  7	  and	  
8	  present	  and	  assess	  the	  three	  universal	  health	  coverage	  case	  studies	  in	  Cuba,	  Thailand	  and	  Rwanda	  
respectively.	  The	  paper	  ends	  with	  a	  discussion	  in	  Section	  9.	  












SECTION	  ONE:	  WHAT	  IS	  UNIVERSAL	  HEALTH	  COVERAGE?	  
	  
1.1	  The	  Policy	  
	  
Universal	   health	   coverage	   is	   defined	   as	   “access	   to	   key	   promotive,	   preventive,	   curative	   and	  
rehabilitative	   health	   interventions	   for	   all	   at	   an	   affordable	   cost”	   (WHO,	   2005).	   Universal	   coverage	  
embodies	  the	  principle	  of	  health	  for	  all	  and	  seeks	  to	  promote	  both	  equity	  in	  access	  to	  health	  services	  
and	  financial	  risk	  protection.	  	  
	  
Adopting	   a	   policy	   of	   implementing	   universal	   health	   coverage	   implies	   that	   the	   entire	   population	   is	  
“covered”	  for	  needed	  health	  care	  services.	  However,	  this	  does	  neither	  necessitate	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  
full	  range	  of	  health	  services	  in	  the	  benefits	  package,	  nor	  that	  the	  full	  cost	  of	  services	  is	  met	  by	  the	  
government.	  	  
	  
Providing	   universal	   coverage	   therefore	   presents	   policy-­‐makers	  with	   a	   choice:	   	   to	   either	   provide	   a	  
limited	  package	  of	  services	  to	  many	  or	  all	  people,	  or	  to	  provide	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  package	  of	  
health	  care	  services	  to	  fewer	  people.	  McIntyre	  (2007)	  has	  described	  this	  situation	  as	  “an	  important	  
trade-­‐off	   between	  what	   are	   frequently	   referred	   to	   as	   the	   breadth	   (how	  many	   people)	   and	   depth	  
(which	  services)	  of	  coverage”	  and	  notes	  that	  the	  scope	  of	  these	  two	  dimensions	  of	  universal	  health	  
coverage	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  affordability	  and	  sustainability	  of	  the	  package	  (2007:	  40).	  	  	  
	  
The	  goal	  of	  any	  universal	  health	  care	  policy	  should	  not	  be	  to	  choose	  between	  these	  dimensions,	  but	  
rather	   to	   extend	   these	   dimensions	   over	   time	  by	   providing	   a	   broader	   package	  of	   services	   to	  more	  
people.	  	  To	  achieve	  this	  goal,	  a	  defined	  package	  of	  services	  may	  need	  prioritisation	  and	  preference	  
for	  specific	  services	  based	  on	  affordability,	  and	  this	  may	  require	  cost	  sharing	  between	  the	  state	  and	  













In	  the	  decade	  between	  the	  World	  Health	  Report	  2000	  –	  which	  provided	  a	  more	  liberal	  conception	  of	  
health	   financing	   and	   cost	   recovery	   –	   and	   the	   World	   Health	   Report	   2010	   which	   is	   particularly	  
considerate	  of	  providing	  financial	  risk	  protection	  for	  the	  vulnerable,	  universal	  health	  care	  coverage	  
gained	  broad	  acceptance	  as	  a	   fundamental	  approach	   through	  which	  health	  systems	  should	  aim	  to	  
provide	  health	  for	  all.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  increased	  attention	  on	  adoption	  of	  this	  policy	  imperative	  
in	  countries	  across	  the	  world.	  
	  
The	  challenge	  for	  health	  systems	  now	  is	  to	  identify	  how	  to	  achieve	  such	  universal	  coverage	  through	  
appropriate	  health	  financing	  mechanisms	  that	  reduce	  the	  potential	  of	  catastrophic	  financial	  risk	  for	  
its	  intended	  beneficiaries.	  	  
	  












1.2	  Financing	  a	  universal	  health	  coverage	  policy	  
	  
According	   to	   Kutzin	   (2001),	   health	   financing	   policy	   in	   support	   of	   universal	   health	   coverage	   should	  
consider	  revenue	  collection,	  pooling	  and	  purchasing.	  It	  is	  the	  choices	  made	  in	  these	  aspects	  of	  health	  
care	  financing	  that	  define	  the	  outcome	  of	  health	  financing	  reform	  in	  a	  country	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  
in	   further	  detail	   in	  Section	  Two.	  This	   view	   is	   supported	  by	  Carrin	  et	  al	   (2008)	  who	   further	   suggest	  
that	   “it	   is	   the	   combination	   of	   institutional	   arrangements	   and	   legislation	   relating	   to	   revenue	  
collection,	  pooling	  and	  purchasing/provision	  that	  determine	  how	  equitable	  and	  efficient	  a	  system	  is,	  
rather	  than	  the	  name	  that	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  it”.	  	  
	  
Building	  on	  this	  approach,	  the	  2010	  World	  Health	  Report	  identified	  three	  major	  financial	  barriers	  to	  
achieving	  universal	  health	  coverage:	  the	  first	  is	  the	  availability	  of	  resources	  (WHO,	  2010);	  the	  second	  
is	  dependence	  on	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket,	  or	  direct,	  payments	  at	  the	  point	  of	  care;	  and	  the	  third	  is	  inefficient	  
and	   inequitable	   use	   of	   resources	   (WHO,	   2010).	   The	   Report	   notes	   that	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   payments	  
prevent	  1,3	  billion	  people	   from	  accessing	  health	   services	   and	   force	  100	  million	  more	   into	  poverty	  
annually	  (WHO,	  2010).	  
	  
	  To	  address	  these	  barriers,	  the	  Report	  makes	  a	  clear	  recommendation	  for	  financing	  universal	  health	  
coverage	   by	   asserting	   that	   the	   path	   to	   universal	   coverage,	   then,	   is	   relatively	   simple	   –	   at	   least	   on	  
paper.	   It	   suggests	   that	   all	   that	   is	   needed	   is	   for	   countries	   to	   “raise	   sufficient	   funds,	   reduce	   the	  
reliance	  on	  direct	  payments	  to	  finance	  services,	  and	  improve	  efficiency	  and	  equity”	  (WHO,	  2010:	  xi).	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals	  and	  raise	  resources	  for	  health,	  the	  World	  Health	  Report	  suggests	  that	  
governments	  should	  prioritize	  health	  in	  government	  budgets	  and	  increase	  the	  efficiency	  of	  revenue	  
collection	   by	   improving	   the	   tax	   collection	   and	   health	   insurance	   contribution	   mechanisms	   (WHO,	  












as	   increasing	  taxes	  on	  luxury	  goods.	  Yet,	  this	  suggestion	  comes	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  “governments	  
will	  need	  to	  implement	  those	  that	  best	  suit	  their	  economies	  and	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  political	  support”	  
(WHO,	  2010:	  xiii).	  	  
	  
The	   last	   option	   for	   generating	   additional	   revenue	   for	   health	   care	   provision	   in	   low-­‐	   and	   middle	  
income	   countries	   is	   for	   high-­‐income	   countries	   to	   provide	   development	   assistance.	   Many	   low-­‐
income,	  developing	  countries	  are	  unable	  to	  finance	  their	  health	  systems	  entirely	  through	  tax-­‐based,	  
or	  social	  health	  insurance,	  funding.	  For	  countries	  where	  increased	  revenue	  from	  domestic	  sources	  of	  
financing	  is	  impossible,	  external	  assistance	  helps	  to	  finance	  universal	  coverage	  schemes	  (Carrin	  et	  al,	  
2008).	  	  
	  	  
Before	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  downturn	  in	  2008,	  development	  assistance	  for	  health	  was	  
increasing	   at	   a	   significant	   rate.	   Between	   2000	   and	   2007,	   funding	   from	   external	   sources	   for	   low-­‐
income	   countries	   increased	   on	   average	   from	   16.5%	   to	   24.8%	   of	   total	   health	   expenditure	   (WHO,	  
2010).	  Often,	  during	  downturns,	  development	  assistance	  for	  health	  is	  insulated	  from	  the	  reductions	  
in	   general	   donor	   assistance	   –	   however,	   current	   trends	   seem	   to	   indicate	   that	   donor	   countries	   are	  
postponing	  or	   cancelling	   their	   pledges.	   Even	   key	  private	  players,	   such	   as	   the	  Global	   Fund	   to	   Fight	  
AIDS,	  Tuberculosis	  and	  Malaria,	  have	  been	  affected	  and	  have	  had	  to	  put	  a	  hold	  on	  recent	  efforts.	  	  
	  
Another	  issue	  for	  countries	  dependent	  on	  donor	  funding	  is	  the	  form	  the	  external	  contribution	  takes	  
and	  how	  this	  aligns	  with	  the	  country’s	  health	  priorities.	   If	   it	   is	  programme	  or	  project	  funding,	  then	  
the	   funds	   are	   dedicated	   to	   specific	   projects	   or	   areas.	   Sector-­‐wide	   approaches	   pool	   funds	   from	  
multiple	  donors	  to	  support	  the	  overall	  health	  sector,	  while	  general	  budget	  support	  provides	  funding	  














Without	   development	   assistance,	   universal	   coverage	   for	  many	   countries	  would	   not	   be	   attainable.	  
Yet,	   as	   a	   source	   of	   financing,	   it	   remains	   unpredictable	   and	   more	   challenging	   to	   coordinate	   than	  
domestic	  sources.	  	  












1.3	  Beyond	  financing	  
	  
Yet	  beyond	  these	  health	  financing	  functions,	  implementation	  of	  universal	  coverage	  is	  also	  influenced	  
by	  a	   range	  of	  other	   factors.	  At	   the	  micro-­‐level,	   the	   implementation	  of	  health	   interventions	  can	  be	  
affected	  by	  geographical,	   financial	  or	  social	  barriers	  to	  use	  or	   lack	  of	  demand;	  or	  even	  by	  a	   lack	  of	  
equipment,	   medical	   supplies	   and	   infrastructure	   (Hanson	   et	   al,	   2003).	   While	   not	   ignoring	   the	  
importance	   of	   addressing	   these	   issues,	   this	   paper	   has	   opted	   to	   focus	   on	   those	   factors	   affecting	  
policy,	  strategic	  management	  and	  the	  broader	  health	  system.	  
	  
Therefore,	  at	  a	  more	  sector-­‐wide	  level,	  examples	  of	  policy	  implementation	  constraints	  include	  weak	  
systems	   for	  planning	  and	  management;	   lack	  of	   intersectoral	   action	  between	  government	   and	   civil	  
society;	  lack	  of	  responsiveness	  to	  user	  needs;	  or	  reliance	  on	  donor	  funding	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
Implementation	   of	   policies,	   such	   as	   universal	   coverage,	   also	   requires	   governments	   to	   have	   the	  
political	  will	  and	  capacity	  to	  affect	  sound	  stewardship	  of	  reform	  (Carrin	  et	  al,	  2008).	  Implicit	  to	  this	  is	  
that	   governments	   are	   able	   to	   enforce	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   and	   that	   decisions	   are	   not	   undermined	   by	  
political	   instability	   and	   insecurity	   (Hanson	  et	   al,	   2003).	   The	   strength	  of	   such	   commitment	   and	   the	  
contextual	  characteristics	  which	  frame	  policy	  often	  impacts	  on	  the	  speed	  of	  implementation.	  	  
	  
In	  most	  European	  nations	  that	  have	  achieved	  and	  maintained	  universal	  coverage,	  the	  transition	  took	  
a	  century	  or	  more.	  However,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  with	  any	  certainty	  how	  long	  any	  specific	  reform	  
process	  will	  take,	  particularly	  because	  the	  determinants	  of	  effective	  transition	  to	  a	  universal	  health	  














1.4	  The	  equity	  imperative	  
	  
Considerable	  emphasis	  has	  been	  given	  to	  the	  equity	   implications	  of	   implementing	  universal	  health	  
coverage.	  The	  transition	  process	  may	  involve	  the	  health	  system	  becoming	  more	  inequitable	  –	  giving	  
preference	  to	  higher	  income	  groups	  in	  urban	  settings	  –	  before	  health	  service	  coverage	  is	  extended,	  
in	  a	  trickle-­‐down	  pattern,	  to	  poorer	  groups	  (Gwatkin	  &	  Ergo,	  2011).	  The	  path	  to	  universal	  coverage	  
may	   also	  mean	   that	   at	   some	   stage	   various	   pre-­‐payment,	   or	   co-­‐payment,	   schemes	   co-­‐exist,	  which	  
provide	  differentiated	  services	  for	  different	  population	  groups.	  	  
	  
Albeit	  limited,	  there	  is	  empirical	  evidence	  which	  supports	  the	  prevalence	  of	  a	  trickle-­‐down	  pattern	  in	  
universal	   health	   coverage	   implementation	   approaches.	   For	   example,	   in	   Brazil	   “new	   health	  
programmes	   initially	   reach	   those	   of	   higher	   socioeconomic	   status	   and	   only	   later	   affect	   the	   poor”	  
(Victora,	  Vaughan,	  Barros,	  Silav,	  &	  Tomasi	  (2000)	  in	  Gwatkin	  &	  Ergo,	  2011).	  
	  
If	   this	   pattern	   of	   inequality	   persists	   or	   becomes	   entrenched	   as	   the	   norm,	   the	   effect	  would	   be	   to	  
exacerbate	  rather	  than	  alleviate	  inequalities	  in	  health	  care	  access.	  This	  may	  not	  apply	  in	  all	  settings.	  
In	  Cuba,	  for	  example,	  health	  services	  were	  provided	  to	  the	  poorest	  groups	  first.	  Approaches	  such	  as	  
this	  can	  be	  termed	  “progressive	  universalism”	  (Gwatkin	  &	  Ergo,	  2011:	  2160).	  According	  to	  Gwatkin	  &	  
Ergo	  (2011)	  “in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  determination	  to	  include	  people	  who	  are	  poor	  from	  the	  beginning,	  
drives	   for	  universal	  coverage	  are	  very	   likely,	  perhaps	  almost	  certain,	   to	   leave	  them	  behind”	   (2011:	  
2161).	  	  
	  












1.5	  In	  search	  of	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  Universal	  Health	  
Coverage	  
	  
Several	  countries	  claim	  to	  have	  achieved	  universal	  health	  coverage.	  For	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	   thesis,	  
Cuba,	   Rwanda	   and	   Thailand	  were	   selected	   as	   case	   studies	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   each	   claims	   to	   have	  
achieved,	   or	   have	   come	   close	   to	   achieving,	   universal	   health	   coverage.	   For	   each	   of	   the	   selected	  
countries,	  the	  health	  system	  will	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  depth	  of	  coverage,	  the	  benefit	  package	  provided	  
and	   the	   level	   of	   prepayment	   involved	   in	   financing	   the	   universal	   coverage	   system:	   in	   other	  words,	  
who	  is	  being	  covered;	  for	  what	  range	  of	  health	  care	  services;	  and	  by	  what	  means.	  	  
	  
Although	  some	  may	  argue	  that	  such	  a	  description	  is	  sufficient	  in	  order	  to	  undertake	  a	  comparative	  
analysis,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  review	  how	  others	  conceptualise	  the	  health	  system	  and	  the	  factors	  that	  
influence	  health	  system	  reform.	  
	  
	  












SECTION	  TWO:	  HOW	  DO	  WE	  DEFINE	  A	  HEALTH	  SYSTEM?	  
	  
The	   concept	   of	   a	   health	   system,	   rather	   than	   a	   health	   service,	   first	   emerged	   in	   the	   context	   of	  
discussions	  on	  approaches	   towards	   implementing	  primary	  health	   care,	   a	  philosophy	  enunciated	   in	  
the	  1978	  Alma	  Ata	  Declaration	  which	  embodies	   the	  principle	  of	   “health	   for	  all”	   (WHO,	  1978)	  as	  a	  
foundation	  for	  advancing	  equity.	  For	  many	  years,	  this	  approach	  underpinned	  discussions	  regarding	  
how	  best	  to	  improve	  health	  outcomes	  for	  everyone.	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  this	  dialogue	  became	  more	  
nuanced,	  with	   increasing	  attention	  being	  paid	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  strategies	   for	  achieving	  national	  
health	  policy	  goals	  (Cassels,	  2005).	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  importance	  of	  emphasising	  the	  need	  for	  health	  
systems	  to	  be	  both	  effective	  and	  efficient	  in	  securing	  better	  health	  outcomes	  gained	  prominence	  in	  
these	  discussions.	  
	  
There	  was	  wide	  agreement	  that	  without	  the	  development	  of	  a	  clear	  and	  consistent	  definition	  of	  the	  
health	  system	  and	  its	  components,	   it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  generate	  policies	  that	  would	  improve	  
health	  system	  performance	  (Hsiao,	  2003).	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  how	  
some	   countries	   were	   able	   to	   meet	   their	   health	   care	   objectives	   while	   others	   failed,	   generic	  
frameworks	  started	  to	  be	  formulated	  and	  propagated,	  thus	  allowing	  for	  different	  health	  systems	  to	  
be	  analysed	  and	  compared,	  with	  respect	  to	  measuring	  the	  performance	  of	  health	  systems	  and	  their	  
improvement	  over	  time.	  	  
	  
One	   of	   the	   early	   health	   system	   conceptual	   frameworks	   was	   presented	   by	   Evans	   (1981)	   who	  
deconstructed	  the	  health	  sector	   into	  four	  main	  actor	  groups	  –	  the	  population	  to	  be	  served;	  health	  
care	  providers;	  third-­‐party	  payers;	  and	  the	  government	  (Shakarishvili	  et	  al,	  2010).	  
	  
In	   consideration	   of	   financing	   of	   health	   systems	   across	   the	   world,	   Evans	   suggested	   that	   the	   one	  












systems	  identified	  were	  all	  based	  on	  pre-­‐payment	  mechanisms.	  Each	  of	  the	  systems	  identified	  was	  
informed	  by	  a	  permutation	  of	   two	  variables:	  how	  health	   finance	   is	   collected	   from	  users;	   and	  how	  
health	  care	  providers	  are	  reimbursed.	  	  
	  
Users	  pay	  for	  their	  healthcare	  either	  through	  voluntary,	  private	  health	  insurance	  –	  with	  a	  choice	  in	  
the	   insurer;	   through	   tax	   contributions;	   or	   through	   compulsory,	   public	   health	   insurance	   systems	  
where	   they	   usually	   do	   not	   have	   a	   choice	   in	   the	   insurer	   (Hurst,	   1991).	   Sometimes	   public	   health	  
insurance	   systems	   are	   financed	   via	   general	   taxation,	   which	   satisfies	   the	   purpose	   of	   providing	  
financial	  protection.	  	  
	  
Health	  care	  providers	  can	  be	  paid	  through	  indirect	  payment	  of	  providers	  whereby	  patients	  pay	  the	  
provider,	  but	  are	  reimbursed	  by	  the	   insurer	  (the	  reimbursement	  model);	   through	  direct	  payment	  -­‐	  
usually	  as	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  or	  capitation	  (the	  contract	  model);	  or	  direct	  payment	  of	  providers	  by	  global	  
health	  budgets	  (the	  integrated	  model)	  (Hurst,	  1991).	  	  
	  
Roemer	   (1991)	   defines	   the	   health	   system	   as	   “the	   combination	   of	   resources,	   organisation	   [of	  
programmes],	   financing,	   and	  management	   that	   culminate	   in	   the	  delivery	  of	   health	   services	   to	   the	  
population”.	  However,	  what	  this	  conception	  fails	   to	  explain	   is	  why	  variations	   in	   these	  components	  
lead	  to	  variation	  in	  performance.	  	  
	  
Hurst	   (1991)	   interpreted	   health	   systems	   in	   terms	   of	   “fund	   flows	   and	   payment	  methods	   between	  
population	  groups	  and	  institutions”	  (Hsiao,	  2003:	  4).	  His	  research	  was	  limited	  to	  developed	  nations,	  
primarily	   seven	   countries	   –	   Belgium,	   France,	   Germany,	   Ireland,	   the	   Netherlands,	   Spain	   and	   the	  
United	   Kingdom	   –	   within	   the	   Organisation	   for	   Economic	   Cooperation	   and	   Development	   (OECD).	  













He	  identified	  six	  distinct	  health	  system	  objectives:	  a)	  that	  all	  citizens	  have	  equitable	  access	  to	  health	  
care	  and	  that	  there	  be	  “equal	  treatment	  for	  equal	  need”	  within	  the	  public	  system;	  b)	  that	  users	  are	  
protected	  from	  catastrophic	  spending;	  c)	  macroeconomic	  (or	  allocative)	  efficiency	  is	  applied	  so	  that	  
an	  appropriate	  amount	  of	   the	  gross	  domestic	  product	   (GDP)	   is	  spent	  on	  health;	  d)	  microeconomic	  
(or	   technical)	   efficiency	   whereby	   available	   resources	   are	   used	   to	   their	   maximum	   benefit;	   e)	  
consumers	  should	  be	   free	  to	  choose	  their	  physicians;	  and	   f)	  health	  care	  providers	  should	  be	  given	  
“the	   maximum	   freedom”	   compatible	   with	   the	   health	   system’s	   objectives	   (Hurst,	   1991).	   These	  
objectives	  can	  be	  broadly	  clustered	  into	  three	  categories	  “adequacy,	  equity	  and	  income	  protection”,	  
“cost	  containment”	  and	  “efficiency”	  (Hurst,	  1991).	  
	  
On	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  health	  systems,	  Hurst	  (1991)	  concluded	  that	  “many	  industrialised	  
nations	   have	   found	   equitable	  ways	   of	   financing	   and	   delivering	   health	   care	   that	   achieve	   adequate	  
outcomes	   (as	   far	  as	   they	  can	  be	  measured).	  The	  cost	  of	  most	  of	   this	   care	   is	   socialised	   throughout	  
populations,	   with	   the	   rich	   supporting	   the	   poor,	   the	   healthy	   helping	   the	   sick,	   and	   the	   young	  
subsidizing	  the	  old.”	  (Hurst,	  1991:	  1).	  	  
	  
Another	  way	  of	  assessing	  health	  system	  performance	   is	   to	   take	  a	   functional	  approach.	  Londono	  &	  
Frenk	  (1997),	  like	  Hurst	  (1991),	  looked	  at	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  various	  components	  of	  the	  
health	  system.	  They	  suggested	  that	  the	  health	  system	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  comprised	  of	  financing,	  
delivery,	  modulation	  and	  articulation.	  In	  this	  conception,	  financing	  refers	  to	  the	  collection	  of	  money	  
from	   households,	   firms,	   the	   government	   and	   donors;	   the	   accumulation	   of	   this	   money	   in	   social	  
insurance	   funds,	   public	   budgets	   for	   health	   or	   household	   savings;	   and	   the	   transfer	   of	   these	   funds	  












combination	  of	   inputs	   into	   a	  process	  which	  produces	  outputs	   such	   as	   services	  which	   in	   turn	   yield	  
health	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Londono	  &	  Frenk	  (1997),	  in	  addition	  to	  financing	  and	  delivery	  the	  health	  system	  should	  
also	   include	   modulation	   and	   articulation.	   Modulation	   is	   a	   broader	   term	   for	   regulation	   and	  
encompasses	  setting,	   implementing	  and	  monitoring	   the	  policies	  which	  govern	   the	  health	  system	  –	  
this	   requires	   careful	   consideration	   of	   the	   various	   sector	   stakeholders.	   Articulation	   is	   the	   process	  
which	   bridges	   financing	   and	   delivery	   and	   is	   a	   means	   of	   assuring	   that,	   and	   how,	   resources	   are	  
channelled	  into	  health	  service	  provision.	  Examples	  of	  articulation	  processes	  include	  the	  enrolment	  of	  
the	  population	  into	  health	  plans,	  the	  implementation	  of	  provider	  incentives,	  and	  the	  management	  of	  
quality	  care	  (Londono	  &	  Frenk,	  1997).	  
	  
Their	   approach,	   applied	   to	   Latin	   America	   although	   relevant	   elsewhere,	   is	   unique	   in	   that	   it	  
acknowledges	  that	  social	  and	  economic	  inequality	  affects	  the	  nature	  of	  health	  challenges	  in	  a	  region	  
and	  that	  health	  systems	  therefore	  need	  to	  be	  structured	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  respond	  to	  these	  
heterogeneous	  needs	  (Londono	  &	  Frenk,	  1997).	  	  
	  
The	  challenges	  faced	  in	  many	  Latin	  American	  countries	  are	  akin	  to	  those	  experienced	  by	  many	  other	  
developing	   and	   emerging	   economies.	   A	   history	   of	   underdevelopment	   led	   to	   accumulated	  
infrastructure	  challenges	  while	  more	  recent	  economic	  growth	  has	  led	  to	  new	  objectives	  and	  policies	  
which	  are	  sometimes	  incompatible	  with	  the	  available	  resources	  (Londono	  &	  Frenk,	  1997).	  In	  addition	  
to	  the	  cultural,	  political	  and	  economic	  history	  of	  each	  country	  which	  shapes	   its	   institutional	  make-­‐
up,	   modernisation,	   growth	   and	   development	   often	   fostered	   highly	   stratified	   economies	   with	  
different	  challenges	  affecting	  different	  social	  groups	  and	  geographic	  areas.	  In	  no	  sector	  is	  this	  more	  













In	  2000,	  the	  World	  Health	  Organisation	  published	  the	  first	  comprehensive	  report	  on	  health	  systems	  
in	   their	   member	   countries	   across	   the	   world,	   entitled	   World	   Health	   Report	   –	   Health	   Systems:	  
Improving	   Performance	   (2000).	   The	   report	   presented	   an	   exhaustive	   account	   of	   health	   systems,	  
health	  system	  functioning	  and	  countries’	  varying	  performance	  in	  achieving	  their	  health	  objectives.	  In	  
this	   World	   Health	   Report,	   health	   systems	   are	   defined	   as	   all	   the	   organisations,	   institutions	   and	  
resources	  that	  go	  into	  producing	  outcomes	  for	   improved	  health	  (WHO,	  2000).	  The	  functions	  which	  
the	   health	   system	   should	   encompass	   are	   “service	   provision,	   resource	   generation,	   financing	   and	  
stewardship”.	  	  The	  health	  system	  should	  strive	  for	  “good	  health,	  responsiveness	  to	  the	  expectations	  
of	  the	  population	  and	  fairness	  of	  financial	  contribution”	  (WHO,	  2000).	  The	  World	  Health	  Report	  on	  
health	   systems	   provided	   a	   sound	   description	   of	   the	   various	   health	   system	   components.	   However	  
what	  it	  did	  not	  do	  was	  to	  explain	  how	  a	  specific	  health	  system	  yields	  certain	  outcomes,	  or	  how	  the	  
system	  components	  could	  be	  reformed	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
Hsiao	  (2003)	  responds	  to	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  World	  Health	  Report	  by	  presenting	  an	  analytical	  
framework	   which	   seeks	   to	   model	   how	   the	   health	   system’s	   major	   components	   account	   for	   the	  
resulting	   health	   outcomes.	   As	   a	   starting	   point,	   Hsiao	   identifies	   improving	   health,	   financial	   risk	  
protection	   and	   public	   satisfaction	   as	   the	   primary	   health	   system	   goals.	   He	   then	   develops	   the	  
framework	   through	   the	  addition	  of	   various	   “control	   knobs”	  or	   instruments	  which	  he	  proposes	  are	  
able	  to	  facilitate	  attainment	  of	  health	  system	  goals:	  financing;	  the	  macro-­‐organisation	  of	  health	  care	  
delivery	  –	  the	  competition	  between	  providers,	  as	  well	  as	  decentralisation	  and	  integration	  of	  decision	  
making;	   the	   incentive	   structure	  which	   determines	   how	  providers	   are	   paid;	   state	   regulation	   of	   the	  
health	   sector;	   and	   a	   more	   abstract	   tool,	   persuasion	   –	   which	   Hsiao	   uses	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   means	  
through	  which	  the	  public’s	  expectations	  and	  preferences	  are	  affected	  by	  advertising,	  education	  and	  













Hsiao	  constrains	  his	  conception	  of	  a	  health	  system	  to	  include	  only	  those	  components	  which	  “can	  be	  
utilised	   as	   policy	   instruments	   to	   alter	   outcomes”	   (Hsiao,	   2003)	   thereby	   excluding	   contextual	  
features.	  
	  
Yet	  another	  set	  of	  frameworks	  considers	  the	  analysis	  of	  health	  sector	  reform.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Cassels	   (1995),	   health	   sector	   reform	   is	   “concerned	   with	   defining	   priorities,	   refining	  
policies	  and	  reforming	  the	  institutions	  through	  which	  those	  policies	  are	  implemented”	  (1995:	  3).	  His	  
contribution	  to	  the	   literature	  was	  to	   look	  specifically	  at	  the	   implications	  of	  health	  sector	  reform	  in	  
low	  income	  countries.	  Like	  Hurst,	  Cassels	  identifies	  access,	  allocative	  efficiency,	  technical	  efficiency,	  
user	  choice	  and	  protection	  from	  catastrophic	  spending	  as	  being	  vital	  policy	  objectives	  for	  the	  health	  
system.	   In	   addition	   to	   outlining	   these	   health	   system	   objectives,	   Cassels	   acknowledges	   that	   these	  
objectives,	   as	   well	   as	   countries’	   inability	   to	   meet	   them,	   are	   not	   new.	   Therefore,	   he	   begins	   to	  
question	  what	   it	   is	   about	   the	   reform	  process	   that	  will	   lead	   to	  purposive,	   sustained	  and	   successful	  
policies	  that	  achieve	  system	  objectives	  (Cassels,	  1995).	  
	  
Cassels	  emphasised	   the	   importance	  of	  understanding	   the	  context	   in	  which	   reform	   is	  going	   to	   take	  
place.	  Implicitly	  alluding	  to	  Kingdon’s	  framework	  for	  agenda	  setting,	  Cassels	  suggests	  that	  the	  need	  
for	  health	  system	  reform	  alone	  is	  not	  a	  sufficient	  precursor	  for	  reform	  to	  be	  implemented.	  Reform	  
implementation	  needs	  a	   trigger,	  which	   is	  most	  often	  political	  or	  economic	  change,	  or	   shifts	   in	   the	  
ideology	  around	  the	  role	  of	  government	   (Cassels,	  1995).	  However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	  note	   that	   the	  
existence	   of	   such	   triggers	   is	   not	   necessarily	   compatible	  with	   the	   development	   of	   an	   equitable	   or	  












capacity	  (ibid).	  Cassels	  also	  makes	  brief	  mention	  of	  the	  need	  for	  stakeholder	  analysis	  of	  the	  different	  
interest	  groups	  invested	  in	  the	  reform	  process.	  	  
	  
The	   framework	   developed	   by	   Joseph	   Kutzin	   (2001)	   is	   even	   more	   specific,	   looking	   particularly	   at	  
health	   system	  reform	  through	  a	   financing	   lens.	  Kutzin	  describes	  his	   framework	  as	  a	   tool	   “to	  assist	  
national	   level	  policy	  analysis	  by	   facilitating	   the	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  a	  health	  care	   system	  
and	  the	  identification	  of	  reform	  options”	  (2001:	  173).	  
	  
Kutzin	  (2001)	  identifies	  four	  generic	  health	  financing	  functions:	  revenue	  collection;	  pooling	  of	  funds;	  
purchasing;	  and	  provision.	  Revenue	  collection	  relates	  to	  the	  sources	  of	  funds	  –	  whether	  external	  or	  
domestic	  companies	  or	  households;	  the	  structure	  of	  payments	  –	  through	  prepayment	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
tax	   contributions	   to	  general	   government	   revenue,	  prepayment	   through	  social	  health	   insurance,	  or	  
out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  spending;	  and	  the	  collection	  agency	  (Kutzin,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Pooling	  of	  funds	  is	  the	  “accumulation	  of	  prepaid	  health	  care	  revenues	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  population”	  
(Kutzin,	   2001).	   Through	   regular	   prepayment	   to	   a	   health	   care	   fund,	   members	   are	   insured	   against	  
unexpected	  health	  care	  costs.	  Members’	  contributions	  are	  pooled	  to	  create	  cross-­‐subsidies	  whereby	  
the	  healthy	  members	  are	  able	  to	  pay	  for	  health	  care	  for	  the	  ill.	  If	  the	  pool	  is	  extended	  across	  income	  
groups,	  then	  cross-­‐subsidies	  can	  also	  occur	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  members	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
However,	  according	  to	  both	  Kutzin	  (2001)	  and	  McIntyre	  (2007),	  caution	  should	  be	  exercised	  in	  how	  
pooled	   resources	   are	   allocated.	   If	   people	  make	   a	   contribution	   to	   health	   insurance	   then	   they	   are	  
entitled	   to	   certain	   benefits.	   If	   access	   to	   different	   insurance	   pools	   entitles	   different	   groups	   to	  












resources	  should	  be	  distributed	  according	  to	  health	  care	  needs	  and	  need	  for	  financial	  risk	  protection	  
(McIntyre,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Purchasing	   of	   services	   is	   the	   transfer	   of	   pooled	   funds	   to	   service	   providers	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  
population.	  It	  involves	  the	  choice	  of	  benefits	  to	  which	  members	  of	  a	  scheme	  are	  entitled	  –	  the	  type	  
of	  service	  and	  type	  of	  provider.	  The	  benefit	  package	  available	  to	  those	  entitled	  to	  benefit	  should	  be	  
determined	   in	   consideration	   of	   the	   affordability	   and	   sustainability	   of	   the	   services	   offered.	   The	  
mechanism	   whereby	   providers	   are	   reimbursed	   is	   also	   important	   and	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   affect	  
efficiency	  and	  cost	  (McIntyre,	  2007).	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  purchasing	  organisation	  is	  also	  relevant.	  	  
	  
In	  summary,	  health	  systems	  have	  been	  conceptualised	  and	  defined	  in	  a	  multitude	  of	  ways	  leading	  to	  
inconsistencies	   in	   the	  components	  which	  are	  analysed	  and	  compared.	  Yet	  despite	   these	  variations	  
the	  common	  thesis	  that	  all	  of	  these	  frameworks	  purport	  is	  that	  most	  countries	  share	  similar	  health	  
policy	   objectives;	   and	   that	   there	   are	   intrinsic	   components	  which	   are	   similar	   in	   all	   health	   systems	  
which	  make	  them	  comparable.	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  proliferation	  of	  tools	  for	  analysing	  health	  systems,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  very	  limited	  analytical	  
understanding	   of	  why	   policies	   aimed	   at	   improving	   health	   system	  performance	   do	   or	   do	   not	   have	  
their	  intended	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
Atun	  &	  Menabde	  (2008)	  suggest	  that	  one	  explanation	  for	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  current	  frameworks	  to	  
adequately	  describe	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  health	  system	  is	  that	  the	  tools	  used	  are	  too	  simple.	  “A	  
better	  understanding	  of	  health	  systems	  and	  how	  health	  system	  elements	  interact	  to	  produce	  results	  
requires	  a	  more	  nuanced	  understanding	  of	  systems	  behaviour”	  (Atun	  &	  Menabde,	  2008:	  127)	  –	  one	  












SECTION	  THREE:	  A	  SYSTEMS	  THINKING	  APPROACH	  
	  
The	   systems	   thinking	   approach	   informs	   the	   broader	   field	   of	   health	   policy	   and	   systems	   research.	  
Originally	  applied	  to	  projects	   related	  to	  specific	   interventions	  such	  as	   tobacco	  control	  and	  obesity,	  
recently,	  this	  approach	  has	  gained	  traction	  in	  the	  international	  health	  policy	  research	  arena,	  and	  is	  
also	  applied	  to	  other	  sectors.	  	  
	  
Systems	  thinking	  originated	  in	  disciplines	  such	  as	  engineering,	  biology,	  and	  psychology.	   It	  proposes	  
that	   a	   system	   should	   be	   conceived	   of	   being	   comprised	   of	   interconnected	   components	   that	   are	  
significantly	   influenced	   by	   changes	   within	   and	   around	   this	   system	   (Atun	   &	  Menabde,	   2008).	   The	  
approach	  also	  advises	  that	  systems	  be	  considered	  as	  dynamic	  –	  evolving	  over	  time	  –	  and	  not	  just	  as	  
static	  frameworks	  (ibid.).	  
	  
“Systems	   thinking	   is	   an	   approach	   to	   problem	   solving	   that	   views	   “problems”	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wide,	  
dynamic	   system.	   Systems	   thinking	   involves	   much	   more	   than	   a	   reaction	   to	   present	   outcomes	   or	  
events.	   It	   demands	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   linkages,	   relationships,	   interactions	   and	  
behaviours	  among	  the	  elements	  that	  characterize	  the	  entire	  system”	  (de	  Savigny	  &	  Adam,	  2009:	  33).	  
This	  approach	  not	  only	  allows	  for	  better	  evaluation	  of	  the	  health	  systems	  components	  as	  they	  relate	  
to	  one	  another,	  but	  also	  for	  better	  evaluation	  of	  the	  health	  system	  components	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  
broader	  health	  system	  and	  of	  the	  health	  system	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  context	  in	  which	  it	  exists.	  	  
	  
Systems	  thinking	  as	  an	  approach	  within	  health	  systems	  research	   is	  relatively	  new.	  This	  Section	  will	  
outline	   the	  relevance	  of	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	   for	  health	  systems	  and	  will	   then	  present	   the	  
framework	   to	   be	   used	   as	   an	   assessment	   tool	   in	   this	   paper.	   This	   framework	   is	   not	   intended	   as	   a	  
stand-­‐alone	  tool	  but	  rather	  as	  gauge	  upon	  which	  to	  measure	  the	  comprehensiveness	  and	  usefulness	  












3.1	  The	  potential	  for	  applying	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  to	  health	  
	  
Health	   systems	   display	   the	   characteristics	   of	   dynamic	   systems:	   the	   effects	   of	   interventions	   or	  
changes	  are	  challenging	  to	  predict	  and	  are	  not	   immediate;	   it	   is	  also	  challenging	  to	  connect	  specific	  
effects	   to	   specific	   causes	   (Atun	  &	  Menabde,	   2008).	   It	   can	   be	   understood	   that	   this	   indeterminant	  
causality	   can	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   interdependence	   between	   health	   systems	   and	   the	   contexts	   in	  
which	  they	  exist.	  	  
	  
If	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  is	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  creating	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  an	  intervention	  
or	  reform	  will	  play	  out	   in	  the	  real	  world,	  then	  it	  seems	  important	  to	  recognise	  the	  influence	  which	  
“the	  world”	   or	   factors	   external	   to	   the	   health	   system	   framework	   components	   have	   on	   the	   health	  
system.	  
	  	  
Much	  like	  the	  development	  of	  a	  platform	  which	  considers	  the	  social	  determinants	  for	  health	  when	  
addressing	   health	   outcomes,	   a	   true	   systems	   thinking	   approach	   should	   consider	   the	   social	  
determinants	  for	  health	  system	  performance.	  
	  
Health	  policy	  formulation	  and	  its	  related	  field	  of	  research	  have	  adopted	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  
in	  recognition	  that	  “	  policies	  are	  ...embedded	  in	  social	  and	  political	  reality	  and	  shaped	  by	  particular,	  
culturally	  determined	  ways	  of	  framing	  problems	  and	  solutions”	   	  (ibid).	   	  Health	  policy	   is	  a	  collective	  
term	   for	   the	   guidelines	   to	   inform	   decisions	   on	   actions	   needed	   to	   strengthen	   health	   systems;	   the	  
processes	   of	   decision-­‐making;	   and	   the	   wider	   influences	   on	   both	   decisions	   and	   their	   processes	  














Health	  systems	  have	  been	  defined	  through	  frameworks	  –	  such	  as	  the	  popular	  WHO	  building	  blocks	  
approach	  -­‐	  the	  elements	  of	  which	  interact	   in	  order	  to	  achieve	  health	  outcomes.	  Thus	  conventional	  
health	   systems’	   frameworks	  provide	  a	  description	  of	   the	   “hardware”	  needed	   to	   implement	  health	  
policy	   directives.	  While	   such	   frameworks	   often	   give	   consideration	   to	   issues	   of	   “governance”,	   they	  
rarely	   give	   recognition	   to	   those	   factors	   which	   define	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   policies	   are	  
implemented	  and	  exist.	  	  	  
	  
Those	   health	   systems’	   frameworks	  which	   focus	   attention	  on	   the	   articulating	   elements	   of	   a	   health	  
system	   –	   the	   “hardware”-­‐	   thus	  miss	   the	   opportunity	   afforded	   by	   a	   systems	   thinking	   approach	   to	  
incorporate	   aspects	   of	   the	   broader	   political	   and	   economic	   context.	   What	   a	   systems	   thinking	  
approach	   offers	   is	   the	   opportunity	   to	   deliberately	   map	   the	   dynamics	   present	   in	   and	   around	   the	  
health	  system	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  implications	  of	  an	  intervention	  or	  reform	  plan	  (de	  
Savigny	  &	  Adam,	  2009).	  	  	  
	  
Applying	  such	  an	  approach	  should	  allow	  analysis	  not	  only	  of	  what	  works,	  with	  which	  hardware,	  but	  
also	  for	  whom	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  (ibid).	  
	  
This	  dissertation	  therefore	  proposes	  that	  health	  systems	  frameworks	  incorporate	  a	  systems	  thinking	  
approach	  which	  allows	  consideration	  of	  this	  context.	  
	  
The	  conventional	  health	  system	  frameworks	  tend	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  a	  description	  of	  the	  
components	  of	  the	  system	  is	  sufficient	  in	  order	  to	  undertake	  a	  comparative	  analysis.	  However,	  this	  
paper,	  in	  adopting	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  will	  supplement	  the	  descriptive	  analysis	  with	  an	  













The	  following	  section	  will	  outline	  and	  develop	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  in	  order	  to	  incorporate	  
the	  structural	  and	  contextual	  factors	  which	  frame	  the	  health	  system	  within	  the	  popular	  	  descriptive	  
health	  system	  frameworks	  discussed	  in	  Section	  Two.	  By	  prescribing	  to	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  












SECTION	  FOUR:	  A	  SYSTEMS	  THINKING	  APPROACH	  FOR	  HEALTH	  
SYSTEMS	  ANALYSIS	  
	  
There	  is	  an	  extensive	  literature	  identifying	  the	  health	  system	  components	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  assess	  
the	  performance	  of	  a	  health	  system.	  This	  thesis	  challenges	  the	  notion	  that	  these	  components	  alone	  
allow	  for	  adequate	  comparison	  between	  health	  systems	  –	  particularly	   in	  terms	  of	   implementation,	  
functionality	  and	  sustainability.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  the	  approach	  proposed	  here	  will	  expand	  on	  the	  traditional	  health	  system	  framework	  to	  
include	  consideration	  of	  the	  economic	  and	  political	  context.	  It	  will	  be	  used	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  critically	  
assessing	  the	  health	  systems	  in	  the	  three	  country	  case	  studies.	  
	  
The	   first	   step	   is	   to	   identify	   and	   describe	   the	   components	   of	   the	   health	   system.	   Drawing	   on	   the	  
various	   conceptions	   of	   a	   health	   system	   as	   discussed	   previously,	   this	   paper	   has	   selected	   those	  
components	  which	  are	  common	  to	  the	  models	  to	  form	  a	  descriptive	  framework.	  	  
	  
The	  core	  descriptors	  of	  this	  health	  system	  framework	  are:	  	  
-­‐	  how	  health	  financing	  is	  collected	  and	  from	  whom;	  	  
-­‐	  how	  these	  resources	  are	  pooled	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  cross-­‐subsidies;	  
-­‐	  how	  providers	  are	  reimbursed;	  and	  	  
-­‐	  which	  services	  are	  provided	  
	  
The	   second	   step	   is	   to	   assess	   each	   health	   system	   according	   to	   a	   systems	   thinking	   approach	  which	  
includes	  a	  process	  evaluation,	  a	  context	  evaluation	  and	  an	  effects	  evaluation	   (de	  Savigny	  &	  Adam,	  













Process	  evaluation	  includes	  consideration	  of	  policy	  formulation,	  stakeholder	  acceptance	  and	  priority	  
setting	   in	   terms	  of	   governance.	   This	   component	   of	   the	   system	   thinking	   approach	   focuses	   on	  how	  
universal	  coverage	  was	   introduced	  and	  implemented	  and	  therefore	  draws	  on	  policy	  analysis	  for	   its	  
assessment	  criteria.	  	  	  
	  
An	   integral	   part	   of	   policy	   analysis,	   and	   one	   that	   is	   congruent	   with	   systems	   thinking,	   is	   to	   move	  
beyond	   classification	   of	   the	   health	   system	   purely	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   functional	   or	   instrumental	  
components.	  In	  so	  doing,	  health	  policy	  and	  systems	  research	  promotes	  recognition	  of	  the	  interests,	  
values,	  relationships	  and	  power	  relations	  between	  the	  main	  actors	  (Sheikh	  et	  al,	  2011).	  This	  inclusion	  
provides	   better	   insight	   into	   how	   reforms	   or	   interventions	   were	   initiated,	   health	   system	  
performance,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   key	   factors	   determining	   implementation	   of	   universal	   coverage	   and	  
sustainability.	  	  	  
	  
Context	   evaluation	   helps	   to	   determine	  whether	   the	   positive	   or	   negative	   effects	   associated	  with	   a	  
reform	   are	   the	   result	   of	   the	   intervention	   or	   of	   the	   structural	   context	   of	   the	   system	   (Atun	   &	  
Menabde,	  2008).	   In	  order	   to	  make	   this	  distinction,	  external	   factors	  have	   to	  either	  be	   ruled	  out	  as	  
determinants	  or	  given	   recognition	   for	   their	   role.	  Since,	   the	  health	  system	   is	  embedded	   in	  a	   social,	  
economic	   and	   political	   context,	   these	   influences	   cannot	   be	   ignored.	   Therefore,	   this	   approach	  
includes	   the	   political	   dynamics	   in	   the	   country	   as	   well	   as	   the	   level	   of	   economic	   development	   and	  
growth.	  	  
	  
Effects	   evaluation	   considers	   the	   changes	   in	   health	   indicators	   such	   as	  morbidity	   and	  mortality	   and	  
changes	  in	  the	  use	  of	  services.	  Due	  to	  the	  complex	  and	  highly	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  the	  health	  system,	  
it	  is	  challenging	  to	  identify	  a	  direct	  causal	  relationship	  between	  changes	  in	  health	  outcomes	  and	  an	  












evidence	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  an	  intervention.	  Health	  service	  utilisation	  data	  provide	  a	  more	  immediate	  
reflection	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  policy	  change.	  
	  
The	  effects	  evaluation	  also	  looks	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  universal	  health	  coverage	  on	  human	  resources	  for	  
health.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  constraints	  on	  the	  implementation	  of	  health	  reform	  policies	  is	  the	  
availability	   of	   appropriately	   skilled	   staff.	   Most	   often	   included	   as	   a	   variable	   in	   assessing	   policy	  
implementation	   at	   a	   service	   delivery	   level,	   this	   paper	   will	   depart	   from	   this	   tradition	   and	   include	  
assessment	  of	  human	  resources	  changes	  as	  an	  outcome	  of	  policy	  reform.	  This	  is	  justified	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  availability	  of	  human	  resources,	  and	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  health	  workforce	  responds	  to	  
the	   reform,	   has	   interesting	   implications	   for	   the	   sustainability	   of	   universal	   coverage	  which	   are	   not	  
often	  discussed.	  
	  
An	   adequate	   health	   services	  workforce	   –	   one	   that	   is	   responsive,	   efficient,	   comprised	   of	   sufficient	  
staff	  and	  fairly	  distributed	  –	  is	  vital	  for	  providing	  good	  quality	  and	  equitable	  health	  services.	  Health	  
systems	  would	  be	  defunct	  without	  the	  people	  that	  make	  them	  work.	  Yet,	  human	  resources	  are	  not	  
merely	  a	   resource,	  people	  have	  the	  ability	   to	  act	  strategically	  and	  alter	  or	   influence	  health	  system	  
objectives	  (Rigoli	  &	  Dussault,	  2003).	  The	  health	  workforce	  affects	  the	  quality	  of	  service	  and	  the	  cost	  
of	  providing	  care,	  and	  the	  deployment	  and	  distribution	  of	  the	  workforce	  affects	  equitable	  access	  to	  
care	  (ibid.)	  
	  
For	  interventions	  with	  more	  limited	  effects,	  ideally,	  the	  last	  element	  of	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  
would	  be	  an	  economic	  evaluation.	  This	  would	  be	  conducted	  separately	  and	  would	  include	  a	  full	  cost-­‐
effectiveness	   analysis.	   However,	   given	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   reforms	   dealt	   with	   in	   this	  
paper,	   the	   economic	   evaluation	  will	   be	   limited	   to	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   relative	   cost	   of	   reform;	   the	  












SECTION	  FIVE:	  METHODOLOGY	  
	  
This	   is	   a	   desk-­‐based	   study	   that	   utilised	   pre-­‐existing	   literature	   and	   data	   to	   bring	   together	  
conceptualisation	  of	  health	  systems	  and	  systems	   thinking	  approaches	  of	  analysis	   in	  order	   to	  apply	  
this	  to	  the	  case	  of	  universal	  health	  coverage	  in	  three	  countries.	  	  
	  
The	  review	  is	  based	  on	  an	  electronic	  database	  search	  of	  academic	  papers.	  An	  extensive	  list	  of	  health	  
and	  economics	  bibliographic	  databases	  was	  searched	  (EconLit,	  ScienceDirect,	  Emerald,	  PubMed	  and	  
ISI	  Web	  of	  Knowledge)	  using	  a	  combination	  of	  search	  terms	  (e.g.	  “health	  systems”;	  “health	  systems	  
approaches”;	  “systems	  thinking	  AND	  health”)	  over	  a	  six	  month	  period	  from	  August	  2011	  to	  January	  
2012.	   This	   search	  was	   supplemented	   by	   a	   search	   of	   websites	   relevant	   to	   health	   systems	   such	   as	  
those	  of	   the	  World	  Health	  Organisation	  (WHO),	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Alliance	  for	  Health	  Policy	  and	  
Systems	  Research.	  	  
	  
Cuba,	   Rwanda	   and	   Thailand	   were	   selected	   as	   case	   studies	   for	   three	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   they	   are	   all	  
developing	  countries	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  economic	  growth.	  Understanding	  the	  implementation	  of	  
universal	   coverage	   in	   economies	   with	   more	   limited	   financial	   resources	   and	   potentially	   a	   greater	  
need	   from	   the	   population	   for	   financial	   risk	   protection	   is	   important	   if	   universal	   coverage	   is	   being	  
touted	   as	   a	   development	   solution	   and	   imperative.	   Secondly,	   universal	   access	   policies	   were	  
implemented	   at	   different	   times	   and	   under	   very	   different	   circumstances	   which	   allows	   different	  
determinants	   to	  be	   tested	   for	   their	   influence	  over	   implementation	  and	  maintenance.	  Thirdly,	   they	  
are	  all	  located	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  world	  –	  and	  within	  each	  region,	  these	  cases	  are	  held	  up	  as	  
exemplars	   of	   successful	   health	   systems.	   Country	   specific	   information	   was	   collected	   through	  
electronic	   database	   searches	   of	   academic	   papers,	   general	   internet	   and	   University	   of	   Cape	   Town	  













5.1	  Limitations	  and	  Exclusions	  
	  	  
The	   primary	   limitation	   of	   a	   desk-­‐based	   study	   is	   that	   it	   is	   reliant	   on	   the	   availability	   of	   existing	  
research.	  Seminal	  works	  from	  Evans	  (1981),	  Hurst	  (1991),	  Roemer	  (1991),	  Londono	  &	  Frenk	  (1997),	  
Hsiao	   (2003),	   Cassels	   (1995)	   and	   Kutzin	   (2001)	   assisted	   in	   mapping	   a	   strong	   tradition	   of	   health	  
systems’	   conceptualisations.	   Yet,	   none	   of	   their	   systems	   frameworks	   were	   able	   to	   contribute	  
adequately	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  with	  what	  success	  health	  systems	  reforms	  are	  implemented	  
and	  how,	  if	  at	  all,	  they	  are	  sustained.	  	  
	  
Therefore,	  alternative	  approaches	  had	  to	  be	  identified.	  After	  extensive	  searches,	  very	  little	  could	  be	  
found	   in	   the	   strict	   health	   systems	   literature.	   Expanding	   the	   search	   yielded	   a	   paper	   by	   Atun	   &	  
Menabde	  (2008)	  which	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  first	  to	  apply	  a	  systems	  thinking	  approach	  to	  the	  
health	  sector	  –	  albeit	  on	  a	  more	  limited	  interventions	  basis.	  Back	  searching	  from	  this	  point	  provided	  
a	  comprehensive	  enough	  systems	  thinking	  theory	  which	  could	  then	  be	  synthesised	  with	  a	  standard	  
health	   systems	   framework.	   In	  order	   to	  narrow	   the	   scope	  of	   this	   framework	   and	  analysis	   tool,	   the	  
factors	  included	  in	  standard	  health	  system	  frameworks	  had	  to	  be	  condensed.	  This	  was	  done	  with	  the	  
understanding	  that	  it	  was	  the	  new,	  contextual	  factors,	  such	  as	  politics	  and	  economics,	  introduced	  by	  
systems	   thinking	   that	   would	   provide	   alternative	   insight	   into	   the	   functioning	   of	   health	   systems	   in	  
reality.	  
	  
The	  description	  and	  analysis	  of	  each	  country	  was	  limited	  by	  the	  available	  information.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Cuba,	   economic	   information	   –	   particularly	   related	   to	   government	   revenue	   sources	   -­‐	   was	   limited.	  
Similarly,	  in	  Rwanda,	  the	  universal	  health	  policy	  is	  very	  recent	  and	  the	  country	  does	  not	  have	  a	  long	  
tradition	  of	  research	  and	  data	  cataloguing.	  It	  appears	  that	  country-­‐specific	  research	  publications	  are	  
clustered	   around	   certain	   time	   periods,	   presumably	   times	   of	   political	   and	   economic	   flux	   or	   at	   the	  












published	  more	  recently	  were	  given	  priority	  but	  government	  publications	  –	  where	  possible	  –	  were	  
the	  primary	   source	  of	   information	  on	  expenditure	  and	  budgets.	  Papers	  addressing	   regional	  health	  
outcomes	  or	  processes	  were	  excluded.	  	  
	  
National	   facts	   and	   statistics	   were	   –	   where	   possible	   –	   triangulated	   to	   determine	   validity.	   	   Where	  
minor	   inconsistencies	   have	   emerged	   in	   the	   data	   an	   ad	   hoc	   process	   of	   determining	   reliability	   has	  
been	   employed;	   this	   considered	   the	   qualifications	   of	   the	   author	   and	   the	   number	   of	   citations	  
attributable	  to	  the	  source.	  
	  












SECTION	  SIX:	  CUBA	  
	  
Since	   1959,	   after	   the	   revolutionary	   victory	   over	   the	   Batista	   regime,	   the	   Cuban	   government	   has	  
prioritised	  the	  health	  care	  system,	   in	  the	  belief	  that	  health	  care	   is	  an	   inalienable	  human	  right.	  The	  
goal	   was	   “to	   guarantee	   every	   individual’s	   ‘right’	   to	   health	   care	   regardless	   of	   race	   or	   ethnicity,	  
through	   the	   public	   provision	   of	   comprehensive,	   free	   care	   in	   all	   regions	   of	   the	   country	   and	   public	  
health	   campaigns	   to	   reduce	   the	   threat	   of	   disease”	   (OAS,	   1983	   in	  Ullman,	   2005:	   7).	  With	   a	   rights-­‐
based	  conception	  of	  health	  care	  provision,	  which	  forms	  the	  primary	  tenet	  of	  national	  health	  policy,	  it	  
is	  no	  surprise	  that	  Cuba	  offers	  one	  of	  the	  most	  extensive	  universal	  health	  coverage	  packages.	  	  
	  
6.1	  The	  System	  
	  
6.1.1	  Universal	  Health	  Coverage	  
	  
Since	   1960,	   Cuba	   has	   pursued	   universal	   health	   coverage.	  While	   almost	   all	   healthcare	   services	   are	  
provided	   free	  of	   charge	   to	  all,	   at	   the	  expense	  of	   the	   state,	   a	   few	  additional	  medical	   expenses	  are	  
paid	  out	  of	  pocket	  by	  users.	  With	  100%	  coverage	  of	  almost	  all	  health	  care	  services,	  Cuba	  has	  become	  
the	  exemplar	  for	  both	  public	  health	  financing	  and	  universal	  coverage.	  
	  












6.1.2	  Overview	  of	  the	  health	  system	  prior	  to	  universal	  health	  care	  
	  
Prior	  to	  the	  1959	  Revolution,	  the	  Cuban	  health	  system	  was	  characterised	  by	  a	  segmented	  financing	  
framework	  with	   both	   private	   and	   public	   financing	   and	   provision	   of	   care.	   A	   social	   security	   system,	  
originating	  in	  1902,	  provided	  coverage	  which	  included	  workmen’s	  compensation	  and	  maternity	  care	  
(Ullman,	   2005).	   Members	   of	   the	   military	   and	   their	   dependents	   had	   their	   own	   health	   care	   plan	  
financed	  by	  the	  state	  (Kirk	  &	  Erisman,	  2009).	  	  
	  
There	   was	   also	   prepaid	   medical	   coverage	   in	   the	   form	   of	   Mutualist	   Health	   Associations.	   These	  
schemes	   were	   dominant	   from	   the	   1930s	   and	   by	   1958,	   there	   were	   over	   100	   mutual	   aid	   clinics	  
operating	   in	   Havana	   and	   Santiago	   de	   Cuba,	   with	   nearly	   one	   half	   of	   the	   Cuban	   population	   as	  
members	  (Sixto,	  2002).	  Members	  paid	  2	  to	  5	  pesos	  a	  month	  to	  receive	  health	  care	  from	  a	  non-­‐profit	  
provider.	   The	   government	   partially	   subsidised	   those	   unable	   to	   afford	   membership	   fees	   (Ullman,	  
2005).	  	  
	  
Cuban	  doctors	  were	  reimbursed	  on	  a	  fee-­‐for-­‐service	  basis	  conditional	  upon	  the	  number	  of	  patients	  
treated	  and	  services	  provided	  (Kirk	  &	  Erisman,	  2009).	  	  
	  
Even	  prior	   to	   the	   implementation	  of	   free	  health	   care	   in	   the	  1960s,	   a	   significant	  proportion	  of	   the	  
population	  was	   covered	  by	   a	  health	   care	  plan	  of	   some	  kind	   (Ullman,	   2005).	  Although	   it	  would	  be	  
unfair	  to	  suggest	  that	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  healthcare	  in	  Cuba	  had	  been	  substandard,	  there	  was	  a	  wide	  
disparity	  between	  developed	  and	  underdeveloped,	   rich	  and	  poor,	  and	  particularly	   rural	  and	  urban	  
areas.	  This	  resulted	  in	  inequitable	  access	  to	  health	  care	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  geography	  and	  quality	  (Kirk	  













Ideologically,	  provision	  of	  health	  care	  was	  not	  viewed	  as	  being	  a	  state	  mandate	  and	  there	  were	  no	  
official	  public	  health	  policies	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  
	  
6.1.3	  Overview	  of	  the	  health	  system	  under	  universal	  health	  care	  
	  
The	  1959	  Revolution	   radically	   altered	   the	   inequities	   in	  health	   care	  access.	  Article	  49	  of	   the	  Cuban	  
Constitution	  states	  that,	  “Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  the	  care	  and	  protection	  of	  their	  health.	  The	  State	  
guarantees	   this	   right:	   by	   offering	   free	   hospital	   and	   medical	   services...by	   offering	   free	   dental	  
treatment;	  by	  developing	  plans	  for	  sanitary	  efforts,	  health	  education,	  periodic	  medical	  examinations,	  
general	  vaccinations,	  and	  other	  preventative	  medical	  means”	  (cited	  in	  Kirk	  &	  Erisman,	  2009:	  30-­‐31).	  	  
	  
Under	   Castro,	   the	   Cuban	   Ministry	   of	   Public	   Health	   (MINSAP)	   assumed	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	  
organisation,	  implementation	  and	  regulation	  of	  the	  health	  system.	  Instead	  of	  relying	  on	  the	  market	  
to	   determine	   distribution	   of	   resources,	   the	   state	   had	   the	   authority	   to	   decide	   which	   services	   to	  
provide	   and	   in	  what	   quantity;	   how	   services	  would	   be	   delivered	   and	   in	  which	   areas;	   and	   played	   a	  
decisive	   role	   in	   planning	   how	   health	   services	   would	   be	   developed	   and	   improved	   in	   the	   long	   run	  
(Ullman,	  2005).	  
	  
Initially,	  the	  Ministry’s	  role	  was	  just	  to	  oversee	  the	  three	  financing	  arms	  of	  the	  health	  system:	  public,	  
mutualist	   (the	   pre-­‐paid	   health	   care	   system),	   and	   private.	   However,	   private	   services	   and	   financing	  
were	   nationalized	   fairly	   rapidly.	   By	   1961,	   only	   two	   years	   into	   the	   new	   regime,	   pharmaceutical	  
companies,	   private	   hospitals	   and	   mutualist	   organisations	   had	   been	   incorporated	   into	   the	   public	  
system	  (Sixto,	  2002).	  	  
	  
The	   Public	   Health	   Law	   (1983)	   specified	   three	   levels	   of	   health	   provision:	   At	   the	   national	   level	   the	  












pharmaceutical	   and	   biotechnological	   research.	   At	   provincial	   level,	   the	   Provincial	   Administrative	  
Council	   was	   in	   charge	   of	   hospitals,	   monitoring	   epidemiological	   trends	   and	   specialty	   training	   of	  
nurses	  working	  in	  blood	  banks.	  At	  the	  municipal	  level,	  a	  local	  council	  –	  elected	  by	  their	  communities	  
–	  ensured	   that	   the	  community	   received	  adequate	  care	   through	  health	  services	   responsive	   to	   their	  
needs	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  Representatives	  from	  all	  three	  levels	  were	  involved	  in	  planning.	  
	  
In	   1963,	   to	   improve	   access,	  many	   existing	   healthcare	   centres	  were	   consolidated	   into	  polyclinics	   –	  
primary	  healthcare	  units,	  which	  were	  also	  monitored	  by	   the	  municipal	   councils.	  These	   formed	  the	  
basis	  of	  a	   community	  health	  programme	  and,	  despite	  having	  an	  emphasis	  on	  curative	   rather	   than	  
preventative	   care,	   advocated	   for	   immunisations,	   blood	   drives	   and	   environmental	   improvements	  
(Ullman,	  2005).	  By	  1974,	  paediatric,	  maternal	  and	  internal	  medicine	  services	  were	  also	  provided	  by	  
the	  polyclinics	  (ibid.).	  	  	  
	  
Residents	  within	  a	  certain	  area	  all	   received	  care	   from	  the	  same	  polyclinic	  and	   the	  same	  physician,	  
with	   the	   intention	   of	   fostering	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   patients’	   needs	   and	   area-­‐specific	  
concerns	   (Sixto,	   2002).	   	   However,	   quality	   of	   services	   in	   the	   polyclinics	   was	   poor	   and	   patient	  
utilisation	   was	   very	   high.	   This	   resulted	   in	   overworked	   staff	   and	   an	   undersupply	   of	   medical	  
equipment	  and	  supplies	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  
	  
To	  address	  the	  challenges	  faced	  in	  provision	  of	  primary	  care,	  the	  Ministry	   implemented	  the	  Family	  
Doctor	   programme	   in	   1984	   which	   placed	   a	   nurse	   and	   a	   doctor	   in	   every	   neighbourhood.	   The	  
physician	  and	  nurse	  teams	  were	  given	  a	  home	  in	  the	  community	  and	  provided	  with	  a	  fully	  equipped	  
clinic.	   These	   consultarios,	   the	   primary	   health	   care	   units,	   continue	   to	   provide	   care	   for	   about	   120	  
households,	   but	   numbers	   vary	   according	   to	   population	   density.	   They	   are	   responsible	   not	   only	   for	  













Consultarios	   report	   to	   the	   nearest	   polyclinic	   from	   where	   patients	   are	   referred	   to	   a	   hospital	   if	  
necessary.	  This	  vertical	  integration	  of	  the	  health	  system	  succeeded	  in	  alleviating	  the	  use	  of	  hospitals	  
and	  emergency	  rooms,	  thereby	  reducing	  costs	  (Spiegel	  &	  Yassi,	  2004).	  This	  programme	  also	  fulfilled	  
the	  original	  preventative	  medicine	  mandate	   for	   the	  community	  health	  programme	  with	  significant	  
improvement	  in	  health	  outcomes.	  
	  
While	  almost	  all	  healthcare	  services	  are	  provided	  free	  of	  charge,	  a	  few	  additional	  medical	  expenses,	  
such	   as	   pharmaceutical	   drugs	   (although	   these	   are	   heavily	   subsidised),	   hearing,	   dental	   and	  
orthopaedic	   procedures,	   wheelchairs,	   crutches,	   prescription	   lenses	   and	   other	   medical	   equipment	  
are	  paid	  for	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  (Sixto,	  2002).	   It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	   low-­‐income	  groups	  are	  exempt	  
from	  these	  costs	  as	  well,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  show	  on	  what	  basis	  people	  are	  characterised	  as	  
low-­‐income	  (Spiegel	  &	  Yassi,	  2004).	  
	  
Funding	   for	   the	   health	   system	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   State.	   Data	   regarding	   the	   composition	   of	   public	  
revenue	  is	  scant	  and	  inconsistent,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  it	  is	  attributable	  to	  direct	  and	  indirect	  
taxes,	  foreign	  investment,	  loans	  and	  aid.	  Income	  tax	  in	  Cuba	  is	  progressive	  with	  the	  highest	  income	  
bracket,	  earning	  over	  CUP	  50,000	  paying	  50%	  of	  their	  income.	  Those	  earning	  less	  than	  CUP	  2,500	  are	  
exempt.	  	  
	  
The	   fact	   that	   the	  health	   system	   is	  almost	  entirely	   funded	  by	  government	   revenue	  means	   that	   risk	  















Human	  Resources	  for	  Health	  
Providing	  free	  health	  care	  for	  all,	  within	  a	  socialist	  context,	  meant	  that	  by	  necessity,	  health	  care	  had	  
to	  be	  provided	  by	  a	  workforce	  who	  sincerely	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  their	  duty	  to	  provide	  care	  to	  those	  in	  
need	  and	   that	   their	   labours	  should	  not	  be	  motivated	  by	  profit	   (Kirk	  &	  Erisman,	  2009).	  Since	  1959,	  
being	  a	  doctor	   in	  Cuba	  has	  been	  perceived	  as	  a	  privilege	  and	  medical	   students	  are	   taught	   to	  view	  
their	  practice	  as	  a	  selfless	  vocation	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
Just	   before	   Castro	   came	   into	   power,	   there	   were	   6,600	   doctors	   practising	   in	   Cuba,	   primarily	  
concentrated	  in	  urban	  areas	  (Ullman,	  2005).	   In	  1958,	  the	  physician	  to	  patient	  ratio	   in	  Cuba	  was	  92	  
per	  100,000:	  the	  ratio	  in	  Havana	  was	  238	  per	  100,000	  while	  in	  the	  rural	  province	  of	  Oriente	  it	  was	  
just	  40	  per	  100,000	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
Graduates	   of	   the	   single	  medical	   school	   in	   Cuba	  were	   compelled	   to	  work	   for	   a	   state	   or	   provincial	  
facility,	   but	   also	   had	   the	   option	   of	   private	   practice.	   The	   urban	   concentration	   of	   doctors,	   together	  
with	  mutual	  health	  insurance,	  resulted	  in	  a	  two-­‐tier	  system:	  in	  the	  cities,	  quality	  services,	  physicians	  
and	  hospital	  care	  were	  available	  to	  those	  who	  could	  pay	  for	  private	  health	  care,	  while	  those	  in	  rural	  
areas	  were	  underserved	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   Castro	   regime’s	   commitment	   to	   health	   for	   all,	   they	   faced	   a	   significant	   crisis	   in	   health	  
human	  resources	  just	  after	  assuming	  power.	  Between	  1958	  and	  1960,	  3000	  of	  the	  6000	  physicians	  in	  
Cuba	   left	   for	   the	  United	   States;	   the	   physician-­‐to-­‐patient	   ratio	   dropped	   to	   54	   doctors	   per	   100,000	  
inhabitants	  by	  1962	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Training	   of	   new	   doctors	   became	   a	   priority.	   The	   number	   of	   medical	   schools	   was	   increased	  












per	   100,000	   inhabitants	   reached	   100;	   by	   1990,	   it	   was	   361;	   and	   in	   1999,	   582	   (Sixto,	   2002),	  
representing	  an	  increase	  in	  physicians	  numbers	  from	  about	  3000	  to	  over	  78,000	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Cuba’s	  primary	  care-­‐led	  Family	  Doctor	  programme	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  its	  medical	  training	  have	  both	  
been	  identified	  as	  explanations	  for	  Cuba’s	  impressive	  basic	  health	  indicators.	  	  
	  
Doctors	   in	   post-­‐revolutionary	   Cuba	   are	   not	   allowed,	   by	   law,	   to	   accept	   payment	   from	  patients	   for	  
their	   services.	   Their	   training	   required	   that	   they	   adopt	   the	   communist	   political	   philosophy	   which	  
rejected	   private	  medical	   care	   (Ullman,	   2005)	   and	   instead	   of	   charging	   a	   fee,	   they	   receive	   a	   salary	  
determined	  by	  the	  State	  (Kirk	  &	  Erisman,	  2009).	  	  	  
	  












6.2	  The	  Process	  
	  
The	  commitment	  to	   implementing	  universal	  health	  coverage	  was	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  principles	  of	  
the	  Castro	   regime.	   The	  Revolution	   and	   the	   radical	   socialist	   reforms	  which	   accompanied	   it	   created	  
the	   platform	   for	   reforms	   to	   the	   health	   system.	   Although	   the	   authoritarian	   nature	   of	   governance	  
meant	  that	  this	  decision	  was	  binding,	  uptake	  and	  roll-­‐	  out	  of	  the	  policy	  was	  not	  without	  challenges.	  	  
	  
Those	  who	  rejected	  the	  socialist	  paradigm	  or	  blocked	  the	  reform	  process	  were	  no	  longer	  welcome	  in	  
Cuba,	  resulting	  in	  an	  initial	  mass	  exodus	  of	  health	  workers	  from	  the	  country	  (to	  be	  discussed	  later).	  
Castro’s	  ultimate	  authority	  meant	  that	  these	  challenges	  presented	  no	  threat	  to	  his	  regime,	  nor	  did	  
they	   impede	   the	   regime’s	   commitment	   to	   reform.	   Decision-­‐makers’	   authority	   to	   act	   on	   policy-­‐
implementation	  or	  change	  without	  the	  need	  for	  broad	  consensus	  facilitated	  a	  process	  which	  could	  
be	   highly	   responsive	   and	   flexible	   to	   changing	   requirements	   –	   such	   as	   rapidly	   training	   a	   health	  
workforce	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  brain-­‐drain.	  	  
	  
The	  Cuban	  heath	  system	  originally	  adopted	  a	   top-­‐down	  approach,	  with	  a	   strong	  central	  authority.	  
However,	   this	   system	   slowly	   evolved	   into	   a	   more	   participatory	   mode.	   For	   example,	   when	   over-­‐
utilisation	   of	   the	   polyclinic	   system	   led	   to	   diminished	   personal	   interaction,	   overcrowding	   and	  
deteriorating	  quality	  of	  care,	  patients	  sought	  care	  at	  emergency	  rooms,	  thus	  shifting	  the	  burden	  to	  
hospitals.	   In	   response,	   the	   Ministry	   undertook	   a	   second	   transformation	   of	   the	   health	   system,	  
incorporating	   a	  more	   bottom-­‐up	   approach	  with	   increased	   local	   autonomy	   and	   control	   of	   primary	  
health	  care	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  
	  
This	   combination	   of	   top-­‐down	   management	   and	   bottom-­‐up	   feedback	   implemented	   in	   Cuba	   -­‐	  
intentionally	   or	   not	   -­‐	   created	   a	   system	   which	   promoted	   open	   communication	   between	   service-­‐












improvements	   in	  processes	  are	   implemented	   to	  achieve	  desired	  outcomes	  on	  a	   continuous	  basis”	  
(2005:	  11).	  












6.3	  The	  Context	  
	  
6.3.1	  Political	  Context	  
	  
By	  late	  1958,	  public	  sentiment	  had	  turned	  against	  the	  Batista	  regime	  and	  its	  repressive	  policies	  and	  
was	  firmly	  in	  support	  of	  the	  revolution	  (Sweig,	  2009).	  
	  
Not	   long	   after	   the	   Cuban	   Revolution,	   the	   26th	   of	   July	  Movement	   –	   led	   by	   Fidel	   Castro	   –	   and	   the	  
Cuban	  Communist	  Party	  began	  to	   form	  a	  closer	  working	  relationship.	  The	  Cuban	  Communist	  Party	  
forged	  the	   link	  between	  Cuban	   leaders	  and	  the	  Russian	  government	  that	   led	  to	  Russian	  assistance	  
when	  US	  sanctions	  were	  implemented	  (Sweig,	  2009).	  
	  
For	  the	  new	  Cuban	  government,	  “the	  liberal	  democratic	  order	  came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  central	  to	  Cuba’s	  
vulnerability	   to	  capitalist	  exploitation	  and	  political	  control	  by	  the	  United	  States”	   (Sweig,	  2009:	  44).	  
Thus,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960s	  the	  sugar	   industry,	  oil	  refineries,	  utilities,	  transportation	  companies,	  
property	   and	   small	   businesses	   were	   all	   nationalised	   and	   under	   state	   management	   (ibid.).	   These	  
reforms	  aimed	   to	  address	   the	   socioeconomic	   status	  quo	  which	   skewed	  benefits	   towards	   to	  urban	  
elite.	  A	  significant	  part	  of	  this	  social	  justice	  agenda	  was	  the	  prioritisation	  of	  health	  and	  education.	  
	  
The	  Cuban	  government’s	  dedication	  to	  providing	  “health	  for	  all”	  came	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  
good	   health	   involves	   more	   than	   just	   medical	   interventions.	   In	   1989,	   a	   “healthy	   municipalities”	  
strategy	  was	   introduced	   (Spiegel	   &	   Yassi,	   2004)	   to	   promote	   improvements	   in	   non-­‐medical	   health	  
determinants	   such	  as	  nutrition,	  education,	   sports	  and	  housing.	  Multiple	   sectors	  were	   involved	  but	  













The	   Cuban	   system	   has	   been	   critiqued	   for	   abandoning	   the	   traditional	   democratic	   model	   of	  
governance	  having	  both	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  private	  sector	  and	  free	  and	  competitive	  elections.	  	  
	  
Yet,	  the	  Cuban	  Revolutionary	  government	  managed	  to	  sustain	  power	  and	  even	  survive	  the	  economic	  
crisis	  in	  the	  1990s.	  This	  success	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  the	  political	  system	  which	  through	  legitimate	  
governance,	  an	  active	  civil	  society,	  and	  responsiveness	  and	  accountability	  to	  the	  people,	  managed	  to	  
avoid	  the	  vulnerabilities	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  pitfalls	  (Saney,	  2004).	  	  
	  
6.3.2	  Economic	  Context	  
	  
In	   Cuba	   it	   is	   almost	   impossible	   to	   extricate	   the	   economic	   context	   from	   the	   political,	   primarily	  
because	  Cuba’s	  socialist	  ideology	  provides	  directives	  to	  both.	  	  
	  
The	   initial	   revolutionary	   reforms	   aimed	   to	   redistribute	   wealth	   in	   the	   country.	  Most	   sectors	   were	  
nationalised	  and	  minimum	  wages	   in	  agriculture,	   industry	  and	  commerce	  were	   increased.	  Taxes	  for	  
the	   working	   and	   middle	   classes	   were	   decreased	   while	   those	   for	   the	   rich	   were	   increased	   (Saney,	  
2004).	  	  
	  	  
In	  further	  efforts	  to	  reduce	  the	  socioeconomic	  inequalities	  in	  the	  country,	  the	  government	  instituted	  
policies	  to	  eliminate	  the	  disparities	  in	  access	  and	  quality	  of	  services	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas.	  
To	  provide	  better	  services	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  make	  optimal	  use	  of	  limited	  resources,	  rural	  residents	  
were	  clustered	   in	  communities	   large	  enough	  to	  make	  service	  provision	  viable	  and	  efficient	   (Saney,	  
2004).	  New	  rural	  towns	  were	  created	  with	  schools,	  clinics	  and	  libraries	  and	  residents	  were	  given	  new	  
homes.	   Rural	   areas	   were	   prioritised	   over	   urban	   ones,	   ensuring	   that	   rural	   towns	   received	   more	  
equitable	   allocations	   of	   labour	   and	   material	   resources	   (ibid.).	   Yet	   revolutionary	   idealism	   was	  













Cuba	  did	  not	  have	  the	  necessary	  capital,	  infrastructure,	  skilled	  labour,	  raw	  material	  or	  technology	  to	  
sustain	  economic	  development.	   In	  1961,	   the	  United	  States	  enforced	  an	  embargo	  on	  all	   trade	  with	  
Cuba.	  With	  the	  termination	  of	  trade	  with	  their	  biggest	  partner,	  the	  Cuban	  economy	  was	  buoyed	  by	  
external	  assistance	  from	  the	  Council	  of	  Mutual	  Economic	  Assistance	  (CMEA),	  comprising	  the	  Soviet	  
Union,	  Eastern	  European	  countries	  and	  Mongolia	  (Saney,	  2004).	  	  
	  
CMEA	  contributed	  investments,	  resources	  and	  technology	  for	  development	  projects.	  Between	  1960	  
and	  1990,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  gave	  Cuba	  approximately	  US$465	  billion	  in	  foreign	  aid	  and	  loans	  and	  was	  
a	   partner	   in	   85%	   of	   all	   Cuba’s	   trade	   (81%	   of	   exports	   and	   88%	   of	   imports)	   and	   75%	   of	   its	   finance	  
(Sixto,	  2002;	  Ullman,	  2005;	  Nayeri	  &	  Lopez-­‐Pardo,	  2005).	  
	  
Trading	   was	   based	   on	   preferential	   pricing	   and	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   commercial	   patronage	   from	   the	  
Soviet	  Union,	  between	  1979	  and	  1989,	   the	  Cuban	  economy	  grew	  at	  an	  average	  annual	   rate	  of	  6%	  
(ibid.).	  
	  	  
The	  dependence	  on	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  made	  Cuba	  vulnerable	  and	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  CMEA	  at	  the	  end	  of	  
the	   1980s	   left	   it	  without	   its	  main	   trading	  partners	   and	  major	   source	  of	   investment.	  After	   over	   30	  
years,	   Cuba	   realised	   the	   effects	   of	   its	   economic	   dependence	  on	   the	   Soviet	  Union.	   The	   end	  of	   the	  
trade	   relationship	   with	   CMEA	   exposed	   Cuba	   to	   world	   market	   prices	   –	   coupled	   with	   a	   decline	   in	  
primary	   commodity	   exports	   which	   had	   previously	   been	   traded	   at	   above	  market	   prices	   (Dunning,	  
2001).	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  “Special	  Period”	  in	  Cuba	  and	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  economic	  crash.	  
	  
From	  1989	  to	  1993,	  the	  GDP	  declined	  by	  35-­‐40%;	  per	  capita	  income	  declined	  by	  39%;	  and	  all	  imports	  













In	   reaction,	   the	   government	   implemented	   a	   range	   of	   economic	   stimulation	   policies,	   including	   the	  
establishment	   of	   small	   private	   enterprises,	   legalisation	   of	   possession	   of	   foreign	   currency	   and	   the	  
development	   of	   a	   tourism	   sector.	   These	   policies	   began	   integrating	   Cuba	   back	   into	   the	   world	  
economy	  and	  were	   successful	   in	  halting	   the	  economic	  decline	   as	  well	   as	  promoting	   growth.	   From	  
1995	   to	  2000,	   the	  economy	  grew	  at	  almost	  5%	  percent	  per	  annum	  and	   imports	  and	  exports	  have	  
steadily	  increased	  (Saney,	  2004).	  	  
	  
The	  government	  still	  accounts	  for	  more	  than	  80%	  of	  all	  employment	  in	  the	  country	  and	  some	  of	  the	  
regulations	  which	  limit	  the	  private	  sector	  have	  been	  eased	  to	  improve	  efficiency	  but	  the	  economy	  is	  
mostly	  still	  under	  state	  control	  (2012	  Index	  of	  Economic	  Freedom).	  	  
	  
Despite	   the	   incorporation	   of	  more	  market-­‐based	   reforms,	   Cuba	   has	   remained	   loyal	   to	   its	   original	  
commitment	   to	  health,	   education	  and	   social	   security.	   Even	  during	   the	  Special	   Period,	   investments	  
into	  these	  sectors	  actually	  increased.	  	  
	  













6.4	  The	  Effects	  
	  
6.4.1	  Health	  service	  utilization	  and	  health	  outcomes	  
	  
Health	   outcome	   indicators	   before	   1959	   were	   relatively	   poor	   in	   rural	   areas,	   with	   high	   rates	   of	  
infectious	  diseases	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
	  
After	  1960,	  infant	  mortality	  has	  been	  reported	  to	  have	  decreased	  from	  37.3	  per	  1000	  live	  births	  to	  
34	   per	   1000	   live	   births	   in	   1970	   and	   19.6	   per	   1000	   live	   births	   in	   1980	   (Ullman,	   2005),	   probably	  
accounted	  for	  by	  increased	  hospital	  deliveries	  and	  abortions	  as	  a	  means	  of	  birth	  control	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
During	  the	  economic	  crisis	  between	  1990	  and	  1994	  –	  the	  “Special	  Period”	  -­‐	  mortality	  rates	  increased	  
from	   64	   per	   10,000	   people	   to	   72	   per	   10,000.	   Approximately	   half	   of	   the	   food	   supplies	   had	   been	  
imported,	  embargoes	  made	   it	  challenging	  to	  maintain	  adequate	   food	  security	  and	  nutrition	   (ibid.),	  
with	   serious	   malnutrition	   affecting	   newborns	   and	   pregnant	   women	   (Ullman,	   2005).	   Access	   to	  
medicines	  and	  medical	  equipment	  was	  also	  limited	  and	  several	  health	  facilities	  were	  closed.	  	  
	  
Overall,	  the	  infectious	  diseases,	  malnutrition	  and	  lack	  of	  resources	  which	  accompanied	  the	  economic	  
crisis	  seriously	  affected	  the	  delivery	  of	  proper	  treatment	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Careful	  resource	  allocation	  and	  increased	  donor	  assistance	  helped	  the	  Cuban	  government	  to	  recover	  
by	  the	  2000s.	  The	  Cuban	  government	  maintained	   its	  commitment	  to	  health	  and	  aimed	  to	   improve	  
primary	  care	  through	  an	  increase	  in	  health	  care	  providers.	  Between	  1990	  and	  2003,	  the	  number	  of	  
doctors	   increased	   by	   76%	   and	  nurses	   by	   16%	   (Nayeri	  &	   Lopez-­‐Pardo,	   2005).	   The	   Family	   Physician	  












cover	  99.2%	  of	  the	  population	  by	  2003	  (Nayeri	  &	  Lopez-­‐Pardo,	  2005).	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  perinatal,	  
infant,	  under-­‐5	  and	  5-­‐15	  years	  and	  maternal	  mortality	  all	   showed	   improvements	   (Nayeri	  &	  Lopez-­‐
Pardo,	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	  2004,	  the	  Cuban	  population	  had	  one	  of	  the	  highest	  life	  expectancies	  in	  the	  Caribbean	  region	  at	  75	  
years	  for	  males	  and	  79	  years	  for	  women	  (WHO	  in	  Ullman,	  2005).	   Infant	  mortality	   in	  the	  same	  year	  
was	  a	  low	  7	  per	  1000	  births	  –	  down	  from	  10.2	  per	  1000	  in	  1992	  (ibid.).	  
	  
Overall,	  the	  Cuban	  health	  system	  proved	  resilient	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis	  of	  the	  1990s,	  a	  consequence	  
which	   has	   been	   attributed	   to	   the	   continued	   prioritisation	   of	   health	   as	   a	   human	   right,	   as	   well	   as	  
sound	   rationing	   of	   limited	   resources	   (de	   Vos	   et	   al,	   2008).	   However,	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   the	  
Cuban	   health	   system	   is	   without	   current	   challenges,	   the	   most	   pertinent	   of	   which	   is	   the	   state	   of	  
human	  resources.	  
	  
6.4.2	  Human	  Resources	  for	  Health	  
	  
While	  the	  number	  of	  physicians	  and	  nurses	  in	  Cuba	  has	  been	  increasing,	  the	  number	  of	  new	  medical	  
school	   enrolees	   has	   been	   decreasing	   since	   1995.	   The	   combined	   effects	   of	   a	   huge	   surplus	   of	  
physicians,	   the	   prohibition	   on	   private	   medical	   practice,	   and	   the	   fact	   that	   other	   occupations	   –	  
particularly	   those	   in	   tourism	   –	   provide	   higher	   salaries	   and	   greater	   access	   to	   dollars,	   create	  
disincentives	   for	   entry	   into	   the	  health	   sector,	   or	   incentives	   to	  emigrate	   (Sixto,	   2002).	  A	   successful	  
mechanic	  in	  Havana	  could	  make	  up	  to	  4,000	  dollars	  a	  month,	  while	  a	  leading	  physician	  would	  make	  
about	  500	  pesos	  or	   twenty-­‐five	  dollars	   a	  month	   (Dunning,	   2001).	   Increasingly,	   doctors	   are	   leaving	  













This	  internal	  brain-­‐drain	  is	  exacerbated	  by	  the	  external	  brain	  drain	  of	  doctors	  emigrating	  to	  practice	  
elsewhere.	  In	  1999,	  244	  doctors	  left	  the	  country	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  	  	  
	  
The	   quality	   of	   Cuba’s	   health	   workers	   has	   been	   recognised	   internationally,	   with	   accompanying	  
increase	   in	   external	   demand.	   Between	   2003	   and	   2005	   the	   number	   of	   Cuban	   doctors	   working	  
overseas	  increased	  from	  5000	  to	  25,000	  (de	  Vos	  et	  al,	  2008).	  Currently,	  the	  implication	  of	  this	  is	  not	  
only	  a	  high	  turnover	  of	  healthcare	  workers,	  but	   in	  some	  areas,	  doctors	  are	  caring	   for	  1500	  people	  
instead	  of	  the	  600-­‐800	  served	  before	  (de	  Vos	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  
In	   Revolutionary	   Cuba,	   practising	   medicine	   was	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prestigious	   professions,	   yet	   the	  
dollarization	  of	   the	  Cuban	  economy,	  coupled	  with	  the	  fact	   that	   financing	   for	  health	  workers	   is	  still	  
peso-­‐based,	  has	  diminished	  this	  prestige.	  This	  disincentive	   is	  possibly	   the	  greatest	   threat	   to	  health	  
care	  in	  Cuba.	  	  
	  
The	  government	  has	  started	  to	  try	  to	  pay	  bonuses	  in	  dollars,	  but	  this	  practice	  has	  not	  been	  extended	  
to	   public	   health.	   For	   the	  most	   part	   the	   strategy	   appears	   to	   be	   continued	   reliance	   on	   the	   human	  
capital	  provided	  by	  the	  many	  doctors	  in	  Cuba	  and	  the	  political	  will	  that	  characterises	  both	  the	  state’s	  
commitment	  to	  health	  as	  well	  as	  the	  commitment	  of	  its	  doctors	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  
	  
According	   to	   Dunning	   (2001:	   20),	   “the	   strength	   of	   budgetary	   support	   for	   peso-­‐dominated	   health	  
expenditures	  on	  the	   family	  doctor	  system	  and	  primary	  care	  suggest	  a	  political	  decision	  about	  who	  
would	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  structural	  adjustment	   in	  the	  economy”.	  With	   limited	  budgetary	  resources,	  
the	  challenging	  conditions	  of	  working	  in	  the	  health	  sector	  and	  the	  increasing	  devaluation	  of	  salaries,	  













6.5	  The	  Economics	  of	  Health	  Financing	  
	  
The	   Cuban	   National	   Health	   System	   is	   financed	   entirely	   by	   state	   resources.	   With	   a	   decentralised	  
system,	  over	  92%	  of	  the	  expenditure	  on	  public	  health	  comes	  from	  municipal	  budgets	  (Sixto,	  2002).	  
The	  national	  commitment	  to	  healthcare	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  health	  budget	  allocations:	  51	  million	  pesos	  
in	  1960,	  increasing	  to	  1,857	  million	  pesos	  in	  2000,	  the	  real	  value	  of	  which	  expenditure	  was	  reduced	  
by	  increasing	  inflation	  over	  the	  same	  period	  (Sixto,	  2002).	  
	  
The	  cost	  of	  the	  Cuban	  health	  system	  was	  mitigated	  by	  significant	  aid	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  
Eastern	   European	   socialist	   countries;	   Cuba	   imported	   the	   majority	   of	   its	   medical	   equipment	   and	  
other	  inputs	  through	  the	  CMEA,	  with	  a	  long-­‐term	  bilateral	  export-­‐import	  agreement	  which	  allowed	  
for	  significant	  price	  subsidies	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  
	  
However,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  1991	  and	  the	  termination	  of	  both	  aid	  from	  and	  trade	  
with	  this	  state	  forced	  Cuba	  into	  economic	  crisis.	  	  
	  
With	   a	   70%	   decline	   in	   trade	  with	   the	   former	   Soviet	   Union	   and	   a	   35%	   drop	   in	   its	   GDP,	   Cuba	  was	  
forced	  to	  reduce	  public	  health	  spending	  by	  70%	  (Ullman,	  2005).	   	  The	  economic	  decline	  resulted	   in	  
electricity	  and	  food	  shortages	  and	  an	  unstable	  exchange	  rate	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  Another	  consequence	  
was	  a	  foreign	  exchanges	  scarcity.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  decline	  in	  medical	  imports.	  According	  to	  the	  Ministry	  
of	   Public	   Health,	   between	   1989	   and	   1993,	   total	   expenditure	   in	   foreign	   exchange	   dropped	   from	  
US$227	  million	  to	  US$56	  million	  in	  1993	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Added	  to	  this,	  were	  increased	  trade	  restrictions	  instituted	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  US-­‐based	  companies	  
and	  foreign	  subsidiaries	  of	  US	  companies	  were	  banned	  from	  all	  trade	  and	  non-­‐US	  companies’	  ability	  












prevented	   Cuba	   from	   accessing	   necessary	   medicines	   and	   medical	   equipment,	   yet	   other	   suggest	  
these	  shortages	  were	   the	   result	  of	  poor	  planning	   (Barry,	  2000;	  Mesa-­‐Lago,	  2002	   in	  Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
One	  positive	  outcome	  of	  this	  period	  was	  that	  the	  embargoes	  on	  pharmaceutical	  imports	  forced	  Cuba	  
to	   investigate	  alternatives	  and	  establish	   its	  own	  pharmaceutical	   and	  biotechnology	   industries.	   The	  
development	  and	  production	  of	  generic	  drugs	  violated	  some	  patent	  laws,	  but	  met	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
population	   and	   generated	   additional	   revenues	   from	   sale	   of	   locally-­‐produced	   pharmaceuticals	   to	  
other	  countries	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  
	  
The	  effect	  of	  the	  US	  embargoes	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  paternalistic	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  
meant	  that	  Cuba	  suffered	  a	  shortage	  of	  hard-­‐currency.	  The	  national	  health	  finance	  system	  relies	  on	  
a	  dollar	  budget	  to	  finance	  its	  imports	  (Nayeri	  &	  Lopez-­‐Pardo,	  2005).	  	  
	  























Therefore,	  expenditure	  on	  health-­‐related	   imports	  dropped	  between	   the	  end	  of	   the	  1980s	  and	   the	  
mid-­‐1990s	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  challenges	  which	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  presented,	  Cuba	  implemented	  
health	   reforms.	   Reforms	   were	   being	   implemented	   throughout	   Latin	   America,	   but	   unlike	   its	  
counterparts	  who	  adopted	  the	  conservative	  framework	  advocated	  by	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  1993	  World	  
Development	  Report,	  Cuba	  remained	  faithful	   to	  the	  original	   tenets	  of	   its	  health	  system.	   Instead	  of	  
introducing	   user	   fees	   and	   privatising	   the	   sector,	   Cuba	   maintained	   its	   exclusively	   public	   national	  
health	  system	  (de	  Vos	  et	  al,	  2006).	  
	  
The	  government’s	  commitment	  to	  health	  was	  not	  shaken.	  In	  1994,	  5.5%	  of	  the	  national	  GDP	  –	  1061	  
million	  pesos	  –	  was	  spent	  on	  health	  care	  and	  represented	  14%	  of	  all	  public	  sector	  spending	  (Ullman,	  
2005).	  Financial	  support	  for	  this	  commitment	  came	  from	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  national	  peso	  budget	  
which	  is	  used	  to	  finance	  internal	  resources	  for	  the	  health	  system,	  such	  as	  personnel	  (Nayeri	  &	  Lopez-­‐
Pardo,	  2005).	  Despite	   the	   reduction	   in	   foreign	  exchange	  expenditure,	  peso-­‐dominated	  health	   care	  
spending	  increased	  and	  spending	  in	  this	  sector,	   in	  absolute	  terms,	  was	  cut	   less	  than	  in	  other	  areas	  
such	  as	  food	  and	  oil	  (Ullman,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Health	  expenditures	  showed	  absolute	  increases	  throughout	  the	  1990s	  –	  increasing	  from	  937	  million	  
pesos	   in	   1990	   to	   1,410	  million	   pesos	   in	   1999.	   That	   is	   an	   increase	   from	   6.6	   of	   the	   budget	   to	   10.7	  
percent	   of	   the	   budget	   (Dunning,	   2001).	   However,	   the	   real	   value	   of	   government	   peso-­‐dominated	  
health	  expenditure	  declined	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  The	  Economic	  Commission	  for	  Latin	  America	  and	  
the	  Caribbean	  recorded	  expenditure	  decreases	  in	  real	  terms	  from	  914	  million	  pesos	  in	  1990	  to	  859	  
million	  pesos	  in	  1998	  for	  health	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  In	  1993,	  domestic	  trade	  in	  dollars	  was	  legalised	  and	  













The	   Special	   Period	  posed	  major	   challenges	   for	   the	  Cuban	  health	   sector	  but	   it	   has	  been	   suggested	  
that	  the	  crisis	  was	  mitigated	  by	  humanitarian	  aid.	  	  
	  
After	   the	   1990s,	   Cuba	   received	   loans	   and	   humanitarian	   aid	   from	   the	   Pan	   American	   Health	  
Organisation	   (PAHO),	   the	   United	   Nations	   Population	   Fund,	   the	   United	   Nations	   Development	  
Programme	   and	   the	   United	   Nations	   International	   Children	   and	   Education	   Fund	   (Sixto,	   2002).	   The	  
European	   Union	   Humanitarian	   Organisation	   started	   relief	   funding	   in	   1993	   and	   by	   1995	   was	  
allocating	  15	  million	  Euros	  annually	  to	  supplying	  food	  and	  medicine	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  Between	  1993	  
and	  1996	   total	   European	   funding	  was	   almost	   85	  million	   Euros,	   in	   addition	   to	  more	   than	  1	  million	  
Euros	  from	  member	  states	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
The	  donations	  received	  may	  have	  offset	  the	  deficits	  which	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Special	  Period	  
but	  donations	  are	  not	  a	  reliable	  source	  of	  funding.	  
	  
In	  2000,	  health	  care	  spending	  in	  Cuba	  represented	  6.1%	  of	  the	  GDP	  and	  approximately	  90%	  of	  this	  
was	  allocated	  to	  the	  primary	  health	  care	  level	  (Ullman,	  2005).	   In	  2002,	  the	  health	  care	  budget	  was	  
over	  1,900,000	  pesos	  –	  171	  pesos	  per	  capita	  (ibid.).	  
	  
Despite	   the	  health	   care	   resource	   scarcity	   of	   the	  1990s,	   economic	   recovery	   in	  Cuba,	   in	   addition	   to	  
consistent	  public	  policies,	  has	  allowed	  the	  health	  system	  to	  recover.	  	  
	  
Overall,	  the	  Special	  Period	  resulted	  in	  decreases	  in	  imported	  health	  resources	  that	  were	  dependent	  
on	   foreign	   exchange	   but	   the	   government	   maintained	   its	   health	   priorities	   by	   increasing	   peso-­‐













These	  choices	  have	  had	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  health	  care.	  The	  health	  financing	  
system	  in	  Cuba	  is	  peso-­‐dominated,	  yet	  as	  of	  1993,	  the	  broader	  economy	  has	  been	  “dollarized”	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  forge	  better	  linkages	  with	  the	  world	  economy.	  Dollars	  enter	  the	  Cuban	  markets	  through	  
remittances	  sent	  from	  relatives	  abroad,	  tourism	  and	  foreign	  direct	  investment.	  The	  dollar	  economy	  
in	   Cuba	   has	   essentially	   devalued	   the	   peso	   and	   is	   creating	   a	   structural	   problem	  within	   the	   health	  
sector	  since	  most	  health	  workers	  have	  peso-­‐based	  salaries	  financed	  by	  the	  state	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  	  
	  
This	  dual	  economy	  also	  helps	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  health	  sector	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  health	  education	   in	  
Cuba	  are	   relatively	   low.	   The	   salaries	  of	   health	  workers	   and	   the	   cost	   of	   tuition	  are	  paid	   for	   by	   the	  
state	  in	  pesos,	  while	  public	  revenue	  is	  bolstered	  by	  foreign	  exchange	  (Dunning,	  2001).	  












SECTION	  SEVEN:	  THAILAND	  
	  
In	   2001,	   Thailand	   became	   one	   of	   the	   first	   developing	   countries	   to	   introduce	   universal	   health	  
coverage	   (Khanna,	   2010).	   The	   newly	   elected	   Thai	   Rak	   Thai	   political	   party	   reformed	   the	   existing	  
health	  system	  to	  achieve	  universal	  health	  coverage	  and	  a	  relatively	  comprehensive	  benefits	  package.	  	  
	  
The	  rapid	  introduction	  of	  universal	  health	  care	  in	  Thailand	  has	  been	  termed	  a	  “big	  bang”	  approach.	  
However,	   this	   policy	   was	   supported	   by	   a	   commitment	   to	   health	   and	   social	   development	   reform	  
which	  spans	  decades.	  	  
	  
	  7.1	  The	  System	  
	  
7.1.1	  Universal	  Coverage	  
	  
Thailand	   implemented	   a	   universal	   health	   coverage	   policy	   in	   2001	   in	   response	   to	   the	   inequitable	  
health	  care	  access	  experienced	  by	  the	  poor	  and	  those	  in	  the	  informal	  sector	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2005).	  	  
	  
Rapid	  roll-­‐out	  of	  the	  policy	  meant	  that	  by	  2005,	  75%	  of	  the	  population	  was	  covered	  by	  the	  universal	  
healthcare	  scheme	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004),	  20%	  by	  other	  health	  insurance	  schemes	  and	  only	  5%	  of	  
the	  total	  population	  did	  not	  have	  health	  insurance	  coverage	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
Under	  the	  Universal	  Coverage	  Scheme,	  beneficiaries	  are	  entitled	  to	  a	  package	  of	  health	  care	  services	  
that	   includes	   “ambulatory	   care,	   in-­‐patient	   care,	   high	   cost	   care,	   accident	   and	   emergency	   care,	  
maternity	   services,	   an	   annual	   physical	   check	   up,	   preventative	   and	   promotive	   health	   services”,	   as	  













7.1.2	  Overview	  of	  the	  health	  system	  prior	  to	  universal	  health	  care	  
	  
As	   early	   as	   1975,	   the	  Thai	   government	   launched	   the	   Low	   Income	  Scheme	   (also	   referred	   to	   as	   the	  
Public	  Welfare	  Scheme)	  which	  aimed	   to	  provide	   targeted	  health	   insurance	   for	   the	  poor,	   for	   those	  
over	  60	  years,	  children	  under	  12	  years	  and	  monks.	  However,	  evidence	  from	  a	  household	  survey	   in	  
2000	   suggests	   that	   only	   17%	   of	   the	   poor	   were	   covered	   by	   this	   scheme	   and	   only	   35%	   of	   the	  
beneficiaries	  were	  actually	  poor	  (Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  	  
	  
Additional	  coverage	  was	  provided	  on	  a	  voluntary	  basis	  for	  those	  who	  were	  not	  eligible	  for	  the	  Low	  
Income	  Scheme	  (Khanna,	  2010).	  In	  1983,	  this	  scheme	  was	  formalised	  and	  the	  Voluntary	  Health	  Card	  
was	   introduced	   to	   cover	   borderline	   non-­‐poor	   households.	   Initially,	   the	   scheme	   focussed	   on	  
community-­‐based	  health	   insurance	   for	  maternal	   and	   child	  health	  managed	  by	   village	   committees,	  
but	   was	   gradually	   expanded	   to	   include	   other	   services,	   until	   becoming	   a	   formal	   voluntary	   health	  
insurance	   in	   1991,	   with	   government	   subsidizing	   50%	   of	   the	   premium	   (Tangcharoensathien	   et	   al,	  
2007).	   According	   to	   Khanna	   (2010),	   as	   a	   voluntary	   scheme	   it	   suffered	   from	   risk	   selection	   as	   the	  
healthy	  opted	  out.	  Yet	  despite	  this,	  the	  scheme	  still	  managed	  to	  improve	  population	  coverage	  from	  
1.4%	  in	  1991	  to	  20.8%	  in	  2001	  (Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
	  
The	   other	   major	   insurance	   pool	   was	   the	   Civil	   Servants	   Medical	   Benefits	   Scheme	   (CSMBS)	   which	  
provided	  public	   servants	  and	   their	  dependents	  with	  a	  generous	  benefits	  package.	   In	  1991,	  15%	  of	  
the	   population	   was	   covered	   by	   this	   scheme	   but	   by	   2001,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   and	  
reductions	  in	  fiscal	  spending,	  this	  reduced	  to	  8.5%	  (Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Lastly,	  there	  was	  a	  Social	  Security	  Scheme	  for	  formal,	  private	  sector	  employees	  financed	  in	  a	  three-­‐
way	  equal	  share	  co-­‐payment	  with	  a	  mandatory	  contribution	  from	  government	  and	  the	  employer	  and	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(Source:	  Damrongplasit,	  2009	  in	  Khanna,	  2010)	  
	  












Table	  2:	  Percentage	  of	  Population	  Covered	  
Health	  Insurance	  
schemes	  
1991	   1996	   2001	  
The	  Low	  Income	  Scheme	   12.7	   12.6	   32.4	  
Civil	  Servants	  Medical	  
Benefits	  Scheme	  
15.3	   10.2	   8.5	  
Voluntary	  Health	  Card	   1.4	   15.3	   20.8	  
Social	  Security	  Scheme	   -­‐	   5.6	   7.2	  
Private	  Health	  Insurance	   4.0	   1.8	   2.1	  
Total	  Insured	   33.4	   45.5	   71.0	  
Source:	  Wibulpolprasert,	  2005	  and	  Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007	  
	  
7.1.3	  Overview	  of	  the	  health	  system	  under	  universal	  health	  care	  
	  
Health	   system	   reform	   in	   Thailand	   aimed	   to	   achieve	   several	   objectives:	   firstly,	   to	   improve	   health	  
systems’	  efficiency,	  reflected	  as	  better	  use	  of	  health	  care	  facilities	  and	  cost	  containment;	  secondly,	  
to	   ensure	   equity	   through	   the	   standardisation	   of	   benefits	   offered	   by,	   and	   equal	   access	   to	   the	  
available	  public	  insurance	  schemes;	  thirdly,	  to	  practice	  good	  governance	  by	  separating	  the	  purchaser	  
and	  provider	  roles	  within	  the	  Universal	  Coverage	  Scheme	  (UCS);	  and	  lastly,	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  
care	  provided	  (Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007).	  
	  
The	  UCS	  was	  intended	  as	  an	  improvement	  on	  the	  Low	  Income	  and	  Voluntary	  Health	  Card	  schemes.	  
The	  Low	  Income	  Card	  scheme	  was	  not	  reaching	  the	  poor	  effectively	  and	  the	  Voluntary	  Health	  Card	  
scheme	  suffered	  from	  risk	  selection	  and	  required	  a	  co-­‐payment	  which	  was	  not	  always	  affordable	  for	  
those	   who	   needed	   it.	   After	   2001,	   the	   Civil	   Servants	   scheme	   and	   the	   Social	   Security	   Scheme	   still	  
existed,	   but	   those	   ineligible	   for	   these	   benefits,	   namely	   those	   in	   the	   informal	   sector	   who	   had	  
previously	   been	   covered	   by	   the	   Low	   Income	   and	   Voluntary	   Health	   Card	   schemes,	   were	   provided	  
with	  universal	  access	  to	  care	  under	  the	  UCS.	   	   Initially,	  those	  wishing	  to	  be	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  UCS	  












upon	  a	  30	  Baht	  co-­‐payment	  per	  outpatient	  visit	  or	  inpatient	  admission.	  However,	  this	  practice	  of	  co-­‐
payment	  was	  abolished	  in	  2006	  by	  the	  new	  government	  (Khanna,	  2010).	  
	  
In	  2001,	  71%	  of	  the	  Thai	  population	  was	  covered	  by	  health	  insurance,	   increasing	  to	  94.3%	  in	  2004.	  
73.5%	   of	   this	   achievement	   is	   attributable	   to	   the	   universal	   healthcare	   scheme	   which	   resulted	   in	  
coverage	  of	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  rural	  beneficiaries	  than	  that	  for	  the	  urban	  population.	  	  The	  latter	  
had	   greater	   coverage	   under	   the	   social	   security	   system	   and	   the	   civil	   servant	   benefit	   scheme	  
(Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	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The	   introduction	  of	   the	  Universal	  Coverage	  Scheme	  provided	  access	  to	  comprehensive	  health	  care	  
for	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   population	   who	   otherwise	   would	   not	   have	   had	   access	   to	   such	   services.	  
However,	  under	  the	  Civil	  Servant	  Medical	  Benefit	  and	  Social	  Security	  schemes	  users	  were	  provided	  
with	  access	  to	  both	  public	  and	  private	  providers	  –	  thereby	  granting	  them	  freedom	  of	  choice	  in	  the	  
quality	  of	  service	  provided	  which	  UCS	  users	  do	  have.	  This	   is	   in	  part	  reflected	  in	  the	  per	  capita	  cost	  
difference	  between	  the	  UCS	  and	  the	  CSMBS	  (Khanna,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Between	   1991	   and	   2004,	   the	   proportion	   of	   people	  with	   access	   to	   health	   facilities	   increased	   from	  
49%	  to	  72%	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  Amongst	  those	  who	  previously	  did	  not	  have	  health	  insurance,	  
the	   implementation	   of	   the	   universal	   healthcare	   scheme	   increased	   coverage	   from	   47%	   in	   1991	   to	  
61%	  in	  2004	  (ibid.).	  
	  
Experience	   with	   the	   Low	   Income	   Scheme	   provided	   the	   historical	   precedent	   for	   a	   comprehensive	  
benefit	  package.	  Private	  beds,	   special	  nurses,	   cosmetic	   surgery	  and	  eye	  glasses	  are	  excluded	   from	  
the	   benefits	   package.	   Initially,	   costly	   treatments	   such	   as	   HIV/AIDS	   treatment,	   dialysis	   and	   renal	  
replacement	  therapy	  were	  also	  excluded	  but	  in	  2003	  HIV/AIDS	  treatment	  was	  included	  and	  in	  2007,	  
dialysis	  and	  renal	  replacement	  therapy	  were	  included	  within	  the	  scheme’s	  benefit	  package	  (Khanna,	  
2010:	  8).	  	  
	  
A	   key	   feature	   of	   the	   Thai	   Universal	   Coverage	   design	   is	   the	   purchaser-­‐provider	   split.	   The	   National	  
Health	   Security	   Office	   acts	   as	   the	   purchaser	   of	   care	   (paying	   the	   primary	   care	   health	   facilities),	  
designs	  the	  benefit	  package	  and	  co-­‐ordinates	  the	  payment	  methods.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health,	  
in	  addition	  to	  private	  facilities	  and	  institutions	  are	  responsible	  for	  providing	  the	  health	  care	  services	  













Primary	  health	  care	  facilities	  are	  the	  main	  contractors	  for	  service	  provision.	  In	  most	  cases,	  they	  are	  
the	   fund	   holders	   and	   are	   responsible	   for	   referrals	   and	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	   payment	   to	   secondary	   and	  
tertiary	   facilities	   (Khanna,	   2010).	   In	   rural	   areas,	   the	   public	   district	   health	   system	   is	   the	   primary	  
provider	   of	   health	   services	   but	   in	   urban	   areas,	   the	   provider	   may	   be	   either	   the	   public	   system	   or	  
private	  hospitals	  as	  long	  as	  they	  register	  with	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health.	  	  
	  
The	  health	  facilities	  have	  to	  register	  to	  be	  providers	  and	  are	  required	  to	  provide	  free	  care.	  Providers	  
are	  paid	  on	  a	  capitation	  basis	  for	  outpatient	  services,	  except	  in	  the	  case	  of	  emergencies	  or	  accidents.	  
In	   the	  event	  of	  an	  accident	  or	  emergency,	  beneficiaries	  are	   then	  allowed	   to	  access	   secondary	  and	  
tertiary	  facilities	  without	  the	  otherwise	  necessary	  referral	  from	  the	  primary	  health	  facilities	  and	  the	  
health	   facility	   is	   reimbursed	   on	   a	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	   schedule	   (Khanna,	   2010).	   In-­‐patient	   services	   are	  
financed	  through	  a	  global	  budget	  –	  set	  at	  a	  national	  level	  (Khanna,	  2010).	  	  
	  
	  












7.2	  The	  Process	  
	  
The	   Thai	   Rak	   Thai	   (TRT)	   Party	   used	   “30	   Baht	   to	   treat	   all	   diseases”	   as	   its	  main	   election	   campaign	  
slogan	  and	  after	  being	  elected	   in	  2001,	   fulfilled	  their	  promise	  and	  made	  providing	  universal	  health	  
care	   a	   priority.	   The	   political	   will	   which	   the	   TRT	   displayed	   found	   congruency	   with	   a	   wider	   health	  
reform	  movement	  active	  in	  Thailand	  which	  made	  generating	  a	  consensus	  more	  feasible.	  	  
	  
Eleven	   non-­‐governmental	   groups	   –	   comprising	   of	   both	   civil	   society	   and	   research	   organisations	   –	  
were	   involved	   in	   drafting	   the	  Universal	   Coverage	  Bill	   submitted	   to	   Parliament	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  
2001	  (Khanna,	  2010).	  The	   implementation	  of	  the	  scheme	  was	  top-­‐down	  and	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  
Health	   gradually	   scaled	   up	   coverage	   over	   a	   rapid	   four	   phase	   process	   (Tangcharoensathien	   et	   al,	  
2007).	  In	  April	  2001,	  the	  scheme	  was	  implemented	  in	  six	  provinces;	  by	  July	  2001	  it	  was	  operating	  in	  
21	  provinces	  and	  in	  October	  2001	  was	  expanded	  to	  the	  whole	  country	  (Pachanee	  &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  
2006).	   Private	   providers	   played	   a	   minimal	   role	   in	   both	   the	   formulation	   of	   the	   scheme	   and	   its	  
implementation.	  It	  is	  the	  rapid	  decision-­‐making	  and	  scale-­‐up	  which	  earned	  the	  Thai	  implementation	  
of	  universal	  coverage	  the	  title	  “the	  big	  bang”	  approach.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  attempt	  at	  drafting	  a	  national	  health	  insurance	  policy	  was	  in	  1996	  but	  failed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  1997	  economic	  crisis	  and	  lack	  of	  adequate	  civil	  society	  support	  (Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
In	   2001,	   the	   political	   conditions	  were	  more	   conducive	   to	   health	   sector	   reform	   because,	   although	  
Thailand	  still	  had	  a	  coalition	  government,	  only	  three	  parties	  were	  represented	  and	  almost	  half	  of	  the	  
members	   of	   the	  House	  of	   Representatives	   came	   from	  a	   single	   party	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   This	  
provided	  a	  more	  cohesive	  decision-­‐making	  body	  able	  to	  lead	  the	  reforms.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Pitayarangsarit	   (2004),	   “Universal	   coverage	   was	   picked	   up	   because	   it	   was	   seen	   as	  












congruent	  with	  the	  reform	  intention	  of	  the	  political	  party.	  Once	  it	  became	  the	  government	  in	  2001,	  
an	  important	  factor	  in	  early	  policy	  formulation	  was	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  national	  research	  provided	  
evidence	  to	  support	  the	  implementation	  of	  this	  policy”	  (in	  Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
	  
The	  reform	  movement	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  new	  government,	  civil	  society	  groups,	  academics	  and	  
researchers,	   policy	   makers	   as	   well	   as	   the	   Ministry	   of	   Public	   Health.	   The	   tri-­‐factor	   of	   technical	  
capacity,	   strong	   political	  will	   and	   public	   support,	  were	   vital	   in	   initiating	   reform	   in	   Thailand	   and	   is	  
referred	  to	  as	  “the	  triangle	  that	  moves	  the	  mountain”	  (Wasi,	  2000).	  
	  












7.3	  The	  Context	  
	  
7.3.1	  	  The	  Political	  Context	  
	  
By	   2004,	   Thailand	   had	   experienced	   11	   coup	   d’états,	   nine	   rebellions	   and	   53	   cabinets	   both	  
democratically	   elected	  and	  appointed	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   Thailand	  became	  a	  democracy	  and	  
got	   its	   new	   Constitution	   in	   1997.	   Yet,	   despite	   this,	   it	   is	   still	   regarded	   as	   being	   relatively	   unstable	  
because	  of	  the	  conflicts	  which	  occur	  between	  the	  coalition	  parties	  which	  make	  up	  the	  government	  
(ibid.).	  	  
	  
In	  2001,	  the	  Thai	  Rak	  Thai	  party	  was	  elected	  into	  government	  on	  a	  populist	  platform	  of	  development	  
and	  growth.	  Despite	  allegations	  of	  corruption,	  undermining	  independent	  civil	  society	  institutions	  and	  
limiting	   press	   freedom,	   the	   party	   was	   re-­‐elected	   in	   2005	   by	   a	   significant	   majority	   (Baker	   &	  
Phongpaichit,	  2009).	  	  
	  
However,	  soon	  after	  re-­‐election	  growing	  protest	  began	  calling	  for	  the	  then	  Prime	  Minister,	  Thaksin	  
Shinawatra,	  to	  resign.	  	  Parliament	  was	  dissolved	  and	  new	  elections	  were	  planned.	  However,	  before	  
they	  could	  be	  finalised,	  a	  group	  of	  top	  military	  officials	  overthrew	  the	  government	  in	  a	  non-­‐violent	  
coup	  d’état	  in	  2006	  and	  repealed	  the	  1997	  Constitution	  (ibid.).	  A	  new	  constitution	  was	  drawn	  up	  and	  
the	  interim	  military	  government	  held	  a	  multi-­‐party	  election	  which	  was	  won	  by	  the	  Thaksin	  People’s	  
Power	   Party	   (TPPP).	   By	   2008,	   the	   TPPP	  Prime	  Minister	  was	   forced	   from	  office,	   and	   the	  party	  was	  
dissolved.	  A	  new	  Democrat	  Party	  leader	  was	  appointed	  as	  Prime	  Minister	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
The	   period	   of	   Democrat	   rule	   between	   the	   end	   of	   2008	   and	   2011	   was	   characterised	   by	   anti-­‐












2011,	   the	  Puea	  Thai	  Party	  won	  the	  elections.	  This	  party	   is	  affiliated	  to	  the	  Thai	  Rak	  Thai	  party	  and	  
many	  of	  the	  populist	  development	  policies	  have	  been	  re-­‐introduced	  (Baker	  &	  Phongpaichit,	  2009).	  
	  
The	   erratic	   Thai	   political	   environment	   gave	   rise	   to	   an	   active	   civil	   society	  movement.	   According	   to	  
Lockhart,	  the	  Thai	  civil	  society	  agenda	  is	  imbued	  with	  a	  “vision	  of	  a	  constant	  struggle	  for	  political	  and	  
policy	  power	  in	  any	  society	  threatened	  with	  abuse	  of	  power	  by	  the	  state”	  (2002:	  5).	  Throughout	  the	  
1990s,	   civil	   society	   became	   more	   responsive	   to	   economic	   growth	   and	   social	   movements	   were	  
centred	   on	   initiatives	   such	   as	   rural	   development.	   Civil	   society	   also	   began	   advocating	   for	   greater	  
grassroots	  awareness	  of	  and	  participation	  in	  state	  planned	  projects	  and	  policies	  (Asian	  Development	  
Bank,	  2011).	  
	  
Civil	  society	  organisations	  in	  Thailand	  have	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  focuses	  and	  are	  involved	  in	  
knowledge	  and	  information	  systems,	  policy	  planning,	  resource	  issues	  and	  advocacy	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
Through	   civil	   society	   organisation	   such	   as	   these	   the	   national	   development	   goals	   and	   the	   health	  
sector	  reforms	  are	  closely	  monitored	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  the	  system	  objectives.	  	  
	  
7.3.2	  Economic	  Context	  
	  
The	   Thai	   government	   has	   long	   been	   guided	   by	   the	   ethos	   of	   a	   “sufficiency	   economy”	   –	   one	   that	  
encourages	   balanced	   and	   sustainable	   development	   (Khanna,	   2010).	   This	   approach	   has	   led	   to	  
cognisance	  of	  a	  broader	  social	  agenda	  throughout	  its	  fluctuating	  economic	  history.	  
	  
During	  the	  economic	  boom	  period	  starting	  in	  1988,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health’s	  budget	  increased	  












(Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   A	   large	   portion	   of	   this	   budget	   was	   invested	   in	   new	   buildings	   and	   more	  
advanced	  medical	  equipment.	  	  
	  
However,	   expenses	   also	   increased	   significantly.	   The	   Civil	   Servants	  Medical	   Benefits	   Scheme	   had	   a	  
four-­‐fold	  increase	  in	  expenses	  –	  from	  4,316	  million	  Baht	  in	  1990	  to	  16,440	  million	  Baht	  in	  1998	  –	  in	  
less	   than	   a	   decade	   as	   a	   result	   of	   overspending	   on	   expensive	   drugs	   and	   technologies,	   as	   well	   as	  
embezzlement	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  	  
	  
The	  private	  sector	  thrived	  during	  the	  high	  growth	  period	  but	  the	  gains	  to	  the	  sector	  were	  inflated	  by	  
dubious	   practices	   such	   as	   overprescribing	   drugs,	   kickbacks	   from	   product	   pushing,	   unnecessary	  
referrals	  to	  private	  hospitals,	  and	  unregulated	  fees	  for	  private	  services	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  
	  
The	  internal	  brain-­‐drain	  of	  health	  workers	  from	  the	  rural	  public	  to	  the	  private	  urban	  sector,	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   significant	   discrepancies	   in	   the	   poor-­‐rich	   health	   spending	   burden,	   led	   to	   the	   period	   being	  
dubbed	  the	  decade	  of	  “High	  Cost	  but	  Less	  Health”	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  
	  
This	  economic	  growth	  led	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  overall	  poverty.	  Between	  1962	  and	  1996,	  the	  proportion	  
of	   indigent	  people	  declined	  from	  57%	  to	  17%	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  economic	  
boom,	  absolute	  poverty	  decreased	  from	  33%	  in	  1988	  to	  11%	  in	  1996	  (Yienprugsawan,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Despite	  national	  economic	  growth,	  the	  disparities	  between	  income	  groups	  were	  widening.	  In	  1996,	  
the	  highest	   income	  quintile	  had	  57%	  of	  the	  national	   income	  while	  the	   lowest	  quintile	  had	  only	  4%	  
(Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  In	  addition,	  decreasing	  overall	  poverty	  masks	  the	  differences	  between	  rural	  













The	  1997	  economic	  crisis	  was	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  Thai	  government’s	  decision	  to	  open	  its	  financial	  
market	   in	   1993	  without	   sufficient	  monitoring	   and	   control	  measures.	   An	   influx	   of	   foreign	   currency	  
overvalued	   the	   currency	   and	   slowed	   down	   the	   export	   market	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   Several	  
industries	  declared	  bankruptcy;	  there	  was	  high	  unemployment;	  high	  interest	  rates	  and	  high	  inflation,	  
which	  again	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  reduce	  its	  public	  spending.	  	  
	  
The	  1997	  economic	  crisis	  inhibited	  the	  positive	  growth	  trend	  with	  annual	  economic	  growth	  declining	  
to	  -­‐11%	  in	  1998,	  which	  in	  turn	  affected	  the	  poverty	  statistics.	  In	  2000,	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  people	  
living	  below	  the	  poverty	  line	  in	  Thailand	  was	  21.3%	  but	  improved	  to	  16%	  in	  2002	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  
2004).	  
	  
By	   2002,	   Thailand	   was	   in	   economic	   recovery	   mode	   and	   had	   implemented	   a	   domestic	   economic	  
stimulus	   policy.	   The	   government	   formulated	   a	   national	   plan	   –	   “poverty	   reduction	   and	   income	  
distribution”	   in	   Thailand	   in	   the	   9th	   National	   Economic	   and	   Social	   Development	   Plan	   (Somkotra	   &	  
Lagrada,	  2008).	  The	  objective	  was	   to	   increase	   the	   low	   incomes	  and	   the	  consumption	   levels	  of	   the	  
poor,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  improve	  the	  structural	  problems	  that	  entrench	  poverty	  (ibid.).	  
	  
The	   policy	   encompassed,	   pro-­‐poor	   macroeconomic	   management	   to	   strengthen	   the	   informal	  
economy;	   capacity	   building	   and	   enhanced	   employment	   opportunities;	   natural	   resource	  
management;	   public	   sector	   restructuring;	   and	   the	   provision	   of	   social	   protection	   for	   vulnerable	  
groups	  (Somkotra	  &	  Lagrada,	  2008).	  	  
	  
With	   increasing	   trade	   liberalisation,	   Thailand’s	   involvement	   in	   international	   trade	   has	   increased	  
significantly.	  In	  order	  to	  capitalise	  from	  the	  growth	  opportunity	  which	  trade	  afforded,	  Thailand	  has	  












looking	  to	  increase	  the	  potential	  benefits	  of	  involvement	  in	  international	  markets	  by	  exploiting	  what	  
it	   considers	   it’s	   comparative	   advantage	   –	   the	   health	   care	   business	   (Pachanee	   &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  
2006).	  The	  challenge	  is	  to	  foster	  growth	  without	  exacerbating	  the	  inequities	  in	  health	  services	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  distribution	  of	  health	  care	  workers.	  
	  
With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   1997-­‐1998	   economic	   crisis	   years,	   Thailand	   has	   experienced	   rapid	  
economic	  growth	  for	  the	  past	  three	  decades	  –	  fostered	   largely	  by	  strong	  political	   leadership	  and	  a	  
government	  committed	  to	  both	  economic	  and	  social	  development.	  Even	  though	  during	  this	  period	  
there	  has	  been	  a	   reduction	   in	   absolute	  poverty	   and	   significant	  development	  of	   the	  health	   system	  
infrastructure,	   relative	  poverty	   and	   inequality	   in	   income	  distribution	  has	   not	   undergone	   the	   same	  
improvement.	  The	  income	  disparities	  are	  most	  prevalent	  in	  the	  widening	  inequalities	  between	  rural	  
and	  urban	  areas	  (Yienprugsawan,	  2010).	  












7.4	  The	  Effects	  
	  
	  7.4.1	  Health	  service	  utilization	  and	  health	  outcomes	  
	  
The	  average	  life	  expectancy	  at	  birth	  of	  Thai	  people	  in	  2002	  was	  69	  years.	  This	  was	  an	  improvement	  
from	  the	  previous	  life	  expectancy	  statistics	  but	  the	  substantial	  increase	  was	  between	  1964	  and	  2000	  
when	  life	  expectancy	  for	  males	  went	  from	  56	  year	  to	  70	  years,	  and	  62	  years	  to	  74	  years	  for	  females	  
(Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  Therefore,	   this	   improvement	  cannot	  be	  attributed	   to	   the	   implementation	  
of	  universal	  health	  coverage.	  	  
	  
According	  to	  the	  World	  Bank	  estimates,	  the	  infant	  mortality	  rate	  per	  1000	  live	  births	  declined	  from	  
49	  in	  1980	  to	  24	  in	  2001.	  The	  child	  mortality	  rate	  per	  1000	  live	  births	  also	  declined	  from	  58	  in	  1980	  
to	  28	  in	  2001	  (in	  Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  
	  
As	  a	   result	  of	  economic	  growth,	  Thailand	   is	  going	   through	  an	  epidemiological	   transition	  which	  has	  
seen	   improvements	   in	   child	   and	  maternal	  mortality	   and	   poverty	   related	   disease	   but	   the	   onset	   of	  
“new”	  health	  problems	  which	  include	  chronic	  disease	  and	  injuries	  (Yienprugsawan,	  2010).	  
	  
In	   Thailand,	   there	   is	   available	   data	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   universal	   coverage	   on	  
health	   services	   utilisation.	  While	   health	   outcomes	   could	   be	   affected	   by	   a	   range	   of	   determinants,	  
utilisation	  rates	  offer	  a	  unique	  indication	  of	  the	  uptake	  of	  reforms.	  
	  
Between	  1996	  and	  2001,	  during	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  annual	  outpatient	  visits	  decreased	  from	  2.87	  to	  
2.84	  per	  person.	  There	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  shift	  away	  from	  using	  private	  facilities	  with	  an	  increase	  













After	  implementation	  of	  Universal	  Coverage,	  and	  during	  Thailand’s	  rapid	  economic	  recovery,	  annual	  
outpatient	   visits	   increased	   to	   3.62	   per	   person	   and	   there	  was	   an	   increase	   in	   public	   facilities	   use	   –	  
primarily	   because	   most	   people	   registered	   for	   universal	   health	   insurance	   have	   to	   use	   the	   public	  
facilities	  closest	  to	  their	  homes	  (Pachanee	  &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  2006).	  	  
	  
A	   decline	   in	   hospitalisation	   in	   private	   facilities	   between	   2001	   and	   2005	   suggests	   that	  moderately	  
well	   off	   yet	   previously	   uninsured	   people	   who	   after	   2001	   had	   access	   to	   the	   Universal	   Coverage	  
scheme,	  no	  longer	  opted	  for	  private	  care	  (Yienprugsawan,	  2010).	  This	  means	  that	  private	  health	  care	  
became	  more	  strongly	  restricted	  to	  the	  wealthy.	  
	  
There	   is	  a	  significant	  difference	   in	  the	  type	  of	  health	  services	  frequented	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  
settings.	  This	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  proximity	  and	  accessibility	  of	  health	  centres	  and	  community	  
hospitals	   in	   rural	   areas	   compared	   to	   the	   urban	   location	   of	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   facilities	  
(Yienprugsawan,	   2010).	   As	   mentioned	   previously,	   one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   UC	   policy	   was	   to	  
improve	   primary	   health	   service	   use	   by	   making	   these	   facilities	   the	   referral	   centres	   –	   essentially	  
making	   primary	   healthcare	   facilities	   gatekeepers	   for	   further	   access	   to	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	  
services.	  	  
	  
The	  more	  pronounced	  use	  of	  health	  centres	  and	  community	  hospitals	  by	  the	  rural	  poor	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  
a	  reflection	  of:	  Firstly,	  the	  accessibility	  of	  alternative	  services	  to	  those	  with	  non-­‐UCS	  health	  insurance	  
in	  urban	  areas;	  secondly,	  the	  remoteness	  from	  and	  the	  travel	  costs	  of	  accessing	  alternative	  services	  
in	  rural	  areas;	  and	  thirdly,	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  coverage	  of	  employment-­‐related	  health	  insurance	  
such	  as	  the	  CSMBS	  and	  SSS	  (Yienprugsawan,	  2010).	  However,	  it	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  UC	  policy	  was	  
successful	   in	   its	  aim	  of	  “channelling	   inappropriate	  demand	  away	  from	  higher	   level	  public	   facilities”	  












routine	  primary	  care	  provision	  is	  sensible	  but	  must	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  deprive	  the	  poor	  of	  access	  to	  
more	  advanced	  care	  when	  needed”.	  
	  
The	   increased	   use	   of	   primary	   health	   facilities	   satisfied	   one	   of	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	   Universal	  
Coverage	   Scheme.	   However,	   this	   increased	   utilisation	   and	   demand	   for	   services	   within	   the	   public	  
system	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  greater	  demand	  for	  human	  resources	  (Pachanee	  &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  2006).	  	  
	  
	  7.4.2	  Human	  Resources	  for	  Health	  
	  
In	   Thailand,	   the	   availability	   of	   an	   adequate	   workforce	   to	   sustain	   the	   public	   health	   system,	   and	  
therefore	   the	   universal	   coverage	   initiative,	   appears	   to	   be	   less	   sensitive	   to	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
universal	  health	  policy,	  than	  it	  is	  to	  the	  economic	  climate	  which	  frames	  it.	  
	  
As	   early	   as	   the	   1970s,	   rapid	   economic	   growth,	   in	   addition	   to	   government	   investment	   to	   support	  
private	   hospitals,	   significantly	   expanded	   the	   private	   health	   sector	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2003).	   The	  
incentive	   of	   better	   pay	   in	   the	   private	   sector,	   resulted	   in	   an	   outflow	   of	  medical	  workers	   from	   the	  
public	  sector	  –	  a	  phenomenon	  referred	  to	  as	  an	  “internal	  brain	  drain”	  (Pachanee	  &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  
2006).	  From	  1971	  to	  1995	  the	  number	  of	  doctors	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  went	  from	  93%	  to	  76%,	  while	  
in	   the	   private	   sector	   numbers	   increased	   from	   7%	   to	   24%	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   By	   1997,	   21	  
community	  hospitals	  had	  no	  doctors	  working	  for	  them	  (ibid.)	  
	  
Yet,	  in	  mid-­‐1997	  the	  severe	  economic	  crisis	  reduced	  people’s	  purchasing	  power	  led	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  
demand	   for	   private	   health	   care	   and	   most	   private	   hospitals	   reduced	   their	   staff	   or	   closed	  
(Wibulpolprasert,	  2003).	  Those	  who	  could	  no	  longer	  afford	  private	  care,	  returned	  to	  public	  facilities	  













Economic	   recovery	   in	   2001	   reversed	   this	   trend	   and	   led	   to	   increased	   demand	   from	   Thai	   locals	   for	  
private	  health	  care.	  The	  demand	  for	  doctors	  to	  provide	  their	  services	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  accounted	  
for	  approximately	  41%	  of	  the	  total	  demand	  for	  health	  services	  (Pachanee	  &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  2006).	  	  
	  
The	  number	  of	  doctors	   resigning	   from	  public	  health	   facilities	  during	  1995-­‐1997	  was	  approximately	  
300	   per	   annum.	   During	   2002-­‐2003,	   those	   numbers	   increased	   to	   500-­‐600	   per	   annum	  
(Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	   This	   can	   largely	  be	  attributed	   to	   lower	   remuneration	   in	   the	  public	   versus	  
the	  private	  sector	  with	  doctors	  working	  in	  public	  hospitals	  being	  paid	  anywhere	  between	  4-­‐10	  times	  
less	  than	  their	  private	  counterparts.	   In	  addition,	  there	  was	  also	  demand	  for	  private	  health	  services	  
from	  foreign	  patients.	  	  
	  
In	   2003,	   there	   were	   over	   970	  000	   foreign	   patients	   utilising	   Thai	   health	   care	   services	   and	   these	  
services	   collected	   US$660	  million	   in	   revenue	   (ibid.).	   If	   this	   trend	   continues,	   there	  will	   be	   an	   ever	  
increasing	  need	  for	  additional	  health	  workers	  to	  serve	  both	  local	  and	  foreign	  patients.	  	  
	  
In	   response	   to	   the	   demand	   for	   health	   care	   workers,	   the	   Thai	   government	   has	   steadily	   been	  
increasing	  the	  production	  of	  doctors	  by	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  medical	  graduates.	  However,	  there	  
are	  also	  challenges	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  doctors.	  
	  
Most	   doctors	   are	   clustered	   in	   urban	   areas	   –	   particularly	   Bangkok.	   The	   rural-­‐urban	   disparities	  
improved	   between	   1979	   and	   1989	   but	   worsened	   during	   the	   economic	   boom	   between	   1989	   and	  













In	  an	  effort	  to	  compensate	  for	  this	  inequality,	  the	  government	  implemented	  the	  “One	  District,	  One	  
Doctor	  Project”	   in	  2004.	  This	  programmes	  recruited	  high	  school	  students	   from	  rural	  districts	   to	  be	  
trained	   at	   local	   universities	   and	   hospitals	   and	   then	   retained	   them	   to	  work	   in	   their	   home	   districts	  
(Pachanee	  &	  Wibulpolprasert,	  2006).	  	  
	  
Overall,	  the	  human	  resource	  distribution	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  
the	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas,	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  economic	  climate,	  improving	  during	  periods	  of	  recession	  
and	  worsening	  during	  economic	  booms	  when	  the	  private	  sector	  expands.	  












7.5	  The	  Economics	  of	  Health	  Financing	  
	  
During	  the	  1997	  economic	  crisis,	  utilisation	  of	  both	  private	  and	  public	  health	  services	  dropped,	  while	  
there	  was	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   people	   self-­‐medicating.	   The	  MoPH’s	   budget	  was	   reduced	  
from	   68	   million	   Baht	   in	   1997	   to	   61	   million	   Baht	   in	   2001	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   The	   Ministry	  
responded	  to	  this	  budget	  cut	  by	  reducing	  its	  capital	  investment	  but	  left	  its	  operating	  budgets	  intact	  
(ibid.).	  	  
	  
Private	  health	   services	  were	   the	  most	   affected	  with	   several	   facilities	   closing	   and	  many	  employees	  
being	  retrenched.	  The	  sector	  also	  underwent	  restructuring	  and	  25	  private	  hospitals	  registered	  under	  
the	  social	  security	  health	  insurance	  scheme	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  
	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  health	   insurance	  coverage	  was	  expanded	  through	  the	  universal	  
healthcare	   scheme.	  Despite	   the	  decrease	   in	   the	  overall	  Ministry	  budget,	   the	  budget	   for	   the	   social	  
welfare	  health	  insurance	  was	  increased	  by	  25.3%	  in	  1997	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  
	  
The	   recovery	   period,	   saw	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   demand	   for	   private	   health	   services	   as	   well	   as	   a	  
government	  policy	   to	   invite	   foreign	  patients	   to	  utilise	  Thai	  health	  services.	  This	  has	   led	   to	  another	  
brain	  drain	  from	  public	  rural	  facilities	  to	  private	  urban	  ones	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  	  
	  
The	  largest	  public	  financial	  source	  is	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health.	  During	  the	  economic	  boom,	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Public	  Health’s	  budget	  was	  8%	  of	  the	  national	  budget,	  but	  much	  like	  everything	  else,	  this	  
was	  affected	  by	  the	  crisis	  and	  declined.	  Since	  the	  government	  implemented	  the	  universal	  health	  care	  
policy,	   the	  Ministry’s	   budget	   has	   increased	   from	   6.7%	   in	   2001	   to	   6.9%	   in	   2002	   and	   7.6%	   in	   2004	  













The	  introduction	  of	  the	  universal	  healthcare	  scheme	  has	  reduced	  household	  spending	  on	  health	  care	  
across	   almost	   all	   income	   groups	   –	   largely	   because	   the	   scheme	   is	   financed	   by	   the	   government.	  
However,	  spending	  reductions	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  the	  greatest	  for	  the	  poor.	  
	  
In	  1992,	  the	  health	  spending	  burden	  relative	  to	  income	  was	  more	  than	  6	  times	  higher	  for	  the	  poor	  
than	  for	  the	  rich.	  However,	  after	  the	   implementation	  of	  the	  universal	  health	  care	  scheme	  in	  2001,	  
this	   inequality	  has	  fallen	  with	  the	  poor	  experiencing	  less	  than	  twice	  the	  health	  spending	  burden	  of	  
the	  rich	  (Wibulpolprasert,	  2004).	  
	  
Figure	  2:	  Percentage	  (%)	  of	  Households’	  Health	  Expenditures	  Compared	  to	  Income	  in	  1992-­‐2002	  
	  














According	  to	  evidence	  from	  the	  Thai	  National	  Statistical	  Office	  presented	  in	  Tangcharoensathien	  et	  
al	  (2007),	  25%	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  the	  Universal	  Coverage	  scheme	  belong	  to	  the	  poorest	  quintile,	  
with	  approximately	  50%	  of	  the	  beneficiaries	  coming	  from	  the	  two	  lowest	  quintiles.	  By	  comparison,	  
the	  CSMBS	  and	  SSS	  mainly	  cover	  beneficiaries	  in	  the	  richer	  income	  quintiles.	  
	  
After	  Universal	  Coverage	  was	   introduced	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  payments	  for	  health	  as	  a	  percentage	  share	  
of	  household	  resources	  decreased	   in	  all	   incomes	  quintiles	  except	  the	  richest	  (Somkotra	  &	  Lagrada,	  
2008).	   The	   decrease	   in	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   spending	   by	   the	   poor,	   together	   with	   pro-­‐poor	   benefit	  
incidence,	  is	  a	  positive	  reflection	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  UC	  scheme.	  	  
	  
The	  incidence	  of	  catastrophic	  health	  expenditure	  –	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  total	  household	  consumption	  
expenditure	  being	  spent	  on	  health	  –	  decreased	  from	  5.4%	  in	  2000	  to	  3.3%	  in	  2002	  and	  2.8%	  in	  2004.	  
The	  number	  of	  individuals	  forced	  into	  impoverishment	  as	   	  result	  of	  	  health	  spending	  also	  decreased	  
from	  2.1%	  in	  2000	  to	  0.8%	  in	  2002	  and	  to	  0.5%	  in	  2004	  (Limwattananon	  et	  al,	  2005).	  
	  
Interestingly,	   health	   spending	   for	   the	   highest	   income	   group	   increased	   by	   42%	   (Wibulpolprasert,	  
2004).	   The	   high	   proportion	   of	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   spending	   in	   the	   higher	   quintiles	   as	   a	   proportion	   of	  
household	  spending	  suggests	  that	  those	  with	  the	  means	  are	  able	  to	  exercise	  consumer	  choice	  and	  
seek	  high	  quality	  services	  that	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  provided	  in	  the	  private	  health	  sector	  (Somkotra	  &	  
Lagrada,	  2008).	  This	  could	  be	  because	  these	  users	  chose	  to	  seek	  health	  services	  outside	  of	  the	  basic	  
benefits	  offered	  by	  their	  insurance	  scheme	  or	  because	  they	  chose	  to	  forfeit	  their	  entitlements	  under	  
the	   universal	   healthcare	   scheme.	   This	   health	   seeking	   behaviour	   –	   driven	   by	   capacity	   to	   pay	   –	   is	  
common	  in	  other	  developing	  countries	  with	  pluralistic	  health	  systems	  (ibid.).	  
	  












Figure	  3:	  Scheme	  beneficiaries	  by	  income	  quintiles,	  2004	  
	  
Source:	  NSO	  Health	  and	  Welfare	  Survey,	  2004	  in	  Tangcharoensathien	  et	  al	  (2007)	  
	  
A	  benefit	  incidence	  analysis	  undertaken	  by	  Limwattananon	  et	  al	  (2005)	  indicated	  that	  for	  outpatient	  
care	  in	  2004,	  the	  Concentration	  Index	  –	  which	  measures	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  from	  the	  use	  of	  
services	   across	   income	  groups	   –	  was	   -­‐0.3326	   and	   -­‐0.2921	   for	   health	   centres	   and	  district	   hospitals	  
respectively.	  Outpatient	  care	  at	  provincial	  hospitals	  measured	  -­‐0.1496.	  A	  larger	  concentration	  index	  
number,	   or	   positive	   numbers,	   indicate	   that	   rich	   households	   are	   benefitting	  more	   than	  poor	   ones.	  
Therefore,	   the	   higher	   negative	   values	   at	   health	   centres	   and	   district	   hospitals	   indicate	   that	   these	  
health	   facilities	   are	   pro-­‐poor.	   The	   lower	   negative	   index	   for	   outpatient	   care	   at	   provincial	   hospitals	  
show	  that	  these	  services	  are	  less	  pro-­‐poor.	  
	  
For	  inpatient	  care	  at	  district	  hospitals	  the	  concentration	  index	  was	  -­‐0.3130	  in	  2001	  	  
and	  -­‐0.2666	  in	  2004.	  Provincial	  hospitals	  again	  appear	  to	  be	  less	  pro-­‐poor	  with	  a	  concentration	  index	  
of	   -­‐0.1104	   in	   2001	   and	   -­‐0.1221	   in	   2004	   (Limwattananon	   et	   al,	   2005).	  Overall,	   the	   district	   hospital	  













Benefit	   incidence	   analysis	   has	   shown	   that	   after	   UC	   had	   been	   implemented,	   public	   subsidies	  
benefited	   the	   poor	   more	   than	   the	   rich.	   Other	   studies	   show	   that	   UC	   prevented	   households	   from	  
incurring	  catastrophic	  health	  expenditure	  and	  that	  it	  averted	  impoverishment	  (Somkotra	  &	  Lagrada,	  
2008).	  However,	  there	  remains	  a	  disjuncture	  between	  the	  availability	  of	  services	  in	  rural	  and	  urban	  
settings.	  
	  
Despite	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   universal	   health	   coverage	   policy,	   there	   are	   still	   significant	  
inequities	   within	   the	   health	   system	   regarding	   resource	   allocation,	   budgeting	   and	   access.	   Overall	  
health	  resources	  per	  capita	  are	  high	  but	  there	  are	  regional	  disparities	   in	  the	  distribution	  of	  human	  
resources,	   number	   of	   bed	   and	   health	   facilities	   (Wibulpolprasert,	   2004).	   In	   Bangkok,	   the	   bed	   to	  
population	  ratio	  is	  1:179;	  the	  doctor	  to	  population	  ratio	  is	  1:	  767.	  In	  the	  more	  rural	  Northeast,	  the	  
bed	  to	  population	  ratio	   is	  1:	  759	  and	  the	  doctor	  to	  population	  ratio	   is	  1:	  7251	  (ibid.).	  Similarly,	  the	  
health	  care	  budget	  tends	  to	  be	  allocated	  to	  wealthier	  regions	  –	  a	  problem	  which	  may	  be	  related	  to	  
the	  number	  of	  health	  facilities	  in	  each	  region.	  
	  
“The	  burden	  of	  health	  expenditure	  does	  not	  correspond	  with	   the	  ability	   to	  pay”	   (Wibulpolprasert,	  
2004:	  342).	  In	  Thailand,	  the	  poor	  have	  a	  greater	  burden	  of	  health	  expenditure	  relative	  to	  the	  rich	  –	  
even	   after	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   universal	   health	   coverage	   scheme,	   the	   difference	   in	   health	  
spending	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor	  dropped	  to	  only	  1.6	  times	  (ibid.).	  In	  addition,	  patient	  care	  at	  
provincial	  hospitals	  preferences	   the	  rich	  while	   the	  poor	  only	   received	  greater	  benefits	   from	  use	  at	  
outpatient	  health	  centres	  or	  community	  hospitals	  (ibid.).	  
	  
The	  majority	  of	   the	   targeted	  beneficiaries	  of	   the	  Universal	  Coverage	   scheme	  work	   in	   the	   informal	  
agricultural	  sector	  and	  do	  not	  have	  a	  regular	  income.	  Yet,	  the	  universal	  coverage	  scheme	  is	  financed	  












Thailand	   via	   taxes	   is	   almost	   impossible	   and	   would	   not	   support	   the	   Thai	   pro-­‐poor	   agenda.	   Thus,	  
practicality	   dictates	   that	   it	   is	   the	  urban,	   employed	  population	   contributing	   to	   the	   financing	  of	   the	  
universal	  health	  care	  scheme.	  An	  EQUITAP	  study	  by	  O’Donnell	  et	  al	  (2005)	  reinforces	  this	  deduction	  
by	  indicating	  that	  overall	  health	  financing	  in	  Thailand	  is	  progressive.	  	  
	  
However,	   the	   long	   term	   financial	   sustainability	   of	   Thailand’s	   Universal	   Coverage	   scheme	   is	   not	  
certain.	  The	  International	  Labour	  Organisation	  conducted	  a	  review	  in	  2004	  which	  concluded	  that	  UC	  
had	  been	  successful	   in	   improving	  access	   to	  health	  services.	  However,	   the	  study	  also	   reported	   that	  
health	  care	  costs	  have	  been	  increasing	  by	  approximately	  US$583-­‐667	  million	  every	  year	  and	  the	  UC	  
scheme	   “will	   remain	   vulnerable	   to	   budgetary	   competition	   and	   political	   manipulation	   rather	   than	  
evidence	  on	  utilisation	  and	  cost	  of	  service”	  (ILO	  in	  Thoresen	  &	  Fielding,	  2011:	  21).	  	  
	  
In	   2006,	   the	   new	  military	   government	   abolished	   the	   original	   30	   Baht	   co-­‐payment,	   increased	   the	  
range	  of	  health	  services	  available	  under	  the	  scheme	  and	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  health	  care	  seeking	  
behaviour.	  Without	   the	   additional	   revenues	   generated	   by	   the	   co-­‐payment,	   the	   increased	   use	   and	  
increased	  cost	  of	  service	  provision,	  the	  Universal	  Scheme	  could	  become	  vulnerable	  and	  potentially	  
unsustainable	   (Thoresen	   &	   Fielding,	   2011).	   There	   is	   currently	   a	   movement	   supporting	   the	   re-­‐
instatement	  of	  co-­‐payments	  which	  would	  be	  proportional	  to	  the	  services	  being	  sought	  (ibid.).	  
	  
In	   addition	   to	   the	   Universal	   Coverage	   scheme,	   the	   state	   also	   finances	   the	   CSMBS	   and	   the	   SSS.	  
Despite	   scaling	   down	   the	   benefits	   available	   under	   the	   CSMBS	   package,	   the	   scheme	   is	   still	   very	  
generous	  and	  covers	  approximately	  3	  million	  civil	   servants	  and	  an	  additional	  1	  million	  dependents	  
(Thoresen	  &	  Fielding,	  2011).	  In	  2002,	  the	  per	  capita	  annual	  expenditure	  in	  terms	  of	  share	  of	  average	  
public	   health	   expenditure	   per	   capita	  was	   159%	   for	   the	   CSMBS	   and	   58%	   for	   the	  UC	   –	  making	   the	  













It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  a	  health	  coverage	  system	  which	   is	  based	  on	  more	  traditional	   insurance	  
principles	  and	  risk	  management;	  and	  which	  benefits	  from	  the	  state	  being	  able	  to	  cost	  share	  with	  the	  
private	  sector	  –	  such	  as	  the	  Thai	  Social	  Security	  Scheme	  –	  may	  be	  a	  more	  efficient	  and	  sustainable	  
system	  (Thoresen	  &	  Fielding,	  2011).	  Yet,	  serving	  a	  limited	  and	  generally	  more	  affluent	  pool,	  the	  SSS	  
is	  not	  pro-­‐poor.	  	  
	  
The	  Universal	  Coverage	  scheme	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  public	  policies	  –	  public	  polls	  conducted	  
between	   2002	   and	   2004	   by	   the	   National	   Health	   Security	   Office	   and	   others	   show	  more	   than	   70%	  
satisfaction	   (Pachanee	   &	   Wibulpolprasert,	   2006).	   Such	   public	   support	   will	   generate	   the	   political	  
motivation	  needed	  to	  sustain	  the	  scheme.	  
	  












SECTION	  EIGHT:	  RWANDA	  
	  
Rwanda	  is	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  countries	  in	  the	  world.	  Yet	  it	  has	  recognised	  that	  health	  is	  a	  necessity	  
and	  that	  by	  committing	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  universal	  coverage,	  it	  will	  be	  better	  positioned	  to	  foster	  social	  
cohesion	  and	  economic	  growth.	  
	  
	  8.1	  The	  System	  
	  
8.1.1	  Universal	  Health	  Care	  
	  
The	   universal	   health	   care	   scheme	   in	   Rwanda	   is	   financed	   through	   compulsory	   membership	   to	  
community-­‐based	  insurance	  schemes,	  called	  mutuelles.	  These	  schemes	  provide	  health	  care	  coverage	  
to	   92%	   of	   the	   population	   (USAID,	   2010).	   Membership	   requires	   a	   contribution	   of	   1000	   Rwandan	  
Francs	   per	   annum	  which	   entitles	   them	   to	   three	   benefit	   packages	   (Diop	   et	   al,	   2007).	   The	   first	   is	   a	  
basic	   health	   centres	   package	   covering	   maternal	   and	   child	   health,	   family	   planning,	   preventative	  
healthcare	  and	  minor	   surgical	  operations.	  The	  second	   is	   for	  district	  hospital	   care	  and	   the	   third	   for	  
tertiary	  hospitals	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
	  
	  	  












8.1.2	  Overview	  of	  the	  health	  system	  prior	  to	  universal	  health	  care	  
	  
After	   the	   1994	   civil	   war	   and	   genocide	   in	   Rwanda,	   the	   government	   implemented	   a	   district	   health	  
model	  which	  decentralised	  all	  aspects	  of	  health	  care	  provision	  to	  the	  district	  level.	  However,	  health	  
centres	   did	   not	   have	   the	   human	   resources	   or	   equipment	   to	   function	   effectively.	   Also,	   60-­‐80%	   of	  
their	   financing	   was	   collected	   through	   user	   fees	   which	   created	   a	   financial	   barrier	   to	   health	   care	  
access	  for	  the	  poor	  (Logie	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  
The	  policy	  of	  user	  fees	  allowed	  fee	  exemptions	  for	  people	  certified	  as	  “indigent”	  but,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
the	  high	  numbers	  of	  indigent	  people	  as	  well	  as	  the	  need	  for	  health	  care	  providers	  to	  recover	  costs,	  
these	  people	  were	  often	  denied	  health	  care	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  Non-­‐governmental	  organisations	  both	  
domestic	  and	  international	  arranged	  for	  reimbursement	  for	  the	  care	  of	  indigents	  in	  health	  facilities	  
but	  this	  system	  proved	  costly	  to	  administer.	  	  
	  
Before	   the	  official	   implementation	  of	  mutuelles	   there	  were	   two	  distinct	  health	   insurance	   systems.	  
The	  first	  was	  the	  institutionalised	  schemes	  such	  as	  the	  Rwandaise	  Health	  Care	  Insurance,	  the	  Army	  
Mutual	   Association	   and	   the	   Genocide	   Survivors’	   Fund	   and	   the	   second	  were	   informal	   community-­‐
based	  schemes	  –	  the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  mutuelles	  were	  developed.	  These	  schemes	  were	  active	  
prior	  to	  adoption	  of	  a	  universal	  coverage	  policy	  and	  still	  are.	  
	  
	  The	   Rwandaise	   Health	   Care	   Insurance	   (RAMA),	   established	   in	   2001,	   initially	   provided	   health	  
insurance	   for	   civil	   servants	   and	   covered	   all	   benefits	   provided	   in	   public	   health	   facilities	   and	   some	  
approved	  private	  ones,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  anti-­‐retrovirals,	  prostheses	  and	  spectacles	  (Musango	  et	  
al,	  2006).	  In	  2006,	  RAMA	  had	  49,283	  contributors	  with	  106,	  111	  dependents.	  The	  scheme	  has	  since	  













The	   Army	  Mutual	   Association	   had	   approximately	   100,000	   beneficiaries	   in	   2006.	   The	  membership	  
and	   administration	   of	   this	   scheme	   is	   identical	   to	   the	   RAMA	  with	   the	   only	   difference	   being	   in	   the	  
criteria	  for	  membership.	  	  
	  
Membership	  of	  both	  the	  RAMA	  and	  the	  army	  scheme	  requires	  a	  compulsory	  contribution	  of	  15%	  of	  
the	  employees’	  salary,	  with	  half	  of	  this	  subsidised	  by	  the	  employers.	  85%	  of	  the	  benefits	  provided	  by	  
this	  scheme	  are	  financed	  through	  the	  pooling	  of	  these	  contributions	  and	  are	  administered	  by	  a	  third-­‐
party	  payment	  system.	  The	  remaining	  15%	  of	  the	  benefit	  costs	  are	  recouped	  through	  co-­‐payments	  
from	  the	  beneficiaries	  (Musango	  et	  al,	  2006).	  
	  
The	  Genocide	  Survivors	  Fund	  provides	  health	  care	  coverage	  for	  needy	  victims	  of	  the	  1994	  genocide	  
and	   covers	   all	   medical	   benefits,	   except	   antiretrovirals,	   and	   also	   provides	   support	   for	   school	   fees	  
(Musango	  et	  al,	  2006).	  1%	  of	  all	  workers’	  salaries	  as	  well	  as	  additional	  corporate	  taxes	  are	  used	  to	  
supplement	  the	  public	  account	  which	  finances	  this	  scheme.	  No	  co-­‐payments	  are	  required	  and	  there	  
were	  approximately	  283,000	  beneficiaries	  in	  2006	  (Musango	  et	  al,	  2006).	  	  
	  
Mutuelles	   existed	   in	   Rwanda	   before	   Independence,	   albeit	   in	   very	   isolated	   settings.	   After	  
Independence,	   mutual	   initiatives	   were	   developed	   in	   at	   least	   five	   provinces	   –	   Kibungo,	   Butare,	  
Gisenyi,	   Gitarama	   and	   Kibuye	   –	   and	   were	   organised	   either	   by	   the	   communities	   themselves	   to	  
provide	  insurance	  for	  health	  or	  transport	  costs	  or	  by	  independent	  service	  providers	  linked	  to	  health	  
centres	  (Musango	  et	  al,	  2006).	  These	  mutuelles	  operated	  until	  1994	  but	  the	  genocide	  destroyed	  any	  
attempts	  at	  social	  organisation,	  up	  until	  1999	  when	  the	  post-­‐genocide	  government	  renewed	  interest	  
in	  the	  development	  of	  more	  formalised	  mutuelles.	  	  	  	  
	  












8.1.3	  Overview	  of	  the	  health	  system	  under	  universal	  health	  care	  
	  
The	  Rwandan	  health	  system	  aimed	  to	  revitalise	  health	  care	  and	  strengthen	  equity	  in	  access	  to	  care	  
(Kayonga,	  2007).	  Unfortunately,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Health’s	  plans	  to	  reform	  the	  health	  financing	  system	  
were	  ruined	  by	  the	  1994	  war	  and	  genocide	  (Parry	  &	  Weiyuan,	  2008).	  	  
	  
More	  recently,	  the	  government	  has	  re-­‐invigorated	  its	  commitment	  to	  improving	  financing	  of	  health	  
services	  in	  the	  country	  and	  has	  introduced	  the	  mutual	  health	  insurance	  scheme,	  known	  as	  mutuelles	  
de	   santé	   or	   simply,	   mutuelles.	   Sometimes	   referred	   to	   as	   mutual	   health	   organisations	   (MHOs),	  
community-­‐based	  health	   insurance	  (CBHIs)	  or	  micro-­‐health	   insurance,	   initiatives	  such	  as	  these	  rely	  
on	   community	   involvement	   to	   manage	   and	   co-­‐finance	   health	   care	   provision	   (Parry	   &	   Weiyuan,	  
2008).	  	  
	  
Community	   financing	   for	  health	  makes	  the	  households	   in	  a	  community	   finance	  the	  health	  services	  
provided	   in	  that	  area.	  Community-­‐based	  health	   insurance	  schemes	  build	  on	  that	  basic	  principle	  by	  
incorporating	   risk	   sharing	   (Carrin	   et	   al,	   2005).	   In	   contrast	   to	   tax-­‐funded	   health	   financing	   or	   social	  
health	   insurance	   schemes,	   community-­‐based	   health	   insurance	   schemes	   are	   more	   accessible	  
resource	  mobilisation	   tools	   for	   countries	   that	  may	   not	   have	   a	   robust	   tax	   base	   or	   the	   institutional	  
capacity	  to	  collect	  taxes	  or	  extend	  social	  health	  insurance	  to	  those	  that	  are	  unemployed	  or	  work	  in	  
the	  informal	  sector	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
Factors	  which	  would	   influence	  the	  performance	  of	  CBHI	  schemes	  –	   in	  terms	  of	  providing	  access	  to	  
good	   quality	   and	   effective	   care,	   as	   well	   as	   sustainability	   –	   include	   affordability	   of	   membership	  














The	   increasing	   interest	   in	  community-­‐based	  health	   insurance	  schemes	   is	  a	  result	  of	   the	   inability	  of	  
many	   developing	   countries	   to	  mobilise	   sufficient	   resources	   from	   the	   population	   through	   tax;	   and	  
hence	   the	   lack	   of	   public	   resources	   to	   finance	   health	   and	   welfare	   programmes;	   as	   well	   as	   the	  
prioritisation	   of	   providing	   universal	   health	   care	   (Schmidt	   et	   al,	   2006).	   There	   is	   a	   wide	   body	   of	  
literature	   on	   community-­‐based	   health	   insurance	   (Bennett,	   2004;	   Carrin	   et	   al,	   2005;	   Ekman,	   2004;	  
Precker	   &	   Carrin	   (eds),	   2004),	   and	   what	   is	   consistently	   highlighted	   is	   the	   need	   to	   make	   these	  
schemes	  accessible	  to	  the	  “very	  poor”.	  
	  
With	  the	  financial	  and	  technical	  support	  of	  development	  partners,	  mutuelles	  were	  initiated	  as	  a	  pilot	  
project	   in	  1999	  but	   significant	  uptake	  only	   took	  place	   in	  2004	  when	   the	  government	   incorporated	  
the	  community-­‐based	   insurance	  schemes	   into	  national	  policy	   (Parry	  &	  Weiyuan,	  2008).	  From	  April	  
2008,	   membership	   to	   some	   form	   of	   health	   insurance	   was	   made	   compulsory;	   every	   Rwandan	   is	  
obliged	  to	  have	  some	  form	  of	  health	  insurance	  coverage	  (ibid.).	  Membership	  of	  mutuelles	  was	  scaled	  
up	   from	  about	  35%	  of	   the	  population	   in	  2006	   to	  almost	  85%	   in	  2008	   (Shimeles,	  2010).	  Such	   rapid	  
growth	  of	  community-­‐based	  health	  insurance	  is	  unprecedented	  in	  any	  other	  country	  (ibid.).	  
	  
Currently,	  mutuelles	   form	   part	   of	   the	   formal	   system	   that	   makes	   up	   the	   pluralistic	   public	   health	  
financing	  system	  active	  in	  Rwanda.	  This	  system	  provides	  state	  financed	  health	  care	  for	  the	  military,	  
victims	   of	   the	   genocide,	   community	   representatives,	   soldiers	   and	   their	   dependents,	   as	   well	   as	  
prisoners	   (Musango	   et	   al,	   2006).	   However,	   the	   largest,	   in	   terms	   of	   population	   coverage,	   is	   the	  
mutuelles	  scheme.	  	  
	  
Initiated	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  lower	  income	  groups	  who	  otherwise	  would	  have	  restricted	  capacity	  to	  pay	  
for	   health	   care	   services,	   schemes	   such	   as	   this	   are	   not	   expected	   to	   generate	   sufficient	   revenue	   to	  













“Rwanda	   is	   the	   only	   country	   in	   sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	   in	  which	   85%	  of	   the	   population	   participates	   in	  
mutual	  insurance	  programmes	  for	  their	  health	  coverage...(coverage	  is	  provided	  for)	  the	  rich	  as	  well	  
as	   the	   poor,	   the	   young	   as	   well	   as	   the	   old,	   the	   urban	   as	   well	   as	   the	   rural	   population”	   (Musango,	  
2008).	  Today,	  health	  insurance	  coverage	  in	  Rwanda	  has	  reached	  92%	  (USAID,	  2010).	  
	  
The	   mutuelles	   are	   funded	   by	   three	   sources,	   household,	   government	   and	   donor	   contributions.	  
Initially,	   household	   contributions	   fluctuated	   across	   areas	   ranging	   from	   3,500	   to	   5,000	   Rwandan	  
francs	   in	   rural	   settings	   and	   up	   to	   11,500	   Rwandan	   francs	   in	   the	   cities.	   However,	   from	   2007,	   this	  
payment	  was	  standardised	  to	  FRw	  1,000	  or	  just	  under	  US$2	  per	  person	  per	  year	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
Members	   are	   also	   required	   to	  make	   a	   US$0.30	   co-­‐payment	   for	   each	   visit	   to	   primary	   health	   care	  
facilities	  and	  a	  co-­‐payment	  of	  10%	  of	  the	  total	  cost	  of	  the	  service	  in	  hospitals	  (ibid.).	  
	  
Risk	   pooling	   takes	   place	   firstly	   at	   the	   sub-­‐district	   level,	   covering	   approximately	   15,000	   people;	  
secondly	  at	  the	  district	  level,	  covering	  approximately	  300,000	  people;	  and	  lastly	  at	  a	  national	  level	  –	  
where	  government	  has	  created	  a	  dedicated	  solidarity	  fund,	  from	  which	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  via	  
the	  Ministry	   of	  Health,	   sponsors	   the	  mutuelle	   contributions	  of	   indigent	   groups	   (MoH,	   2009).	   	   The	  
Community	  Risk	  Pool	   is	  managed	  by	  the	  mutuelle	  at	  sub-­‐district	   level	  and	  covers	  primary	  care;	  the	  
District	   Risk	   Pool	   is	   a	   fund	   that	   unifies	   proportional	   contributions	   from	   the	   community	   pool	   in	  
addition	  to	  subsidies	  from	  the	  local	  government.	  The	  National	  Pool	  pays	  for	  tertiary	  care.	  The	  RAMA	  
and	  Military	  Medical	  Insurance	  pools	  are	  separate	  (MoH,	  2009).	  	  
	  
The	  mutuelle	  members	  are	  entitled	  to	  three	  complementary	  benefit	  packages.	  The	  most	  basic	  is	  the	  
health	   centre	   package	   which	   covers	   pre-­‐natal	   and	   post-­‐natal	   consultation,	   vaccinations,	   family	  












essential	   generic	   drugs,	   laboratory	   analyses,	   minor	   surgical	   operations,	   preventative	   health	   and	  
ambulance	  transfers	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  The	  second	  package	  is	  for	  district	  hospital	  care	  and	  the	  third	  
for	   tertiary	   health	   services.	   In	   order	   to	   access	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   care,	   members	   need	   to	   be	  
referred	  by	  the	  primary	  providers	  who	  act	  as	  gate	  keepers	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  system	  (ibid.)	  
	  
For	  those	  who	  are	  just	  unable	  to	  pay	  the	  required	  premiums	  for	  mutuelle	  membership,	  and	  do	  not	  
qualify	   for	  donor	  sponsorship	  or	  government	  subsidies,	  microfinance	   institutions	  have	  emerged	   to	  
provide	  loans	  to	  pay	  the	  premium.	  These	  loans	  need	  to	  be	  repaid	  within	  12	  months	  and	  come	  with	  a	  
15%	   interest	   rate.	   In	  order	   to	  make	   the	  borrowing	  process	  accessible	   to	   the	  poor,	   no	   collateral	   is	  
needed	   but	   to	   guarantee	   the	   loan,	   banks	   instead	   require	   that	   borrowers	   cluster	   in	   registered	  
associations.	   If	   the	   loan	   is	   approved,	   the	   microfinance	   banks	   deposit	   money	   directly	   into	   the	  
mutuelle	  account	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  This	  system	  relies	  on	  community	  control	  and	  social	  pressure	  to	  
secure	  repayment	  of	  loans.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Diop	   et	   al	   (2007)	   microfinance	   has	   been	   effective	   in	   removing	   financial	   barriers	   to	  
mutuelle	  membership	  and	  is	  now	  the	  “preferred	  enrolment	  mechanism”.	  However,	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  
the	  very	  poor	  generate	  the	  finances	  to	  repay	  the	  loan	  and	  the	  interest	  accruing	  to	  it.	  
	  
Mutuelles	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   good	  means	   of	   providing	   health	   care	   coverage	   for	   vulnerable	   groups	  
because,	   as	   community-­‐based	   schemes,	   it	   became	   easier	   to	   identify	   and	   target	   the	   poor	   with	  














One	   estimate	   indicates	   that	   approximate	   10%	   of	   the	   population	   are	   exempt	   from	   paying	   the	  
mutuelle	  premium	  but	  that	  up	  to	  30%	  of	  the	  poorest	  in	  the	  population	  still	  need	  to	  have	  their	  fees	  
waived	  (Kalk	  et	  al,	  2005	  in	  Logie	  et	  al,	  2008).	  
	  
Financing	  needed	  to	  subsidize	  the	  premiums	  for	  the	  very	  poor	  come	  from	  either	  interest	  generated	  
from	  the	  mutuelle	  bank	  accounts	  or	  through	  the	  sponsorship	  from	  NGOs	  or	  development	  partners.	  
In	  2004-­‐2005,	  approximately	  15	  donor	  organisations	  supported	  200,000	  to	  290,000	  people;	  and	   in	  
2006	   the	  Global	   Fund	   for	   AIDS,	   Tuberculosis	   and	  Malaria	   started	   a	   five-­‐year	   grant	   to	   sponsor	   the	  
membership	  fees	  for	  the	  very	  poor,	  orphans	  and	  people	  living	  with	  HIV/AIDS	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  By	  
2008,	  the	  Global	  Fund	  was	  financing	  approximately	  1.5	  million	  Rwandans	  (The	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  WHO,	  
2008).	  
	  
Also	   in	   2006,	   the	   government	   began	   to	   co-­‐finance	  membership	   fees	   so	   that	   the	   benefit	   package	  
available	   could	   include	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   care.	   Revenue	   for	   this	   comes	   from	   a	   national	  
solidarity	   fund	   which	   pools	   contributions	   from	   the	   formal	   sector’s	   social	   insurance	   scheme,	   the	  
Military	  Medical	   Insurance	  scheme,	   the	  central	  government	   (when	  possible)	  and	  external	  partners	  
(Diop	   et	   al,	   2007).	   This	   fund	   allocates	   funds	   to	   district	  mutuelles	   to	   pay	   for	   the	   very	   poor	   and	  
reimburses	  tertiary	  hospitals	  at	  a	  negotiated	  fee	  for	  providing	  care	  to	  members	  referred	  to	  them	  by	  
district	  facilities	  (ibid.).	  
	  
There	   is	   no	   standardised	   provider	   payment	   mechanism.	   Some	   mutuelles	   pay	   providers	   on	   a	  
capitation	   basis	   while	   others	   reimburse	   on	   a	   fee-­‐for-­‐service	   basis.	   The	   government	   has	   also	  
implemented	   performance-­‐based	   payment	   which	   reimburses	   providers	   based	   on	   the	   output	  
achieved	  –	  for	  example,	  number	  of	  children	  immunised	  –	   in	  order	  to	  meet	  certain	  health	  outcome	  












services	  and	  improve	  efficiency.	  It	  is	  uncertain	  whether	  mutuelles	  have	  the	  financing	  or	  management	  
capacity	   to	   cope	  with	   this	   payment	   system	   but	   it	   is	   yet	   another	  means	   of	   trying	   to	   augment	   the	  
health	  sector	  budget.	  	  
	  
The	  mutuelle	   infrastructure	  has	  been	  ‘linked’	  with	  the	  pre-­‐existing	   insurance	  schemes	  in	  Rwanda	  –	  
public	  financing	  and	  social	  health	  insurance	  –	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  national	  solidarity	  funds	  
(Diop	   et	   al,	   2007).	   These	   funds	   essentially	   allow	   all	   contributions	   to	   be	   pooled	   at	   a	   national	   level	  
before	  allocating	  them	  to	  the	  various	  schemes	  and	  assist	  in	  minimising	  administrative	  costs.	  	  












8.2	  The	  Process	   	  
	  
Local	  mutuelle	   initiatives	  were	   present	   in	   Rwanda	   in	   the	   1990s,	   but	   the	   national	   development	   of	  
these	  schemes	  only	  started	  in	  1999.	  Formalising	  the	  mutuelle	  system	  came	  in	  response	  to	  both	  the	  
decline	  in	  the	  use	  of	  health	  services	  as	  a	  result	  of	  user	  fees	  as	  well	  as	  the	  decrease	  in	  financial	  aid	  as	  
Rwanda	  transitioned	  from	  a	  post-­‐genocide	  to	  a	  development	  period	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  
	  	  
The	  mutuelle	   policy	   in	   Rwanda	   was	   implemented	   with	   specific	   objectives:	   a)	   to	   remove	   financial	  
barriers	   to	   accessing	   health	   care;	   b)	   to	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   health	   care;	   c)	   to	   enhance	  
management	   capacity;	   and	   d)	   to	   improve	   community	   participation	   in	   the	  management	   of	   health	  
care	  services	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  The	  operational	  mechanisms	  needed	  in	   rder	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals	  
were	  unclear,	  therefore	  the	  Rwandan	  government	  adopted	  an	  incremental	  policy	  roll-­‐out	  approach.	  
	  
The	   pilot	   phase	   was	   initiated	   in	   1999	   and	   during	   this	   time	   policymakers	   designed	   their	  
implementation	  strategies,	  developed	  the	  administrative	  system	  and	  defined	  the	  roles	  certain	  actors	  
would	  play,	  and	  worked	  to	  generate	  consensus	  on	  the	  mutuelles	  policy	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  
	  
The	   adaptation	   phase	   –	   which	   took	   place	   between	   2001	   and	   2003	   –	   implemented	   the	  
recommendations	   which	   came	   out	   of	   the	   pilot	   project	   and	   expanded	  mutuelle	   enrolment.	   Since	  
then,	  the	  mutuelles	  have	  been	  scaled	  up	  to	  cover	  all	  provinces	  and	  districts.	  	  
	  
Health	  insurance	  in	  Rwanda	  is	  given	  additional	  support	  by	  two	  complementary	  health	  policies.	  The	  
Ministry	  of	  Health’s	  “Health	  Policy	  2004”	  aims	   to	   improve	   the	  availability	  of	  human	  resources	  and	  
quality	   drugs/vaccines;	   expand	   geographical	   access	   to	   health	   facilities;	   improve	   the	   financial	  
accessibility	  to	  health	  services;	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  health	  services;	  strengthen	  research;	  reinforce	  













The	  “Health	  Sector	  Strategic	  Plan	  2009-­‐2012”	  revised	  plans	  and	  recommitted	  to	  health	  reforms	  and	  
improvements.	   The	   important	   new	   initiatives	   included	  performance-­‐based	   financing1	  to	   reimburse	  
health	   providers	   and	  motivate	   increased	   utilisation	   and	   improved	   quality	   of	   services;	   and	   further	  
expansion	  of	   the	  mutuelles	  and	  research	   into	  better	  mechanisms	   for	  subsidizing	   the	  premiums	   for	  
the	  very	  poor	  (MoH,	  2009).	  	  
	  
The	  Health	   Financing	  Policy	   in	   Rwanda	   is	   committed	   to	   ensuring	   that	   “quality	   health	   services	   and	  
particularly	   MDG-­‐related	   interventions	   are	   financially	   accessible	   to	   the	   whole	   population	   in	   an	  
equitable,	  efficient	  and	  sustainable	  manner	  under	  a	  result-­‐based	  financing	  framework”	  (MoH,	  2009).	  
In	  order	   to	  achieve	   this	  goal	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	   intended	   to	   formulate	  and	   implement	  policies	  
related	  to:	  improving	  risk	  pooling;	  improving	  the	  efficiency	  of	  resource	  allocation;	  increasing	  internal	  
resource	   mobilisation	   in	   order	   to	   make	   the	   system	   more	   sustainable;	   and	   improving	   the	  
effectiveness	  of	  external	  aid	  for	  health	  (MoH,	  2009).	  	  
	  
The	   role	   which	   donors	   played	   in	   the	   formulation	   and	   implementation	   of	   the	   universal	   health	  
coverage	  policy	  in	  Rwanda	  has	  not	  been	  identified	  in	  official	  documents	  or	  open	  source	  materials.	  	  
	  
Overall,	   in	   order	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   process	   of	   universal	   coverage	   implementation,	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  policy	  process	  in	  Rwanda	  requires	  further	  documentation	  and	  review.	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  introduction	  of	  performance-­‐based	  remuneration	  on	  the	  health	  system	  will	  not	  
be	   discussed	   in	   this	   paper.	   Performance-­‐based	   financing	   creates	   financial	   incentives	   for	   health	  
workers	   to	  meet	  specific	  performance	   indicators	   (Kalk	  et	  al,	  2010).	   Limited	  evidence	  suggests	   that	  
this	  may	  result	  in	  positive	  outcomes	  with	  only	  limited	  resources	  –	  and	  Rwanda	  is	  often	  touted	  as	  the	  
exemplar	  of	  this.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  evidence	  on	  what	  the	  long	  term	  effects	  may	  be.	  Kalk	  et	  
al	   (2005)	   suggest	   that	  performance-­‐based	   remuneration	  may	   lead	   to	   crowding-­‐out	  of	   services	  not	  
remunerated,	   in	   an	   uncontrolled	   environment	   the	   influence	   of	   just	   one	   policy	   cannot	   be	  













8.3	  The	  Context	  
	  
8.3.1	  Political	  Context	  
	  
On	  April	  6th	  1994,	  military	  and	  militia	  groups	  in	  Rwanda	  administered	  the	  systematic	  murder	  of	  over	  
800,000	   Tutsis	   and	   moderate	   Hutus.	   The	   genocide	   triggered	   a	   civil	   war	   which	   lasted	   until	   the	  
Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	  (RPF)	  defeated	  the	  Rwandan	  Army	  and	  took	  Kigali	  on	  July	  4th	  1994.	  The	  war	  
ended	  on	  July	  16th	  (www.iss.co.za).	  
	  
The	  RPF	  organised	  a	  coalition	  government	  called	  “the	  Broad	  Based	  Government	  of	  National	  Unity”.	  
In	  2003,	  Rwanda	  adopted	  a	  new	  constitution	  and	  planned	  for	  presidential	  and	  legislative	  elections.	  
The	   seven	   political	   parties	   involved	   endorsed	   Paul	   Kagame	   for	   president	   and	   he	  was	   elected	   to	   a	  
seven	  year	  term	  from	  2003	  to	  2010	  (www.iss.co.za).	  
	  
The	   RPF	   leads	   a	   multi-­‐party	   government.	   However,	   in	   practice	   the	   RPF	   retains	   control	   over	   all	  
government	   ministries	   and	   non-­‐RPF	   members	   retain	   their	   seats	   through	   the	   grace	   of	   the	   ruling	  
party.	  Members	  of	  both	  government	   and	   civil	   society	  who	   speak	  out	   against	   the	  RPF	  government	  
risk	  harassment,	  arrest	  or	  assassination.	  Political	  parties	  capable	  of	  threatening	  RPF	  dominance,	  are	  
accused	   of	   causing	   ethnic	   divisions	   in	   Rwanda	   or	   of	   supporting	   genocide	   ideology	   as	   a	  means	   of	  
discrediting	   and	   disqualifying	   opposition	   (Longman,	   2011).	   This	   suppressive	   political	   environment	  
has	  also	  encumbered	  free	  speech	  and	  discussion.	  It	  is	  reported	  that	  citizens	  have	  realised	  that	  there	  
are	  no	  benefits	  to	  challenging	  the	  RPF	  (ibid.)	  
	  
What	  the	  RPF-­‐led	  government	  has	  been	  commended	  for	  is	   its	  handling	  of	  external	  aid.	  Since	  1994,	  
the	   government	   has	   asserted	   its	   policy	   independence,	   declaring	   that	   the	   government	   and	  no	  one	  












“To	   realise	   our	   development	   vision,	   we...must	   substitute	   external	   conditionality...with	   effective	  
domestic	  policies	  –	  knowing	  what	  we	  need	  to	  do	  and	  articulating	  this	  clearly	  and	  consistently	  to	  our	  
development	   partners.	   This	   requires	   that,	   among	   other	   things,	   we	   learnt	   to	   say	   “no”	   to	   donors	  
whenever	  their	  priorities	  do	  not	  align	  with	  our	  development	  objectives.”	  (in	  Zorbas,	  2011:	  108).	  
	  	  
What	  assists	  a	  positive	  donor-­‐recipient	  in	  Rwanda	  is	  that	  for	  most	  donors,	  Rwanda	  is	  not	  of	  strategic	  
or	  commercial	   interest.	  Development	  cooperation	  is	  the	  primary	  interest	  for	  big	  donors	  and	  in	  this	  
respect	   “donors	   need	   success	   stories	   as	  much	   as	   the	   recipients	   need	   the	   aid”	   (Lorenzo	   (2008)	   in	  
Zorbas,	  2011:	  109).	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  donors	  continue	  to	  see	  results	  and	  perceive	  their	  funding	  
to	  be	  used	  efficiently,	  there	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  interest	  in	  Rwanda	  from	  the	  donor	  community.	  
	  
The	  sustained	  donor	  funding	  in	  Rwanda	  despite	  the	  political	  situation,	  has	  led	  to	  concerns	  that	  the	  
donor	   community	   is	   sending	   the	   wrong	   message	   about	   democracy	   promotion.	   For	   now,	   donors	  
continue	  to	  adopt	  a	  non-­‐offensive	  approach	  based	  on	  constructive	  dialogue,	  rather	  than	  critiquing	  
the	  state.	  Yet,	  the	  risk	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  government	  becoming	  an	  openly	  authoritarian	  state	  is	  high,	  
in	  which	  case	  donor	  funding	  will	  be	  retracted	  (Hayman,	  2011).	  	  	  
	  
8.3.2	  Economic	  Context	  
	  
Progress	   in	  developing	  an	  equitable	  health	  system	  in	  Rwanda	  has	  not	  taken	  place	  in	  isolation	  from	  
socio-­‐economic	   development.	   In	   2000,	   the	   government	   introduced	   a	   development	   framework	   –	  
“Vision	  2020”	  –	  a	  long-­‐term	  plan	  with	  objectives	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  year	  2020.	  The	  aim	  is	  to	  halve	  
the	   number	   of	   people	   living	   in	   poverty;	   improve	   life	   expectancy	   to	   55	   years;	   and	   decrease	   aid	  
dependence	   (MoH,	   2009).	   In	   order	   to	   achieve	   these	   goals	   the	   government	   plans	   to	   decrease	  
population	   growth,	   improve	   access	   to	   education	   and	   improve	   population	   health	   by	   targeting	   the	  













This	   objective	   and	   outlook	   was	   put	   into	   policy	   through	   the	   Economic	   Development	   and	   Poverty	  
Reduction	   Strategy	   Paper	   in	   2002.	   The	   primary	   strategies	   promoted	   were	   sustainable	   growth	   to	  
increase	  employment;	  poverty	  reduction	  in	  rural	  areas	  and	  improved	  governance	  (MoH,	  2009).	  
	  
In	  2008,	  agriculture	  contributed	  31%	  to	   the	  economy	  –	  with	  80%	  of	   the	  population	  dependent	  on	  
agriculture	  for	  domestic	  income;	  services	  contributed	  47.7%;	  and	  industry	  contributed	  15.6%	  (MoH,	  
2009).	  
	  
Economic	  growth	  between	  2001	  and	  2005	  averaged	  at	  5.6%	  per	  year	  and	  has	  largely	  been	  attributed	  
to	   the	  comprehensive	  economic	  reforms	   implemented	   (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  Corruption	  has	  declined,	  
there	  has	  been	  significant	  infrastructure	  development	  and	  primary	  school	  access	  and	  enrolment	  has	  
improved	  (Logie	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Yet,	  despite	  GDP	  growth	  from	  US$	  235	  per	  capita	  in	  2002	  to	  US$	  492	  per	  capita	  in	  2008,	  Rwanda	  is	  
still	   one	  of	   the	  poorest	  nations	  –	   the	  national	   poverty	  headcount	   showed	  only	   a	  marginal	   decline	  
between	  2000/2001	  and	  2005/2006,	  from	  60%	  to	  57%.	  Importantly,	  in	  rural	  areas	  where	  90%	  of	  the	  
population	  live,	  the	  prevalence	  of	  poverty	  remained	  unchanged	  at	  62%	  over	  the	  same	  period	  (MoH,	  
2009).	   This	   is	   indicative	   of	   the	   unequal	   distribution	   of	   income	   between	   urban	   and	   rural	   areas	   –	  
Rwanda’s	  Gini	  co-­‐efficient	  measuring	  economic	  inequality	  is	  0.51	  (Logie	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Rwanda	   is	   also	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   foreign	   aid	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   limited	   formal	   sector	   in	   the	  
country	  as	  well	  as	   the	  small	   tax	  base	   (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  Revenue	  collected	   from	  domestic	   sources	  













	  8.4	  The	  Effects	  
	  
	  8.4.1	  Health	  service	  utilization	  and	  health	  outcomes	  
	  
As	   a	   result	   of	   improvements	   in	   essential	   child	   health	   interventions,	   such	   as	   immunisation	   and	  
management	  of	  neonatal	   and	   childhood	  diseases,	   under-­‐five	  mortality	   rates	   in	  Rwanda	  decreased	  
from	  152	  to	  103	  per	  1000	   in	  under	  a	  decade	  (MoH,	  2009).	   Improvements	   in	  maternal	  health	  have	  
also	  been	  made	  with	  an	   increased	   rate	  of	  assisted	  deliveries	   from	  39%	  to	  52%	  between	  2005	  and	  
2007	  and	  significant	  improvements	  in	  the	  use	  of	  contraceptives	  by	  women	  (ibid.).	  The	  leading	  causes	  
of	   death	   in	   children	   under-­‐five	   are	   malaria,	   pulmonary	   infections,	   diarrhoea,	   malnutrition	   and	  
premature	   birth	   as	   a	   result	   of	   malaria.	   Child	   malnutrition	   is	   a	   challenge	   and	   24%	   of	   all	   children	  
under-­‐five	   are	   underweight	   but	   improvements	   have	   been	   made	   in	   reducing	   malaria	   morbidity	   –	  
rates	  decreased	  from	  37%	  in	  2005	  to	  15%	  in	  2008	  (ibid.).	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  if	  these	  trends	  are	  maintained,	  and	  further	  improvements	  in	  community-­‐
based	  nutrition	  programmes	  and	  neonatal	  management	  are	  made,	  Rwanda	  has	  a	  chance	  of	  meeting	  
the	  child	  mortality	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal	  by	  2015.	  	  
	  
With	  malaria	  and	  HIV/AIDS	  as	  the	  major	  burdens	  of	  disease	  in	  Rwandan,	  it	  is	  vital	  that	  preventative	  
measures	  are	  strengthened	  and	  extended	  to	  cover	  the	  rural	  poor,	  in	  order	  to	  decrease	  the	  effect	  of	  
these	  diseases	  on	  households,	  the	  economy	  and	  the	  health	  system	  (MoH,	  2009).	  	  
	  	  
Membership	  of	  mutuelles	  led	  to	  increased	  use	  of	  health	  services.	  In	  2000,	  members	  made	  1-­‐3	  visits	  
annually	  compared	  with	  the	  average	  of	  1	  for	  the	  non-­‐insured.	  The	  mutuelles	  have	  increased	  health	  












quintiles	  than	  higher	  ones	  (Saksena	  et	  al,	  2010).	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  mutuelles	  scheme	  will	  
decrease	  the	  utilisation	  gap	  between	  rich	  and	  poor.	  	  
	  
	  8.4.2	  Human	  Resources	  for	  Health	  
	  
Very	  little	  research	  is	  available	  on	  the	  status	  of	  human	  resources	  for	  health	  in	  Rwanda.	  According	  to	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  (2009),	  progress	  still	  has	  to	  be	  made	  regarding	  the	  availability	  and	  distribution	  
of	  qualified	  health	  personnel.	  	  
	  












8.5	  The	  Economics	  of	  Health	  Financing	  
	  
Total	  health	  expenditure	   (THE)	  per	  capita	  declined	   from	  US$18	   in	  1998	   to	  US$12	   in	  2002,	  with	  an	  
improvement	  to	  US$17	  in	  2003.	  Between	  2003	  and	  2006,	  THE	  per	  capita	  doubled	  to	  reach	  US$34	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  and	  THE	  as	  percentage	  of	  GDP	  increased	  from	  6.6%	  to	  10.7%	  (MoH,	  2009).	  It	  is	  
important	   to	   note	   that	   a	   significant	   share	   of	   the	   available	   health	   financing	   was	   earmarked	   for	  
HIV/AIDS	  interventions	  (ibid.).	  	  
	  
In	  2006,	  government	  health	  expenditure	  was	  US$6.3	  per	  capita	  and	  contributed	  19%	  to	  THE.	  Donor	  
contributions	  of	  US$17.7	  per	  capita	  made	  up	  53%	  of	  THE	  and	  private,	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  spending	  was	  
US$9.4	  per	  capita	  and	  contributed	  28%	  of	  the	  THE	  (MoH,	  2009).	  	  
	  
Figure	  4:	  Health	  Financing,	  1998-­‐2006/7	  
	  













The	   distribution	   of	   health	   finance	   contributions	   changed	   in	   2003	   –	   the	   first	   year	   in	   which	   state	  
contributions	   exceeded	   those	   of	   the	   private	   sector,	   primarily	   representing	   private	   household	  
spending	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  Still,	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  health	  financing	  in	  Rwanda	  comes	  from	  donors	  
with	  aid	  contributions	  more	  than	  doubling	  since	  1998	  (ibid.).	  The	  graph	  below	  shows	  that	  that	  even	  
though	  donor	   funding	  has	   increased	   since	  1998,	   as	   a	   share	  of	   total	   health	   expenditure,	   there	  has	  
actually	   been	   a	   slight	   decrease	   in	   the	   donor	   contribution.	   This	   is	   because	   public	   funding	   also	  
increased	  over	  this	  time.	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Share	  of	  health	  financing	  by	  public,	  private	  and	  donor	  sources	  in	  R anda,	  1998-­‐2003	  
	  	  	  Source:	  Diop	  et	  al	  (2007)	  
	  
The	   increase	   in	  domestic	  revenue	  and	  aid	  resulted	   in	  an	   increase	   in	  available	  government	  revenue	  
and	   hence	   government	   spending.	   However,	   increasing	   the	   share	   of	   public	   spending	   on	   health	  
remains	   a	   challenge.	   Rwanda’s	   public	   health	   spending	   was	   US$6.3	   per	   capita	   which	   was	   low	  
compared	   to	  neighbouring	  countries:	  Zambia	  spent	  US$23,	  Kenya	  US$14	  and	  Mozambique	  US$12.	  














In	   2002,	   the	   government	   was	   spending	   8.6%	   of	   its	   revenue	   on	   health	   but	   this	   only	   contributed	  
approximately	  a	  third	  of	  total	  health	  spending	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  remainder	  came	  from	  donors	  and	  
out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  expenditure	  (Logie	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  
Data	   from	   household	   and	   patient	   surveys	   obtained	   between	   2000	   and	   2006	   showed	   a	   significant	  
reduction	  in	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  expenditure	  for	  health	  services.	  Yet,	  despite	  the	  scale-­‐up	  and	  expansion	  
of	  mutuelles,	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  spending	  is	  still	  the	  main	  form	  of	  private	  expenditure	  within	  the	  health	  
sector.	  Private	  expenditure	  contributed	  28%	  of	  THE	  in	  2006,	  compared	  with	  25%	  in	  2003.	  Of	  private	  
expenditure	  which	  amounted	  to	  US$9.4	  per	  capita	  in	  2006,	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  spending	  made	  up	  US$7.5	  
per	  capita;	  mutuelles	  only	  contributed	  about	  US$3.6	  per	  capita	  (MoH,	  2009).	  A	  possible	  explanation	  
for	   this	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  mutuelle	   schemes	   only	   cover	   part	   of	   the	   cost	   of	   health	   services	   and	  
beneficiaries	  are	  still	  expected	  to	  make	  a	  co-­‐payment	  for	  health	  services	  received	  (MoH,	  2009).	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  poorest	  members	  of	  mutuelles	  spent	  a	  tenth	  of	  the	  amount	  spent	  by	  non-­‐members	  in	  
the	  same	  income	  bracket	  in	  2000;	  and	  between	  2000	  and	  2006	  out-­‐of-­‐pocket	  expenditure	  for	  health	  
declined	  by	  25%	  (Diop	  et	  al,	  2007).	  However,	  this	  data	  also	  showed	  that	  the	  lowest	  income	  members	  
were	   contributing	   20%	   of	   the	   household	   income	   towards	   health	   expenditure	   (including	   the	  
premiums)	  while	  higher	   income	  members	  were	  spending	   less	  than	  10%	  of	  their	  household	   income	  
(ibid.).	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  conclusive	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  financial	  protection	  afforded	  by	  the	  mutuelles.	  
	  
In	   2006,	   almost	   3%	  of	   all	   households	   –	   approximately	   280,000	   people	   –	   experienced	   catastrophic	  












pocket	   payments,	   the	   proportion	   facing	   catastrophic	   health	   expenditure	   doubled	   to	   6%	   after	  
implementation	  of	  the	  mutuelle	  scheme	  (Saksena	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  
	  
Of	   those	  who	  were	   insured	  by	  a	  mutuelle,	  one-­‐fifth	   faced	  a	  household	   financial	  burden	  exceeding	  
10%	   of	   household	   income	   (ibid.).	   Additional	   costs,	   exogenous	   to	   the	   mutuelle	   system,	   such	   as	  
forgone	   income	   or	   transport	   costs,	   may	   affect	   this	   outcome	   but	   still	   indicate	   that	   the	  mutuelles	  
could	  improve	  the	  level	  of	  financial	  protection	  given	  to	  beneficiaries.	  
	  
Schmidt	  et	  al	  (2006)	  show	  that	  any	  contribution	  to	  the	  mutuelles	  which	  exceeds	  US$1	  per	  year	  per	  
capita,	  would	  exceed	  the	  monthly	  income	  of	  the	  poorest	  quartile.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  higher	  
the	  contribution,	  the	  fewer	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  receive	  coverage.	  The	  challenge	  is	  thus	  to	  set	  
the	   premium	   so	   that	   it	  maximises	   revenue	   for	   the	   health	   financing	   system	  while	   also	  maximising	  
health	  insurance	  coverage.	  
	  
The	  mutuelles	  scheme	  has	  been	  supported	  by	  external	  donors,	  such	  as	  the	  Global	  Fund	  to	  fight	  AIDS,	  
Tuberculosis	  and	  Malaria	  (The	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  WHO,	  2008).	  	  
	  
The	  dependence	  of	  the	  health	  sector	  on	  donor	  funding	  presents	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  sustainability	  of	  
health	   developments.	   The	   Rwanda	   health	   sector	   now	   receives	   the	   largest	   share	   of	   external	  
resources	  on	  the	  continent	  (MoH,	  2009).	  Donors’	  contributions	  to	  total	  health	  expenditure	  increased	  
from	  42%	  in	  2003	  to	  beyond	  53%	  in	  2006	  (ibid.).	  
	  
The	   sustainability	   of	   the	  mutuelles	   scheme	   has	   been	   questioned	   in	   terms	   of	   domestic	   financial	  
contributions.	   Contributions	   are	   currently	   not	   calculated	   based	  on	   capacity	   to	   pay	   since	   everyone	  












need	   to	   improve	   opportunities	   for	   cross-­‐subsidies	   between	   the	   better-­‐off	   and	   the	   very	   poor	   (The	  
Bulletin	  of	  the	  WHO,	  2008).	  	  
	  
	  Donor	  Funding	  
	  
More	   than	   50%	   of	   the	   financing	   for	   health	   care	   in	   Rwanda	   comes	   for	   donors	   or	   NGOs.	  
Approximately,	   27%	   of	   state	   and	   donor	   resources	   are	   spent	   on	   administration	   of	   these	   funds.	   In	  
addition,	  the	  time	  scale	  for	  funding	  is	  often	  unreliable	  –	  most	  projects	  are	  only	  financed	  for	  a	  year	  
before	  being	  renegotiated	  –	  and	  is	  susceptible	  to	  changes	  in	  inflation	  or	  the	  exchange	  rate	  (Logie	  et	  
al,	  2008).	  This	  makes	  long-­‐term	  planning	  impossible.	  	  
	  
In	   2006,	   the	   Rwandan	   government	   began	   integrating	   all	   donor	   funding	   into	   a	   single	   framework	  
which	  plotted	   the	   sustainability	   of	   aid	   over	   the	  medium-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	   (Logie	   et	   al,	   2008).	   Policy	  
plans	   are	   formulated	   by	   the	   government	   in	   consultation	   with	   development	   partners	   such	   as	   the	  
United	  Kingdom,	  the	  European	  Union,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  African	  Development	  Bank,	  Sweden,	  the	  
Netherlands	  and	  Germany	  (ibid.).	  These	  donors	  now	  provide	  aid	  in	  the	  form	  of	  direct	  budget	  support	  
but	  parallel	  funding	  of	  specific	  sectors	  or	  projects	  has	  not	  been	  disallowed	  (Logie	  et	  al,	  2008).	  	  
	  
As	   yet,	   sector-­‐wide	   approaches	   for	   health	   have	   not	   yet	   emerged	   in	   Rwanda	   but	   donors	   have	  
increasingly	  been	  aligning	  their	  funding	  to	  support	  government	  objectives.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  
Global	  Fund	  to	  fight	  AIDS,	  Tuberculosis	  and	  Malaria	  which	  contributes	  to	  the	  mutuelles;	  has	  assisted	  
in	   renovating	   district	   laboratories	   and	   upgrading	   health	   facilities;	   provides	   performance-­‐based	  
financing	  for	  HIV/AIDS	  treatment;	  as	  well	  as	  funding	  the	  prevention	  of	  mother	  to	  child	  transmission	  













SECTION	  NINE:	  DISCUSSION	  
	  
This	   dissertation	   used	   a	   systems	   thinking	   approach	   to	   assess	   factors	   potentially	   influencing	   the	  
implementation	   and	   sustainability	   of	   universal	   health	   care	   systems.	   Conventional	   health	   system	  
frameworks	   did	   not	   address	   the	   issue	   of	   contextual	   determinants	   of	   health	   systems’	   functioning	  
adequately,	   and	   the	   intention	   of	   this	   paper	  was	   to	   identify	  whether	   a	   systems	   thinking	   approach	  
could	  answer	  the	  question:	  What	  are	  the	  characteristics	  of	  developing	  countries	  that	  claim	  to	  have	  
successfully	   implemented	   universal	   health	   coverage	   policies?	   And	   how	   have	   these	   systems	   been	  
sustained?	  
	  
From	  the	  assessment	  of	  Cuba,	  Thailand	  and	  Rwanda,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  factors	  which	  have	  the	  most	  
prominent	   impact	   on	   the	   implementation	   and	   sustainability	   of	   universal	   health	   coverage	   are	   the	  
nature	   of	   political	   leadership	   and	   available	   revenue.	   In	   order	   for	   universal	   health	   coverage	   to	   be	  
implemented,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  political	  will	  and	  an	  opportunity	  created	  by	  greater	  social	  change	  to	  
facilitate	   it.	   In	  order	  to	  sustain	  this	  system,	  there	  needs	  to	  be	  strong	  and	  continuous	   leadership	  to	  
allow	   health	   policies	   to	   be	   developed	   that	   are	   complementary	   to	   other	   sector	   policies;	   are	  
supported	   by	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   co-­‐ordinated	   resources;	   and	   can	   be	   seen	   all	   the	  way	   through	   from	  
inception	   and	   implementation	   to	   complete	   integration.	   Most	   importantly,	   in	   order	   for	   universal	  
coverage	   to	   be	   successful,	   it	   needs	   the	   revenue	   to	   sustain	   it.	   The	   cases	   of	   Cuba,	   Thailand	   and	  
Rwanda	  highlight	  these	  findings.	  	  
	  
	  












	  9.1	  Cuba	  
	  
The	  Cuban	  health	  system	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  equitable	  in	  the	  world.	  With	  100%	  coverage	  for	  almost	  
all	  services,	  Cuba	  is	  the	  closest	  example	  of	  truly	  universal	  health	  within	  developing	  economies.	  This	  
system	  has	  been	  sustained	  for	  over	  fifty	  years	  and	  political	  commitment	  to	  it	  has	  been	  maintained.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  effectively	  implement	  this	  system,	  the	  country	  was	  divided	  into	  units	  as	  small	  as	  a	  single	  
neighbourhood	  –	  each	  serviced	  by	  a	  physician	  and	  nurse	  team	  who	  run	  the	  primary	  health	  care	  unit.	  
This	   team	   is	   the	   referral	   gateway	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   health	   system.	   While	   aiding	   in	   preventing	  
congestion	  at	  district	  and	  tertiary	  health	  centres,	  this	  system	  fails	  to	  accommodate	  consumer	  choice	  
in	  physician.	  Yet,	   in	  the	  interest	  of	  efficiency,	  and	  given	  the	  successes	  of	  the	  model,	   it	  seems	  a	  fair	  
trade-­‐off.	  	  
	  
With	   some	   of	   the	   best	   health	   outcomes	   in	   the	   region,	   certainly	   in	   the	   developing	  world,	   Cuba	   is	  
considered	   one	   of	   the	   best	   examples	   of	   universal	   health	   coverage	   implementation.	   The	   Cuban	  
system	   is	  perceived	  as	  being	  a	   success	  both	   in	   terms	  of	  equity	  and	  efficiency.	  This	  achievement	   is	  
aptly	   described	  by	  de	  Vos	   as	   an	   “exclusive	  public	   health	   system	   (which)	   has	  been	  quite	  unique	   in	  
pairing	  limited	  resources	  with	  excellent	  results	  (de	  Vos	  et	  al,	  2008).	  “Cuba’s	  exclusively	  public	  health	  
system	  has	  been	  quite	  unique	  in	  pairing	  limited	  resources	  with	  excellent	  results”	  (de	  Vos	  et	  al,	  2008).	  
	  
While	   the	  Cuban	  health	   system	  has	  been	   lauded	   for	   its	   commitment	   to	  universal	   health	   coverage	  
and	  its	  ability	  to	  follow	  through	  on	  this	  commitment,	  it	  does	  not	  necessarily	  follow	  that	  this	  model	  
should,	   or	   indeed	   could,	   be	   emulated	   in	   other	   developing	   countries.	   Current	   health	   systems	  
frameworks	  do	  not	  give	  consideration	  to	  the	  structural	  issues	  which	  frame	  the	  health	  sector	  and	  are	  













The	   successes	   achieved	   in	   Cuba	   derived	   from	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   which	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	  
duplicated:	   economic	   gain	   and	   protection	   from	   the	   patronage	   of	   USSR;	   the	   long-­‐term	   rule	   of	   the	  
Castro	  regime	  which	  allowed	  for	  planning	  and	  a	  consistent	  commitment	  to	  the	  policy;	  the	  dominant	  
public	  sector	  and	   its	  constant	  prioritisation	  of	  health;	  and	   importantly,	   the	  relatively	  high	   levels	  of	  
spending	  on	  health	  –	  assisted	  by	  external	  funding.	  	  
	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  Cuban	  health	  system	  can	  be	  attributed	  largely	  to	  this	  rare	  congruence	  of	  political,	  
economic	  and	  development	  features.	  The	  fact	  that	  Cuba	  is	  a	  developing	  country	  cannot	  alone	  justify	  
suggestions	  that	  if	  Cuba	  could	  achieve	  universal	  coverage,	  other	  developing	  countries	  can	  do	  it,	  too.	  
Without	  the	  strong	  political	  commitment	  shown	  by	  the	  Castro	  regime,	  along	  with	  a	  plethora	  of	  other	  
determinants,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  Cuba	  would	  have	  succeeded.	  	  
	  
Within	  the	  health	  system,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  health	  workforce	  is	  a	  critical	  component	  of	  its	  success.	  
There	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   in	   the	   long	   run,	  with	   Cuba’s	   increased	   assimilation	   into	   the	   global	  
economy	  and	  their	  acceptance	  of	  the	  dollar	  for	  local	  trade	  –	  while	  medical	  workers	  are	  still	  paid	  in	  
pesos	  –	  will	  lead	  to	  increasing	  shifting	  of	  costs	  onto	  these	  workers.	  With	  this	  shift	  in	  macro-­‐economic	  
direction,	   the	  sustainability	  of	  a	  health	  system	  so	  reliant	  on	  the	  dedication	  of	   its	  health	  workers	   is	  
fragile.	  
	  
The	   success	   of	   “the	   Cuban	   model”	   –	   as	   represented	   by	   impressive	   health	   indicators–	   eclipses	  
concerns	   about	   the	   health	   system’s	   capacity,	   organisation	   and	   sustainability.	   However,	   before	  
recommending	  the	  Cuban	  system	  as	  a	  model	  for	  other	  developing	  countries	  to	  emulate,	  a	  detailed	  
and	   systematic	   assessment	   of	   the	   strengths	   and	  weaknesses	   of	   the	   system	   and	   its	   socio-­‐political-­‐















The	   Thai	   government	   addressed	   poverty	   alleviation	   and	   promoted	   an	   equitable	   health	   financing	  
system	   by	   reducing	   reliance	   on	   out-­‐of-­‐pocket	   spending	   and	   by	   introducing	   a	   mechanism	   which	  
pooled	  financial	  risks.	  This	  universal	  coverage	  scheme,	  introduced	  in	  2001,	  was	  rolled	  out	  so	  rapidly	  
that	  within	  four	  years	  of	  its	  initiation,	  75%	  of	  the	  population	  was	  covered	  by	  it,	  leaving	  only	  5%	  not	  
covered	  by	  any	  other	  insurance	  scheme.	  	  
	  
Like	  Cuba,	  primary	  health	  care	  units	  responsible	  for	  designated	  areas	  are	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  Thai	  
health	  system.	  These	  units	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  promoting	  access	  to	  health	  care	  and	  decreasing	  
service	  use	  of	  secondary	  and	  tertiary	  facilities.	  	  
	  
What	  makes	  Thailand	  unique	   is	  that	  the	  commitment	  to	  providing	  health	  services	  to	  everyone	  has	  
not	  relied	  only	  on	  political	  will	  for	  its	  sustainability.	  Certainly,	  the	  coincidence	  of	  having	  the	  political	  
support	   of	   the	   “newly”	   elected	   Thai	   Rak	   Thai	   Party	   significantly	   facilitated	   the	   introduction	   of	  
universal	   coverage.	  However,	  at	   that	  point,	  a	   culture	  of	  equitable	   social	  development	  was	  already	  
present	  in	  the	  country	  and	  through	  political	  change	  and	  upheaval	  the	  Thai	  system	  has	  stayed	  true	  to	  
these	  values.	  This	  could	  be	  explained	  by	  a	  strong	  civil	  society	  –	   inclusive	  of	  a	  strong	  academic	  and	  
research	  cohort	  –	  capable	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  state	  on	  issues	  of	  importance,	  and	  of	  monitoring	  the	  
state’s	  commitment	  to	  social	  development	  and	  equity.	  	  	  
	  
However,	   like	   any	  universal	   coverage	   scheme,	  within	   a	   conducive	   socio-­‐political	   environment,	   the	  
success	   of	   the	   health	   system	   remains	   dependent	   on	   having	   both	   the	   human	   and	   the	   financial	  













Within	  Thailand,	   there	   is	  on-­‐going	   concern	  over	   the	   failure	   to	  achieve	  an	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  
health	  care	  workers	  across	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  private	  and	  public	  sectors.	  
The	  trend	  appears	   to	  be	  that	   in	  an	  economic	  growth	  period,	  when	  the	  private	  sector	   is	  dominant,	  
there	   is	   an	   internal	  brain	  drain	  away	   from	  public	  health	   services,	  within	  which	   there	   is	   already	  an	  
urban	   bias.	   This	   implies	   an	   unfortunate	   correlation	   between	   economic	   growth	   and	   inequitable	  
service	  provision	  across	  urban-­‐rural	  areas.	  
	  
	  “Insufficient	  regulation	  of	  human	  resources	  for	  health	  leading	  to	  an	  inequitable	  internal	  distribution	  
of	   health	   care	   professionals…can	   render	   the	   poor	   without	   access	   to	   essential	   health	   services”	  
(Thoresen	   &	   Fielding,	   2011:	   21).	   Without	   regulation	   to	   determine	   human	   resource	   capacity	   and	  
distribution,	  the	  system	  would	  be	  defunct.	  
	  
Along	  with	  human	  resources,	  the	  Thai	  health	  system	  requires	  adequate	  financial	  resources	  to	  sustain	  
it.	   While	   the	   tax	   base	   is	   not	   insignificant,	   there	   is	   no	   pooling	   of	   funding,	   and	   therefore	   cross-­‐
subsidisation,	  between	  the	  different	  insurance	  schemes.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  a	  more	  efficient	  
and	  equitable	  strategy	  may	  be	   to	  merge	   the	   three	  public	   insurance	  schemes	   thereby	  reducing	   the	  
administrative	   costs	   of	   running	   separate	   insurances	  while	  maintaining	   the	   pro-­‐poor	   nature	   of	   the	  
Thai	  public	  health	  financing	  system	  (Thoresen	  &	  Fielding,	  2011).	  	  














The	  case	  of	  community-­‐based	  health	  insurance	  in	  Rwanda	  is	  interesting	  for	  several	  reasons.	  The	  first	  
of	  these	  is	  the	  exponential	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  mutuelle	  schemes	  were	  scaled	  up	  –	  especially	  given	  the	  
uncertainty	   regarding	   the	   effects	   on	   service	   utilisation	   and	   financial	   protection.	   Second	   is	   the	  
political	  commitment	  of	  politicians	  and	  policy	  makers	  to	  the	  mutuelle	  scheme,	  despite	  the	  economic	  
and	  political	  challenges	  faced	  by	  Rwanda	  (Shimeles,	  2010).	  
	  
When	   the	  Rwandan	   government	   implemented	   a	   universal	   health	   coverage	  policy	   in	   2004,	   a	  mere	  
decade	  had	  passed	  since	  the	  genocide.	   It	  was,	  and	  remains,	  one	  of	  the	  poorest	  countries	   in	  world,	  
and	  at	   the	   inception	  of	   the	  policy,	  health	   infrastructure	  was	  severely	   lacking.	  Yet,	  even	  within	   this	  
unlikely	   context,	   the	   government	   recognised	   the	   importance	   of	   improving	   its	   health	   system	   and	  
supported	  efforts	  striving	  for	  universal	  coverage.	  	  
	  
The	   timing	   of	   this	   commitment	   coincided	   with	   global	   interest	   in	   universal	   health	   care	   and	  
widespread	   support	   for	   developing	   countries	   to	   attain	   the	   Millennium	   Development	   Goals.	   The	  
nature	  of	  Rwanda’s	  economy	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  2000s	  also	  made	  it	  attractive	  to	  donor	  support	  and	  
other	  development	  assistance	  initiatives.	  	  
	  
With	   a	   limited	   revenue	   base,	   and	   therefore	   a	   lack	   of	   public	   resources,	   community-­‐based	   health	  
insurance	  schemes	  were	  the	  most	  feasible	  health	  financing	  system.	  This	  system	  allowed	  members	  to	  
share	   part	   of	   the	   cost	   of	   health	   provision.	   The	   effectiveness	   of	   the	   national	   solidarity	   fund	   in	  
facilitating	  risk	  pooling	  will	  have	  to	  be	  assessed	  when	  more	  data	  –	  particularly	  regarding	  the	  socio-­‐













In	  order	   to	   relieve	   some	  of	   the	   financial	  pressure	  on	  households,	   innovative	   financing	   strategies	  –	  
such	  as	  microfinancing	  –	  have	  been	   implemented	  and	   significant	   subsidies	  have	  been	   contributed	  
from	  the	  state	  and	  the	  donor	  community.	  These	  subsidies	  are	  vital	  in	  maintaining	  a	  financing	  system	  
that	  allows	  the	  poor	  to	  have	  access	  to	  health	  services	  –	  particularly	  those	  from	  donor	  organisations	  
that	  subsidise	  the	  entire	  premium.	  
	  
Since	  2004,	  there	  have	  been	  improvements	  in	  health	  outcomes	  in	  Rwanda	  –	  particularly	  in	  maternal	  
and	  child	  health.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  universal	  health	  coverage	  policy	  has	  been	  effective.	  	  
	  
There	  is	  insufficient	  evidence	  on	  the	  efficiency	  and	  equity	  of	  the	  current	  health	  financing	  system	  to	  
generate	   a	   conclusive	   assessment.	   The	   entire	   population	   is	   expected	   to	   have	   compulsory	  
membership	  with	  a	  mutuelle	  scheme	  but	   this	  membership	  comes	  at	  a	  cost.	   In	  a	  population	  where	  
more	  than	  half	   the	  population	   lives	   in	  poverty,	  more	  than	  half	  should	  also	  be	  exempt	  from	  paying	  
the	  necessary	  mutuelle	  premiums	  or	  co-­‐payments.	  	  
	  
Yet,	  very	  little	  information	  is	  available	  regarding	  the	  number	  of	  non-­‐poor	  benefitting	  from	  the	  state	  
and	  donor	  subsidies	  or	  the	  number	  of	  poor	  people	  who	  do	  not	  have	  access	  to	  health	  coverage	  (Diop	  
et	  al,	  2007).	  	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  government	  support	  additional	  interventions	  such	  as	  development	  of	  
income	  generating	  activities	  that	  target	  the	  poor,	   in	  order	  to	  enhance	  the	  capacity	  of	  this	  group	  to	  













The	  inability	  of	  the	  state	  to	  raise	  revenues	  for	  the	  health	  system	  from	  domestic	  sources	  has	   led	  to	  
over-­‐dependence	  on	  external	  funding.	  This	  dependence	  undermines	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  health	  
system	  since	  external	  funding	  is	  neither	  predictable	  nor	  constant.	  	  
	  
The	  dependence	  on	  donors	  has	  merely	   shifted	   the	  affordability	  constraint	   from	  households	   to	   the	  
state	   and	  donors.	   Thus,	   a	   precarious	   relationship	   has	   developed	  between	   equitable	   financing	   and	  
sustainability.	  	  
	  
However,	  strategies	  such	  as	  these	  could	  only	  be	  feasible	  further	  into	  the	  future	  and	  do	  not	  mitigate	  
the	  current	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  health	  system.	  
	  
The	  mutuelle	   scheme	   is	   an	   innovative	  way	   to	   institutionalise	   risk	   pooling	   and	   generate	   additional	  
resources	   for	  a	  developing	  health	  system	  but	   the	   financing	  of	   this	  scheme	  still	   relies	  on	  extracting	  
revenues	  from	  relatively	  poor	  households	  who	  cannot	  afford	  the	  premiums	  and	  an	  overdependence	  
on	  unpredictable	  donor	  funding.	  Even	  with	  government	  commitment	  to	  universal	  health,	  were	  it	  not	  
for	   donor	   funding,	   universal	   coverage	   would	   not	   have	   been	   feasible.	   Thus,	   the	   implementation	  
conditions	   and	   process	   were	   very	   unique	   to	   this	   circumstance	   and	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   replicated	  
elsewhere	   and	   even	   if	   the	   system	   could	   be	   transferred,	   little	   more	   could	   be	   gauged	   from	   the	  
Rwandan	  experience	  regarding	  equity,	  efficiency	  or	  sustainability.	  
	  












9.4	  The	  Similarities	  and	  Differences	  
	  
Current	  health	  systems	  frameworks	  which	  focus	  solely	  on	  how	  health	  financing	  is	  collected	  and	  from	  
whom;	  how	  resources	  are	  pooled;	  how	  providers	  are	  reimbursed;	  and	  which	  services	  are	  provided	  
are	   not	   sufficient	   to	   gauge	   the	   key	   determinants	   affecting	   implementation	   of	   universal	   health	  
coverage	  or	  whether	  these	  systems	  will	  be	  maintained.	  At	  best	  they	  can	  respond	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  
system	  is	  adequately	  providing	  health	  coverage.	  	  
	  
In	   the	   cases	   of	   Cuba,	   Thailand	   and	   Rwanda,	   health	   systems’	   frameworks	   can	   be	   used	   to	   assess	  
whether	  or	  not	  their	  health	  financing	  systems	  display	  all	  the	  elements	  of	  an	  equitable	  and	  efficient	  
system.	  In	  general	  in	  these	  three	  countries,	  there	  are	  mandatory	  contributions	  to	  a	  health	  insurance	  
scheme	   that	   pools	   resources,	   shares	   risk	   and	   this	   financing	   allows	   for	   the	   provision	   of	   accessible	  
services	  that	  appear	  to	  have	  positive	  health	  outcomes.	  Yet	  there	  are	  additional	  factors	  which	  appear	  
to	   determine	   the	   success	   of	   each	   system’s	   implementation	   and	   others	   which	   affect	   their	  
maintenance	  and	  future	  sustainability	  that	  are	  overlooked	  by	  these	  frameworks.	  	  
	  
In	  general,	  factors	  such	  as	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  context	  tend	  not	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  health	  
systems’	   frameworks	  commonly	  used.	  These	  considerations	  have	  so	   far	  been	   limited	  to	  the	  health	  
policy	  and	  planning	  arenas.	  	  
	  
From	  the	  studies	  included	  in	  this	  paper,	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  an	  expanded	  conceptual	  framework	  for	  health	  
systems,	  which	  includes	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  factors	  which	  lie	  outside	  of	  the	  health	  system	  
provides	   a	  better	  option	   for	   assessing	  both	  universal	   health	   coverage	  and	   its	  outcomes	   through	   a	  













Perhaps	   the	  most	   important	   factor	   leading	   to	   the	   successful	   introduction	   of	   universal	   health	   care	  
policies	  is	  political	  will	  and	  stability.	  This	  is	  necessary	  not	  only	  for	  legitimising	  the	  policy,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  
vital	   for	   leading	   the	   policy	   process,	   and	   for	   supporting	   responsive	   and	   flexible	   reforms	   which	  
promote	  long-­‐term	  sustainability.	  	  
	  
The	  importance	  of	  political	  will	  has	  been	  recognised	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  policies	  such	  as	  universal	  
coverage	  but	  has	  not	  been	  emphasised	  enough	  in	  relation	  to	  maintaining	  the	  reform	  and	  providing	  
the	  political	  support	  to	  sustain	  it	  through	  challenging	  economic	  periods,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  oversight	  to	  
manage	  the	  policy	  successfully.	  	  
	  
In	  both	  Cuba	  and	  Rwanda,	   the	  one-­‐party,	  authoritarian	   regimes	  created	  a	  political	  environment	   in	  
which	  the	  decisions	  of	  the	  state	  could	  be	  implemented	  without	  opposition	  and	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  
quickly.	   The	   top-­‐down	   nature	   of	   policy-­‐making	   provided	   these	   regimes	   with	   a	   system-­‐wide	  
perspective	  and	  the	  power	  to	  restructure	  the	  system	  to	  be	  more	  conducive	  to	  universal	  health	  care	  
provision.	  In	  Cuba,	  this	  includes	  having	  the	  autonomy	  to	  allocate	  resources	  in	  favour	  of	  their	  social	  
justice	   agenda.	   However,	   this	   political	   system	   is	   attended	   by	   other	   sacrifices,	   such	   as	   freedom	   of	  
choice.	  
	  
In	  Thailand,	  the	  universal	  coverage	  policy	  gained	  its	  support	  both	  from	  the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  an	  active	  
and	   involved	   civil	   society.	   If	   technical	   capacity,	   strong	   political	   will	   and	   public	   support	   were	   “the	  
triangle	   that	  moved	   the	  mountain”	   (Wasi,	   2000),	   then	   public	   support	   was	   definitely	   at	   the	   apex.	  
Pressure	  from	  civil	  society	  managed	  to	  put	  universal	  coverage	  on	  the	  reform	  agenda	  in	  2001	  and	  has	  













In	  Thailand,	  civil	  society	  support	  has	  proven	  a	  more	  than	  adequate	  alternative	  to	  the	  authoritarian	  
regimes	  which	   carried	   the	   policy	   of	   universal	   coverage	   in	   Cuba	   and	   Rwanda	   but	   is	   dependent	   on	  
having	   a	   government	   which	   is	   receptive	   to	   civil	   society	   participation.	   	   This	   suggests	   that	   public	  
policies	  require	  sustained	  support	  from	  stakeholders,	  whether	  state	  or	  civil	  society,	  who	  are	  able	  to	  
affect	  change	  and	  manage	  policy	  and	  system	  development	  in	  the	  face	  of	  several	  challenges.	  
	  
Such	  challenges,	  where	  there	  is	  already	  political	  buy-­‐in	  and	  support,	  come	  mainly	  from	  the	  economic	  
context	   –	   particularly	   having	   the	   financial	   revenue	   to	   sustain	   universal	   health	   care	   provision	   and	  
having	  an	  adequate	  health	  workforce.	  	  
	  
Both	   management	   of	   scarce	   human	   resources	   for	   health	   and	   development	   of	   innovative	   health	  
financing	  mechanisms	  have	  been	  discussed	  in	  the	  health	  systems	  literature	  but	  as	  yet,	  few	  concrete	  
solutions	  have	  been	  presented.	  Consideration	  needs	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  economic	  context,	  financial	  
and	  human	  resource	  capacity	  in	  any	  country	  contemplating	  implementation	  of	  universal	  coverage	  or	  
any	  other	  reform.	  These	  factors	  cannot	  only	  be	  considered	  when	  implementing	  a	  policy	  but	  need	  to	  
be	  considered	  far	  earlier	  when	  reforms	  are	  first	  presented	  as	  development	  tools.	  For	  example,	  the	  
feasibility	  of	  long-­‐term	  maintenance	  of	  a	  universal	  coverage	  health	  system	  should	  have	  included	  an	  
economic	  context	  evaluation	  before	  being	  introduced	  in	  Rwanda.	  	  
	  
In	   Rwanda,	  where	   there	   is	   an	   obvious	   lack	   of	   domestic	   revenue,	   the	  universal	   health	   scheme	  has	  
been	   sustained	   by	   the	   continued	   funding	   from	   the	   international	   donor	   community.	   However,	   in	  
times	   of	   financial	   crises	   –	   such	   as	   now	   –	   developing	   countries	   should	   not	   expect	   to	   rely	   on	  













Even	   in	   Thailand,	   which	   is	   relatively	   far	   more	   developed	   than	   Rwanda,	   the	   universal	   health	   care	  
scheme	   is	   proving	   a	   drain	   on	   public	   resources.	   Maintenance	   of	   the	   system	   is	   contingent	   upon	  
continued	  economic	  growth	  and	  higher	  salaries	  to	  bolster	  the	  tax	  base	  and	  create	  improved	  cross-­‐
subsidies	   from	  wealthy	   to	   the	  poor.	  However,	   the	  pattern	   in	  Thailand	   seems	   to	  be	   that	  economic	  
growth	   and	   the	   expansion	   of	   the	   private	   sector	   draws	   human	   resources	   out	   of	   the	   public	   sector	  
which	  administers	  the	  universal	  coverage	  initiative.	  Somehow,	  incentives	  will	  have	  to	  be	  created	  to	  
retain	  health	  workers	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  without	  these	  incentives	  creating	  a	  further	  drain	  on	  state	  
resources.	  
	  
In	  Cuba,	  health	  system	  financing	  has	  been	  sustained	  by	  a	  state-­‐controlled	  economy	  which,	  through	  
control	   over	   health	   worker	   salaries,	   has	   managed	   to	   limit	   costs.	   But,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   increasing	  
globalisation	  and	  marketisation	  of	  the	  Cuban	  economy,	   it	  will	  be	  remarkable	   if	  these	  factors	  fail	  to	  
influence	  the	  available	  human	  resources	  for	  health	  and	  their	  interest	  in	  joining	  a	  profession	  which	  is	  
not	   providing	   the	   financial	   returns	   found	   in	   other	   sectors.	   Reversing	   this	   trend	   will	   require	   ever	  
increasing	   funding	   injections	   into	  wages	   and	   salaries	  which	  may	   prove	   unsustainable	   in	   a	   country	  
with	  already	  stretched	  public	  resources.	  
	  
Health	  systems	  frameworks	  which	  exclude	  consideration	  of	  economic	  context,	  risk	  presenting	  a	  very	  
naive	   picture	   of	   the	   determinants	   of	   successful	   health	   system	   functioning.	   The	   introduction	   of	  
mechanisms	  to	  collect	  health	  insurance	  contributions,	  to	  pool	  risk,	  to	  pay	  providers	  efficiently,	  and	  
to	  provide	  necessary	  services	  all	  become	  redundant	  if	  there	  is	  not	  enough	  money	  to	  finance	  it.	  	  
	  
The	   economic	   context	   influences	   policy	   feasibility	   and	   long-­‐run	   sustainability.	   In	   all	   three	   case	  
studies	   economic	   factors	   threaten	   long-­‐run	   sustainability.	   Without	   consideration	   of	   how	   these	  












coverage	   –	   risk	   becoming	   temporary	   attempts	   at	   creating	   equitable	   and	   accessible	   health	   access,	  
instead	  of	  having	  the	  longevity	  to	  affect	  real	  change.	  
	  
The	   political	   context	   affects	   the	   uptake	   of	   policies	   as	   well	   as	   their	   maintenance	   and	   appropriate	  
management.	  The	  countries	  in	  these	  case	  studies	  depended	  on	  strong	  and	  sustained	  political	  will	  –	  
from	  the	  state	  itself	  and	  sometimes	  also	  from	  civil	  society	  –	  to	  create	  the	  opportunity	  for	  reform,	  as	  



















This	   paper	   set	   out	   to	   assess	  whether	   health	   systems	   frameworks	   capture	   all	   the	   determinants	   of	  
how	  health	  systems	  function.	  Through	  a	  review	  of	  the	  conceptual	   literature	  and	  the	  exploration	  of	  
the	  experiences	  of	  three	  countries	  which	  have	  implemented	  universal	  health	  coverage	  policies,	  this	  
paper	   has	   established	   that	   consideration	   of	   the	   contextual	   factors	   –	   the	   political	   and	   economic	  
factors	  that	  frame	  the	  health	  sector	  –	  is	  vital	  to	  adequately	  assess	  health	  systems	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  
pursue	  reform	  initiative	  such	  as	  universal	  coverage.	  	  
	  
Health	   systems	  are	   influenced	   significantly	  by	   their	   context.	  Health	   systems	   frameworks	  which	  do	  
extend	  beyond	  description	  of	  the	  health	  system’s	  articulating	  mechanisms	  –	  such	  as	  how	  financing	  is	  
collected;	  from	  whom;	  how	  it	   is	  pooled	  and	  how	  providers	  are	  reimbursed;	  and	  which	  services	  are	  
provided	  –	  neglect	  the	  critical	  influence	  of	  contextual	  factors	  which	  shape	  the	  health	  system.	  	  	  
	  
This	  paper	  was	  not	  an	  attempt	   to	  generate	  an	  alternative	  health	  systems’	   framework.	   Its	  aim	  was	  
rather	   to	   critically	   assess	   whether	   the	   current	   frameworks	   adequately	   describe	   the	   full	   range	   of	  
characteristics	   of	   a	   health	   system	   relevant	   to	   the	   implementation	   and	   maintenance	   of	   a	   health	  
reform	  policy	  –	   in	   this	  case,	  universal	  health	  coverage.	  What	   it	  has	  shown	   is	   that	   the	  context	   is	  as	  
important	  as	  the	  elements	  of	  the	  health	  system	  itself	  –	  as	  a	  descriptive	  tool,	  and	  potentially	  more	  so	  
as	  predictor	  of	  successful	  health	  reform	  systems.	  
	  
Current	   health	   systems’	   frameworks	   miss	   opportunities	   by	   not	   capturing	   all	   the	   factors	   which	  
influence	   the	   functioning	   of	   health	   systems.	   In	   consideration	   of	   the	   important	   influence	   of	   such	  
contextual	   factors	   a	   systems’	   thinking	   approach	   will	   provide	   a	   more	   realistic	   assessment	   of	   the	  













When	   utilising	   health	   systems’	   frameworks	   to	   assess	   development	   tools	   for	   improving	   health	  
outcomes,	  such	  as	  universal	  health	  coverage,	  it	   is	  critical	  that	  such	  assessment	  takes	  cognisance	  of	  
the	  broader	  political	  and	  economic	  environment.	  In	  this	  manner,	  implementation	  of	  health	  reforms	  
to	   improve	  access	  to	  health	  for	  all	  becomes	  not	   just	  rhetoric	  but	  an	  achievable	  goal	   informed	  by	  a	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